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The objective of this thesis is to provide an empirical contribution to tax haven 
literature and improve the understanding of firm behaviour relating to tax haven 
utilization. The thesis sets out to explore 1) the understudied relationship 
between corporate governance and tax haven utilization and 2) the hitherto 
unexplained relationship between subsidiary locations of a Multinational 
Enterprise and tax haven utilization. 
 
This work reviews corporate governance and tax avoidance literature and 
synthesizes a theoretical bridge to explain tax haven utilization as a function of 
corporate governance. Two key variables are identified, ownership concentration 
and women members of the Board of Directors. Empirical results show negative 
effect of both measures on the likelihood of a firm to own tax haven subsidiaries, 
confirming the author’s predictions. 
 
Secondly, the thesis provides rationale for investigating subsidiary locations and 
tax haven utilization. The empirical results point to a strong relationship between 
the two, with evidence suggesting a role of unrecorded capital flight in the 
relationship. In the larger picture, the findings could point to wealth extraction by 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Corporate tax avoidance has been high on the political agenda in developed countries in recent 
years. The debate stems from a deeper public sentiment that the rich do not “pay their fair share” 
as US Senator Bernie Sanders put to great effect during the 2016 primaries. This has been on the 
back of much media coverage on multinational enterprises (MNEs), such as Apple’s large 
offshore reserves, $215 billion by 2016, and Google’s trouble with tax authorities in the UK. At 
the centre of the heated discussions are tax havens, secretive jurisdictions with low or zero 
corporate tax rates, that have been blamed as a primary tool for corporate tax avoidance and an 
important actor behind the Global Financial Crises (Palan, Murphy & Chavagneux, 2010). Calls 
for the abolishment of tax havens in lieu of their role in tax avoidance have been raised at the 
United Nations by both independent experts (United Nations, 2016) & recently by heads of state 
(United Nations, 2019).  
Tax havens serve as financial hubs which handle enormous amounts of capital and trade, 
even if no significant productive industrial activity is recorded there. This has made them nerve 
centres of the global trade networks and a permanent fixture in international business. An 
increasing number of MNEs own tax haven subsidiaries or, in some cases, are owned by parent 
companies based and registered in a tax haven, with Zucman (2014) estimating the use of tax 
havens to have grown tenfold since 1980 and UNCTAD (2013) stating that investments in 




The relationship between MNEs and their use of tax havens has been an important part of 
corporate strategy for more than half a century, yet the management and strategy literature has 
only recently attempted to explain this intriguing and topical phenomenon. The complexity and 
nature of profit shifting via tax havens therefore demands further quantitative, qualitative as well 
theoretical understanding at many levels, be it at the individual (micro), firm (meso) and country 
(macro) level (Christensen 2011; Beugelsdijk, Hennart, Slangen and Smeets 2010; Eden 2001; 
Jones and Temouri 2016; 2018).  
 
Looking at the popular context of the last decade, one of the main factors that resulted in 
the Global Financial Crises (GFC) of 2008, is thought to be the pervasiveness of extreme risk-
taking behaviour of the US banking sector which adversely affected many other countries (Rose 
and Spiegel, 2010). An examination of the US banking sector has revealed inefficient corporate 
governance and control mechanisms as well as a lax institutional and regulatory environment 
(Vazquez and Federico, 2015). Following the repercussions that the GFC has had on the real 
economy in many countries, there has been a substantial backlash on the corporate world. For 
example, MNEs are characterised as undermining economic development and are seen as a set of 
institutions, which do not pay back their fair share to the societies and communities in which 
they operate. The new wave of popular sentiment centres on the idea of crony capitalism. 
Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the US and the UK. For example, in the US - 
traditionally a bastion of capitalistic ideology - the Occupy Wall Street movement of 2011 to the 
Bernie Sanders presidential election campaign in 2016 can be classified as manifestations of an 




So what exactly are the complaints against MNEs that have galvanized and sustained 
such movements over the ten years since the GFC? One of the key issues that has created such 
hostility is avoidance and the role of tax havens. Indeed, regular news about the minimal tax 
filings of large MNEs keep the public opposed and worried on the state of public finances. For 
example, news of Amazon having paid £62 million in corporation tax over a 20-year period after 
generating £7 billion in revenue over the same period are a point in case (Sweney, 2017). 
Amazon of course achieved this through corporate structuring that allows it to hold its 
intellectual property (IP) in its European headquarters in Luxembourg (i.e. a tax haven) and 
classifies its UK branch of the company as a subsidiary for providing services. Such utilization 
of tax havens is followed by other MNEs across the globe, which allows them to take a very 
aggressive tax avoidance approach in order to increase shareholder value (see recent call for 
papers on this topic by Temouri et al. (2018) and Pereira et al., (2018)). 
However, it is not only the public that is wary of these arrangements, it is also the public 
authorities. The GFC has left many governments across the industrialized world short on revenue 
and, coupled with the anti-corporate tax avoidance sentiment among the public, has incentivised 
them to take measures aimed at penalizing MNEs. Amazon, Apple, Google and others have 
faced fines by governing authorities, as large as 13 billion euros (Farrell and McDonald, 2016) 
over their use of tax havens to minimize corporate tax.  
Despite the fact that the issue of offshore tax haven activity has been on the policy 
agenda for multiple decades and previous government initiatives have been limited in their 
impact, corporate tax avoidance has become a more prominent topic in recent years and has led 




Profit shifting initiative of 2013 agreed by the G8 included new measures to deal with tax 
avoidance by allowing access to each other's information held on individual and company tax 
affairs. The BEPS Report (OECD, 2015), which is endorsed by the OECD council, committing 
countries to a comprehensive action plan to address these issues. The Action Plan identified 15 
actions along three key pillars: introducing coherence in the domestic rules that affect cross-
border activities, reinforcing substance requirements in the existing international standards, and 
improving transparency as well as certainty. The objective of these policies is to create a system 
of global tax reform designed to have a significant impact upon MNE strategy in terms of 
taxation. At the same time that the EU is looking to implement a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base (European Union, 2016) in order to mitigate profit shifting.  
However, many leading commentators would agree that BEPS has largely failed in its 
objectives (Graetz, 2016). Indeed, the international corporate tax policy landscape is full of 
contradictions and represents a one step forward, two steps back approach. For example, even as 
the OECD and European Union take actions to tighten up the corporate taxation systems, the US 
has just enacted legislation that significantly liberalises its corporate tax regime (Kaplan and 
Rappeport, 2017). The tax holiday thus awarded has indeed increased repatriation of capital to 
the US (UNCTAD, 2019), but this comes at the expense of validating the use of tax havens to 
withhold taxes until such an opportunity does arrive.  
Given this policy background and media attention, the academic literature is multi-
disciplinary in nature and explores in the role of tax havens in the world economy. For example, 
the accounting and finance literature focusses on estimating the overall degree of profit shifting 




whereas the economic geography and public economics literature focusses on location factors 
and firm determinants driving tax avoidance (e.g., Clausing, 2003; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; 
Goh et al., 2016; Graham and Tucker, 2006; Higgins, Omer, and Phillips, 2015 Huizinga and 
Laeven, 2006; Jaafar and Thornton, 2015; Klassen, Lisowsky, and Mescall, 2017; Lisowsky, 
2010; Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt 2013; Rego, 2003).   
Based on the above discussion and context of the GFC, the overarching objective of the 
2nd chapter of this thesis is to review the literature that examines tax avoidance in conjunction 
with tax havens, the determinants and characteristics of tax havens, the methods availed by 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) to utilize tax havens and the role that corporate governance 
arrangements can play driving or hindering to tax haven activity.  
The 3rd chapter of this thesis aims to investigate the theoretical underpinnings of 
corporate governance literature and how scholars have investigated tax avoidance in general with 
corporate governance implications. The chapter tries to synthesize corporate governance and tax 
avoidance literature to form a bridge that would forge a relationship between tax havens & 
corporate governance. Lastly, this chapter provides an empirical study on the relationship 
between corporate governance & tax haven utilization by MNEs. After defining, in broad terms, 
two theoretical lenses for analysis of corporate governance, the study focuses on an empirical 
investigation of the role of ownership concentration & female members in the Board of Directors 
(BOD) in a firm’s likelihood of owning a tax haven subsidiary. 
The 4th chapter studies the use of tax havens by MNEs and its interaction with their 
geographical or political areas of operation. Based on the internationalisation theories this 




hypothesis developed and tested empirically through a longitudinal study of thousands of MNEs 
across 24 developed world countries.  
This work is especially relevant in times when MNEs face unprecedented levels of 
scrutiny. The thesis contributes to literature by providing a resource to understand what tax 
havens are, where they fit in the international business framework, how to identify tax havens, 
what are the methods MNEs use to take advantage of tax havens and what existing literature says 
about the determinants of tax haven usage. The thesis also provides an examination of corporate 
governance theories and how scholars have linked governance mechanisms to both tax avoidance 
and tax havens and contributes further by identifying a relationship between one aspect of 
corporate governance with tax haven utilization, opening the door for further exploration. Lastly 
an empirical and theoretical contribution is made with the identification of subsidiary locations 
as a key factor in determining MNE decision to invest in tax havens and the moderation effect of 












Chapter 2: Tax & tax havens 
 
This chapter contributes to the thesis by identifying and mapping how the extant academic and 
policy literature has hitherto investigated tax competition, tax evasion & tax avoidance, the 
magnitude of tax haven activity over time, channels and mechanisms via which individual MNEs 
are able to use tax havens and the main determinants that seem to drive MNEs to tax havens. 
This chapter sets the stage for the thesis, providing the definitions, classifications and 
understanding of the world of international tax avoidance and tax havens that are then built on in 
the next two chapters and empirical studies.  
 The first half of the chapter outlines the various concepts involved in tax haven activity 
and starts with an overview of corporate taxation issues, including the notions of tax competition, 
the difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion, transfer pricing, international debt shifting 
and corporate inversions. Section 2 describes the subtle differences in how tax havens are 
defined and section 3 outlines the existing literature on the determinants and impact of tax haven 
activity. This background information is important in order to make a coherent link with how 
corporate governance arrangements can help explain tax haven activity. 
 
 





It is widely believed that tax rates and reforms/harmonization in developed countries have 
important repercussions on company behaviour and particularly on MNE location choice 
(European Commission, 2001; OECD brief 2008). A vast literature, since the 1980s, tends to 
support this belief by offering many estimates of a significant effect of taxes on FDI flows. 
Generally, in measuring how FDI responds to changes in taxes, the literature makes a distinction 
between which tax rates to consider or which are considered by foreign investors. For example, 
Devereux and Griffith (1998) using a conditional logit model show that the effective average tax 
rate (EATR) – as opposed to the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) – plays a significant 
deterring role in the location decision of US MNEs in the period 1980-1994 that locate in 
Europe, including the UK, Germany and France.  
In particular, Devereux and Griffith (1998) show that the sensitivity of the UK to average 
tax increases is higher than Germany and France. The marginal effect of increasing the UK 
EATR by 1 percentage point will reduce the conditional probability of a firm locating in the UK 
by 1.29 percentage points. Similarly, for France a 1 percentage point increase in the EATR 
reduces the conditional probability of a firm locating there by 0.50 percentage points, whereas 
the for Germany the impact is 0.97 percentage points. The mean elasticities of the probability of 
choosing each location with respect to the EATR are reported as -0.4 for the UK and -1.7 for 
France and Germany.  
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) also show evidence that tax differentials play a significant 
role in understanding foreign location decisions. Based on a panel of bilateral FDI flows for 11 
OECD countries over the period 1984–2000, they report negative and significant coefficients on 




country. They measure the semi-elasticity of the statutory tax differential to be −4.22, which 
means that a 1-point rise in the host corporate statutory rate relative to the investor country rate 
reduces FDI inflows by 4.22%.  
Overall, many studies differ in the tax rates considered and country and method used, 
which partly explains the range of outcomes. However, according Mooij and Ederveen’s (2003) 
meta-analysis on 25 empirical studies, the median value of elasticity of FDI to tax rates is around 
-3.3 which means that a 1 per cent reduction in the host country tax rate raises FDI in that 
country by 3.3 per cent. The range of semi-elasticities starts from −10.9 per cent (Hines, 1996) to 
+1.3 per cent (Swenson, 1994), which mostly depends on the estimation method (Desai and 
Hines, 2001). However, the vast majority of the reported elasticities are negative. Other 
extensive reviews of the literature include Hines (1997, 1999) and Gordon and Hines (2002) who 
suggests an estimate on the basis of the literature between −0.5 and −0.6 (i.e. a 1% higher tax 
rate leads to a reduction in FDI inflows of 0.5 to 0.6 per cent). Another literature review by 
Gorter and De Mooij (2001) suggests that intra-European investment flows tend to be more 
responsive to tax rate differentials than intercontinental flows. 
 Taken together, the literature as well as the trend of corporate tax rates has shown 
significant competition across countries to attract foreign investment as well as remain 
competitive for indigenous domestic investments (Zodrow, 2003; Devereux et al, 2008; 
Devereux and Loretz, 2013a). However, Jones and Temouri (2016) show that this “race to the 
bottom” type competition on statutory corporate tax rates has done little to reduce tax haven 
activity. They show that despite observing a significant reduction in the top statutory tax rates 




investments, the stylised facts suggest that the use of tax havens is becoming increasingly more 
frequent even as countries become more competitive over their corporate tax rates (OECD, 
2013). This indicates that the impact of home country corporate tax rates seems small; implying 
that MNEs are likely to use tax havens regardless of the home country statutory rate and take 
significant advantage of the strong host country-specific advantages that tax havens can provide. 
The specific advantage being a sizeable reduction in their tax liability. The pursuit of lower and 
lower tax liability, and in turn higher profits, by MNEs has placed their tax planning strategies 
under scrutiny by not just tax authorities, but increasingly by the general public. The question 
often asked is of morality, even legality of MNEs tax minimization activities, particularly with 
regards to the use of tax havens.  
 
2.2 Tax avoidance versus tax evasion 
Since the objective of any MNE is to increase profits, corporate taxes appear as a cost, which 
MNEs naturally try to minimize. The minimization of taxes that are set on profits has been the 
focus of a large section of literature. Tax minimisation strategies are also sometimes termed tax 
avoidance; tax sheltering; tax planning; tax evasion and even tax fraud. With this plurality of 
nomenclature comes a plurality of definitions. Tax avoidance, as viewed by Dyreng, Hanlon and 
Maydew (2008) is simply anything that reduces a firm’s effective tax rate, in compliance with 
the law or at least within the realm of grey-area interpretations of it. The definition is an 
empirical one, aimed at measuring tax avoidance in empirical studies through estimations 
surrounding effective tax rates. Fisher (2014) states that tax avoidance practices seek to 




interpretation of a country’s law,” payment of a tax on “profits declared in a country other than 
where they were really earned,” or tax payment that occurs “somewhat later than the profits were 
earned.” In practical terms, this translates to taking advantage of tax loopholes, credits, shifting 
of profits to a different jurisdiction to avoid taxes and deferral, sometimes indefinite, of taxes 
owed in country of residence.  
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) offer a conceptual understanding, terming tax avoidance as 
any activity that reduces the explicit taxes of a firm. This understanding covers activities that are 
directly motivated by tax gains as well as those that produces tax benefits as a by-product. They 
acknowledge that this covers the spectrum of activities from perfectly legal to what others have 
described as tax aggressive, non-compliance and even evasion, but chose not to make a 
distinction.  
Eden and Smith (2011) provide for a distinction between some of the terms discussed. 
They assign the use ‘tax avoidance’ and ‘tax minimization’ for methods of tax cost reduction that 
are in conformity of the legal requirements of the jurisdiction(s) in question. ‘Tax evasion’ for 
tax cost reduction measures that may or may not be legal and ‘tax fraud’ for methods that are 
illegal with clear intent (such as falsifying records). There exists however no conformity in the 
use of these terms in literature. For example, Payne and Raiborn (2018) define the term ‘tax 
avoidance’ as retention of wealth by legal means and ‘tax evasion’ as a failure to pay legally due 
taxes, an activity they classify clearly as illegal. Furthermore, the term ‘aggressive tax 
avoidance’ is introduced as a bad faith interpretation of the law that takes advantage of legal 




Perhaps the most simplistic distinction is offered by Abney and Monnin (2018), who 
refer to the US Supreme Court judgement stating,  
“[t]he legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his 
taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.”  
 
They contend thus that tax avoidance is any measure aimed at reduction of taxes that the 
law permits and tax evasion is criminal activity and requires the government(s) to prove that a 
taxpayer violated a known legal duty intentionally. This has the benefit of settling the grey-area 
or bad faith interpretations of the law issue, removing them from the realm of evasion into that of 
avoidance.  
However, this work is aimed at tax accounting professionals and helps clarify how they 
view the issue of tax. Most of these professionals are in the tax planning industry (Eden and 
Smith 2011). The primary function of such professionals is helping firms to increase profits by 
minimizing tax costs (Sikka, 2008; Sikka and Hampton, 2005; Sikka and Wilmott, 1995). Sikka 
and Hampton (2005), for example, have argued that the Big Four accounting firms no longer 
focus on auditing and are in fact now more focused towards tax planning and the selling of tax 
avoidance products to MNEs and individuals. In fact, this assertion is supported by the work of 
Jones, Temouri and Cobham (2018) who find that MNEs that are clients of the Big Four 
accountancy firms are likely to build and maintain a larger network of tax haven subsidiaries 
than MNEs who are not.  
The importance of the use of tax haven subsidiaries for both tax avoidance and tax 
evasion cannot be understated. Fisher (2014) notes that, “Several of the methods that modern 




a common way to evade taxes. Tax havens are naturally a common site for tax avoidance 




2.3 Transfer Pricing & the Arm’s Length Standard. 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), a transfer 
price is “a price, adopted for book-keeping purposes, which is used to value transactions between 
affiliated enterprises integrated under the same management at artificially high or low levels in 
order to effect an unspecified income payment or capital transfer between those enterprises.” 
(OECD 2010). Tax havens are not always directly involved in transfer pricing and the Arm’s 
Length Standard (ALS) is a guideline for conducting “legitimate” transfer pricing. However, the 
system is open to manipulation.  
Scholars define transfer pricing as the setting of prices for transactions between or among 
firms that are commonly controlled or related parties; in other words, the pricing of related-party 
transactions (also known as non–arm’s length or controlled transactions) (Byrnes and Cole, 
2018; Eden, 1998, 2016). For firms operating across international boundaries, transfer pricing 
presents a key operational imperative and an opportunity to maximize profits. This is because 
different jurisdictions have different tax rates, laws and loopholes, presenting a natural incentive 
for MNEs to structure their transactions in such a way that the highest tax liability is manifested 
in low or lowest tax rate jurisdictions. Transfer pricing thus represents an instrument that is used 




the tax risks and profits, resulting in a reduction of the overall corporate tax liability, (Buus , 
2009; Swenson, 2001; Solilova & Nerudova , 2012, 2013). 
In 1933 the arm’s length principle was created to guard against manipulating transfer prices (to 
prevent manipulation of tax owed on business) and has since become the key pillar of the 
transfer pricing rules. Modern day bilateral tax treaties between countries as well as guidelines 
by international bodies on how to split tax revenues generated from cross border economic or 
business activity use the Arm’s length principle as the basis (Byrnes and Cole, 2018; Eden, 1998, 
2009). In theory the principle is simple. It requires enterprises within the same group to set 
transfer prices for intra group transactions in accordance with, or similar to, the prices that would 
be set if the transaction was taking place between two un-associated parties.  
The idea behind this arrangement is to prevent distortion of profits, that would be the basis for 
taxation, during intra-group transactions. Businesses would naturally be inclined to distort the 
profits in a manner that would minimize their tax liability. To prevent the distortion, an added 
step in the Arm’s length principle is to not only maintain the price but maintain conditions for 
intra group transactions that would also be comparable to conditions that would be present in a 
comparable “uncontrolled” transaction (between un-associated parties). 
The authoritative statement of the arm’s length principle can be found in Article 9(1) of the 
OECD Model Convention on Income and Capital known as primary adjustment: 
“When conditions are made or imposed between two enterprises in their commercial or financial 
relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then 
any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by 
reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise 





Thus, in theory, authorities can tax MNEs in their own jurisdictions on a base that they 
deem fair, as opposed to a base produced by accounting manipulations by MNEs.  Since the mid-
1960s, most countries have followed the OECD Model Income Tax Convention and adopted the 
separate accounting approach, treating MNE foreign subsidiaries as independent entities whose 
income is taxable in the host country up to the “water’s edge”. In 1979, the OECD began to issue 
guidelines to tax authorities and MNEs on how to set transfer pricing rules to implement Article 
9. The Transfer Pricing Guidelines (TPG) was first issued in 1995 and has been updated several 
times.  
 This OECD initiative (TPG) has now been adopted in more than 60 countries as the 
foundation for their transfer pricing regulations. Although that has been a forward step in 
harmonising international tax & transfer pricing regimes, significant differences across countries 
- both in the specific rules and in their application - still remain (Byrnes and Cole, 2018; Eden, 
2009, 2016). These are widespread even within the EU; two Member States (Cyprus and Malta) 
still don’t have transfer pricing regulations, & the sophistication of transfer pricing regulations 
among states that do have them varies significantly. The United Nations has built on early and 
important work by OECD, the key international organization at the heart of the international tax 
transfer pricing regime, with measures & guidelines designed particularly for tax authorities in 
developing countries. The UN Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries includes a similar article (Art. 9) to the key OECD Model Convention 
article on “associated enterprises” with the same arm’s length test. The first set of transfer 
pricing guidelines for developing country tax authorities was published by the UN in 2013 and a 




Model Tax Conventions, which provide the foundation for nearly all bilateral tax treaties around 
the globe, endorse the Arm’s Length Standard (ALS).  
 Operationalizing the arm’s length principle is a complicated & sometimes elusive 
endeavour. In both sets of guidelines, implementation of the ALS requires the completion of a 
comparability analysis, between associated party transactions and non-associated party 
transactions, that involves four steps. First, the different branches/subsidiaries/parts of an MNE 
are treated as if they were separate entities and intra-group transactions singled out. Then an 
assessment takes place of the conditions in such transactions that differ from conditions that 
would be present in a comparable transaction in the market place. Then a judgement is made on 
whether the accounts, that have arisen or changed because of said intra-group transaction, of the 
MNE in different jurisdictions need to be corrected to represent fair tax liabilities, in accordance 
with the Model Tax Convention Art 9. Lastly profit and tax is calculated for the hypothetical 
scenario that the transaction was to take place in the market for un-associated MNEs. These steps 
in practice are difficult to accurately implement, especially with differentiated products, brands, 
patents etc which might not have an accurate comparable example in the open market. In fact, 
some scholars have argued that the arm’s length standard might not reflect economic realities of 
the modern world (Taylor et al. 2015; Bartelsman & Beetsma,2000; Wells and Lowell, 2014; 
Hines and Rice,1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2006). 
 
With national jurisdictions trying to tax international corporations, in an environment 
where the OECD & UN Model Tax Conventions are not applied equally, nor are they without 




aggressive tax planning. The OECD itself estimates that 4-10% of global income tax revenues 
are lost, coming to $100-$240 billion. In the EU, the estimation of loss of corporate income tax is 
in the EUR 50-70 billion range. In 2013 the OECD & G20 launched the Base Erosion & Profit 
Shifting project to combat tax evasion & shutdown opportunities for profit shifting that arise 
because of an inconsistent and unenforceable international tax regime.  
  The use of transfer pricing via tax havens is perhaps one of the best examples of this 
arbitrage opportunity. Tax havens allow MNEs to shift profits out of high tax locations into low 
tax locations (Eden, 2009). They are associated with extremely low (often zero) rates of tax on 
corporate profits for non-resident companies and offer a high degree of secrecy in terms of 
information exchange that could be used by revenue authorities to raise tax both at home and in 
foreign locations. The arm’s length principle is hard to apply when dealing with intellectual 
property. Intangible assets like patents, trademarks, copyrights etc. increasingly hold huge value 
for the global firm. That value is set in house, and, as explained above, since business set the 
value themselves, governments are hard pressed to find comparable transactions between 
unrelated parties, leaving room for tax-induced manipulation of transfer prices (Grubert, 2003; 
Desai et al, 2006).  
 Transfer pricing thus forms the basis on the international tax avoidance system, and tax 
havens provide the tools to exploit it to an extreme level. Beer, de Mooij and Liu (2018) identify 
transfer pricing as a main channel of international tax avoidance, but also name a few others; 
strategic IP location, international debt shifting, tax treaty shopping, tax deferrals and corporate 
inversions or HQ locations. Following is a brief look some of these methods utilized for 




2.3.1 Intangible asset location:  
One way firms’ take advantage of the inefficiency of the international tax regime and 
increasingly global nature of business is by moving their intangible assets to tax havens, or low 
tax jurisdictions. Dischinger and Riedel (2008) find that a lower a subsidiaries corporate tax rate, 
the higher the is its level of intangible asset investment. Once moved to a tax haven, intangible 
property can be sub-licensed to different subsidiaries within the corporate group, generating 
royalty payments to the tax haven subsidiary. This is a very effective way of shifting profits out 
of high tax zones.  
MNEs can create intellectual property (IP) by conduct their research and development 
(R&D) activities in one country but transfer the ownership of the IP to a different country. Often 
the country where the MNE transfers ownership of IP is one with very low tax rates, resulting in 
royalty payments and license fees going into a jurisdiction that provides huge tax savings for the 
MNE. As there often exists no comparable transactions of IPs between unrelated parties, 
applying the arm’s length price for an MNE’s intangible transactions is usually an unfeasible 
task for tax authorities. This leaves room for tax-induced manipulation that MNEs employ to 
minimize tax liability and increase their post-tax profits. (see e.g. Grubert, 2003; Desai et al, 
2006). 
 
2.3.2 International Debt Shifting 
International debt shifting refers to the practice of intercompany loans across international 
boundaries. Subsidiaries of the same group, or even a subsidiary and a parent company, can 




tax jurisdiction with loans from a subsidiary, or parent, in a tax haven. There is evidence of large 
firms setting up low-tax (tax haven) affiliates for internal debt shifting purposes (Weyzig 2014). 
Weyzig (2014) particularly highlights the role of Dutch “special purpose entities) for internal 
debt shifting as well as in avoiding withholding taxes when moving funds. This method allows 
for paying off profits generated in high tax jurisdictions as interest or loan repayment to 
subsidiaries in tax havens, before tax. Thus minimizing the MNEs tax bill without exposing it to 
risk.  
 
2.3.3 Corporate Inversions 
Corporate inversion refers to the practice of MNEs reincorporating in a tax haven country in 
order to reduce their tax liability. In a typical inversion, of say a U.S. firm, the MNE merges with 
a foreign company. The entity that ultimately emerges from this transaction is invariably 
incorporated in a tax haven, or a “low tax jurisdiction”, yet remains operative in the home 
country, in this case the U.S. (Fischer and Marsh; 2018).  
An examination of corporate inversions by Desai and Hines (2002) between 1982 and 
2002 emphasised the tax planning element in motivation, showing that the foreign firm that 
eventually became parent on average faced lower tax rates. A similar argument is put forward by  
Seida and Wempe (2004) after examining ETRs faced by 12 MNEs that underwent inversions. 
Huizinga and Voget (2009) also look at international M&As and find that the resulting pattern of 
subsidiary ownership is a product of efficient tax planning by MNEs as the location of the new 




Until 2004, US firms simply had to change their domicile to achieve an inversion. This 
was stopped with the enactment of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (Qi Dong and Xin 
Zhao, 2018), which denied the tax benefits of an inversion if the original U.S. stockholders 
owned 80% or more of the new firm. (White, 2014). Inversions have become harder since then, 
with larger population centre tax havens like Ireland typically the targeted jurisdiction instead of 
the “dot” tax havens like the Cayman Islands, but they are still an issue.  
 
2.4 Classifying tax havens 
Tax competition among sovereign states & the “race to the bottom”, distinctions between tax 
avoidance & tax evasion, as well as strategies that MNEs utilize to avoid taxes, and the role of 
tax havens in each of these phenomena have been outlined so far. This paper will now focus on 
this key cog in the international tax (avoidance) system; tax havens.  
The first question that arises regarding tax havens is one of definition, what exactly 
constitutes a tax haven. Given the unwelcome scrutiny and criticism of tax avoidance and by 
extension tax havens, jurisdictions labelled as tax havens tend to contest the assertion. The 
contestations and arbitrary nature of the definition has not gone unnoticed by academics, with 
earlier work by scholars noting that tax havens lack a clear definition and its application is often 
controversial (Sharman, 2006).  
The literature has tackled the issue since, with Larudree (2009) defining tax havens as 
jurisdictions that provide two facilities “(1) zero or near-zero taxes on business activities; and (2) 
secrecy regarding financial assets”. Secrecy laws prevent individuals privy to information about 




from revealing said information about bank accounts, about financial assets and transactions. 
Typically, this includes the name and origin of the beneficial owner of said investments. 
The book “Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works” (Palan, Murphy, and 
Chavagneux 2010), also endeavours to provide a clear criterion. With a full chapter devoted to 
discussing salient features of tax havens, a detailed summary of which will be beyond the scope 
of this paper, certain defining characteristics of tax havens are singled out. These include ease of 
incorporation, the provision of secrecy and, most importantly, zero or nominal tax rates. 
In the nation state era sovereign states strive to control all laws and regulations within 
their borders. In an increasingly interconnected world, this becomes more of a challenge as well 
as more desirable. Tax havens are jurisdictions that look to profit from their ability to set the 
laws of international business within their borders. Admittedly, in this endeavour they are not 
alone. Preferential Tax Regimes (PTRs), light touch regulation and one-window operations are 
tools that both the developed world, and especially developing world, have utilized in order to 
increase their attractiveness to foreign capital. Only with tax havens, these arrangements are 
taken to the extreme.  
Traditionally, most PTRs are targeted towards the manufacturing and services sectors, or 
assembly lines. The idea behind them is increased employment and spill over benefits for the 
host jurisdiction. Tax havens however target the financial sector, where the idea is to capture 
mobile capital, which in an ever more interconnected world market, is a valuable and abundant 
commodity. With business taking place across jurisdictions, tax havens provide the ease of doing 
business and nominal tax rates that make them the most attractive location for capital. In other 




minimize taxation, which is a cost. Thus Palan (2003) terms tax havens as “virtual” centres, 
where trade takes place only on paper.    
 
2.4.1 Dot Tax Havens 
Dharmapala and Hines (2009) investigate countries that become tax havens and find that the 
likelihood of a country becoming a tax haven increases from 26% to 61% percent as governance 
quality improves, for countries with a population of less than one million. Governance quality is 
important because firms or individuals do not want to entrust their capital to countries that are 
politically volatile or have low levels of property rights, investor or capital protections, as well as 
weak institutional structures. In fact, their evidence shows that low tax rates offer much more 
powerful inducements to foreign capital when the jurisdiction in question is well governed. Thus, 
the “dot tax havens” as distinguished by Hines and Rice (1994) and Desai et al. (2006b), which 
differentiate low population centres from the larger tax havens referred to as the “Big 7”, such as 
Switzerland, Hong Kong and Singapore.  
The distinction between the smaller, dot tax havens and the bigger population centres has 
been at the heart of some debate. The matter of size, i.e. many jurisdictions that could provide 
low tax rates, ease of incorporation and secrecy also have viable domestic economic activity and 
serve as “legitimate” centres of business. Therein arises the complication of tax havens and 
“Offshore Financial Centres” (OFCs). 
Morriss (2010) has argued that OFCs provide a valuable financial service and beneficial 
regulatory competition. They create an environment for improved asset and risk management, as 




to home country economies as well. The negative connotations that come with the tax haven 
label should not affect OFCs, is the argument, but where is the line between the two? 
The term OFCs is used most commonly to describe financial centres specializing in non-
resident financial transactions, especially those known as Euro-market transactions (Palan et al., 
2010). Many tax havens vie for this term as opposed to classification as a tax haven, and larger 
population centres have a more legitimate claim. Indeed, Palan et al. (2010) agree that the 
definition concerning countries like Switzerland, Singapore or Luxembourg is a complex 
question. They answer it by positing another question in turn, would these centres continue to 
thrive if the tax haven provisions on offer were eliminated? They suggest the answer is in the 
negative.  
2.4.2 Switzerland 
Perhaps a look at how some of these jurisdictions developed into the financial centres of trade 
they are today or how they operate would provide the answer. Zucman, Fagan and Piketty (2016) 
provide a brief history of the development of Switzerland into the financial behemoth it is today. 
Zucman et al. (2016) trace the origins of Swiss financial services industry to the era right after 
the first world war. He argues that in the wake of the war, it was the wealth of French and some 
German residents that bolstered the Swiss banks. Governments after the war raised taxes rapidly 
in order to fund the rebuilding of Europe, and wealthy residents moved their capital to 
Switzerland in order to avoid the higher taxation. To succeed in doing so, they deposited in 
Swiss banks not only cash or gold, but financial securities, in the shape of bonds and stocks. 




hide the wealth from home country tax authorities, but continued to earn income on the financial 
securities, often American, they had deposited in Swiss banks tax free.  
Indeed, Switzerland has done away with some of the secrecy provisions, such as 
numbered accounts, but Zucman et al. (2016) assert that these have been replaced by letter 
accounts, i.e. shell companies. Individuals or firms can make arrangements to hold financial 
securities inside Switzerland even today, as long as they hold them through shell companies 
incorporated in other tax havens.  
 
2.4.3. Ireland 
A more modern case that parallels Switzerland is that of Ireland. Ireland has a stated corporate 
tax rate of 12.5% and the government has contested the label of tax haven allotted to it on this 
basis. Tobin and Walsh (2013) have laid out Ireland’s case in detail. They point to OECD’s 4-
point definition of tax havens as laid out here. 
1. No or only nominal taxes (and offering, or being perceived as offering, a place for non-
residents to escape tax in their country of residence);  
2. Lack of transparency (such as the absence of beneficial ownership information and bank 
secrecy);  
3. Unwillingness to exchange information with the tax administrations of OECD member 
countries; and  
4. Absence of a requirement that activity be substantial (transactions may be "booked" in the 





With Ireland’s statutory tax rate at 12.5% and open economy, they argue that Ireland does 
not qualify. The concentration of high R&D or intangible asset holding industries in Ireland, 
often an indicator of tax havens (Desai et all, 2006; Jones and Temouri 2016) is credited to an 
agglomeration effect and strong educational system. Furthermore, they point to a number of 
regulatory, transparency measures taken by Ireland (EU Saving Directive, FACTA) to refute 
allegations of opacity or secrecy.  
Harding (2014) as well as Hickson (2012) also address the case of Ireland as a tax haven 
and have the opposite point of view. While Ireland’s tax rate of 12.5% is not as low as other tax 
havens, it is pointed out that companies can use the “double Irish” strategy to get significantly 
lower tax rates. American MNEs in particular, it is argued, make use of this strategy to use 
Ireland as a tax haven. 
A good example of this is Google. Google uses subsidiaries located in Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Bermuda in a complex structure to avoid taxes. Both Ireland and the 
Netherlands have investment friendly policies, highly developed legal and financial consultancy 
and administrative services and infrastructures to support MNEs’ special purpose entities (SPEs) 
(Altshuler and Grubert, 2006; Weyzig and Van Dijk, 2009). The “double Irish” structure works 
by shifting taxable profits from subsidiaries where profits are generated to tax havens by using 
royalty payments for intangible assets (Intellectual property). 
Google holds its intellectual property in a subsidiary called “Google Ireland Holdings” 
(GIH) which is incorporated in Ireland but is tax resident in Bermuda. GIH in turn licensed the 




sublicense the use of its IP all google subsidiaries actually operating in Europe, Middle East and 
Africa. By charging loyalty payments to its subsidiaries, Google was able to shift all its profits 
from Europe, Middle East and Africa to GIL.  
GIL is subject to the 12.5% Irish corporate tax rate, but since it owes royalty payments to 
GIH, profits can again be shifted out without taxation. The slight problem is that Irish firms have 
to pay withholding taxes for royalty payments out of the European Union, which GIH is 
considered being a tax resident in Bermuda.  
To avoid the withholding taxes, GIL routes the royalty payments though a subsidiary in 
the Netherlands since there are no withholding taxes on royalty payments within the EU. The 
Dutch authorities consider GIH to be an Irish firm, and thus Google can simply transfer the 




Luxembourg is another jurisdiction that is widely considered a tax haven but with a stated 
corporate tax rate of 27.8%, it often contests that label. Luxembourg, for practical purposes, is 
however a tax haven and uses a host of loopholes and special tax treatments to provide tax relief 
to foreign capital. This can be examined with a look at how Amazon used Luxembourg and 
avoided paying taxes in many European countries.  
 Amazon’s standard operator of the business and retail services offered through European 




Technologies Holding SCS (Technologies, Luxembourg) which is ultimately owned by Amazon 
Inc. (the US). Amazon developed intangible assets in the United States and transferred them to 
Amazon Europe Technologies Holding SCS (Technologies, Luxembourg). Therefore, Amazon 
Europe Technologies Holding SCS is able to extract rent from all of Amazon’s European 
business and retail offerings in the form of a license fee for using the intellectual property. This 
business arrangement works for Amazon because of favourable tax rulings it has obtained from 
the Luxembourg tax authorities. The European Union does not look upon the arrangement 
favourably and launched a European Commission enquiry to ascertain whether the tax 
arrangement between Amazon and Luxembourg amounts to state aid (European Commission 
2014). Subsequently a preliminary report by the European Commission enquiry ruled that the 
tax ruling was favourable to Amazon to the extent that it indeed constituted state aid (European 
Commission 2014). 
 Technologies Holding SCS is a partnership company and is set up so that it does not 
operate a Permanent Entity in Luxembourg. This means the company has no tangible presence 
in Luxembourg, no offices or employees. Without a permanent presence, it is not liable for tax 
in Luxembourg. The partners of the company are American and do not reside in Luxembourg 
either, meaning their income should has to be taxed in America and not in Luxembourg either. 
In theory that is a viable arrangement, but the American partners only have to pay tax on their 
income once it is repatriated to the US. Opening the door for indefinite deferral of taxes. 
Remarkably, this calculation arrangement was accepted by the Luxembourg authorities.  
 The European Commission was not provided with any report by Luxembourg that could 




transfer pricing arrangement made by Amazon was assessed within eleven days, meaning 
limited time for analysis. Furthermore, the Luxembourgish authorities accepted the transfer 
pricing method proposed by Amazon in a manner that did not seem to correspond to any of the 
methods in the OECD Guidelines (OECD 2010). 
The OECD Guidelines (para 6.16) states: ‘a royalty would ordinarily be a recurrent payment 
based on the user’s output, sales, or in some rare circumstances, profits.’ 
The arrangement determines the royalty payment for the use of IP rights owed by Amazon EU 
Sarl (Luxembourg) – that deals with all of Amazon’s European business - to Technologies 
(Luxembourg) – a firm that, as pointed out earlier, is not a tax resident in Luxembourg. 
The European Commission preliminary report cited a letter from Amazon to the 
Luxembourgish tax authorities in October 2003 (European Commission 2014) that set out the 
specific transfer pricing arrangement under which the licence fee from European businesses of 
Amazon would be calculated. This Fee was to be calculated as a percentage of all revenue (the 
Royalty Rate) received by EU Sarl Luxembourg in connection with its operation of the 
European web sites. 
Cooper (2018) looks at the Amazon case and concludes that: 
 
“This arrangement allows Amazon to calculate the royalty as a residual profit. A 
calculation is made to determine the profit that is attributable to Amazon EU Sarl through its 
operation of the EU websites. The remainder of the profit is paid as the Licence Fee to 
Technologies. This royalty is clearly a ‘residual’ but according to Amazon is ‘expressed’ as a 
percentage of revenues. This does not comply with the OECD Guidelines that state that the 
residual should be calculated as a percentage of revenues. Expressing the amount as a 




calculated.  The consequence is that Amazon EU Sarl (Luxembourg) receives only 4 – 6% of 
operating expenses as remuneration for its work.” 
 
Thus for all practical purposes, Luxembourg acts as a tax haven for Amazon and allows 
the giant internet marketplace to evade taxes on most of its European business activities, despite 
a relatively high tax rate.  
 
2.4.5 Tax Haven; Defining a variable 
 
The empirical literature so far has largely focussed more on nominal or low tax offerings 
by jurisdictions, and perhaps overlooked secrecy provisions when defining tax havens. This 
thesis will attempt to correct this oversight. First, the tax rate question. Hines & Rice (1994) and 
Desai et al. (2006b) talk of “dot tax havens”, geographically small, isolated, often island 
economies that thrive as financial hubs with little indigenous population or industry; Cayman 
Islands, Andorra, Monaco, Seychelles etc. These are in contrast to the Big 7; Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Switzerland, Liberia, Lebanon, Singapore and Panama, all with populations over 2 
million and significant indigenous economic activity. Jones & Temouri (2016) stick with the 
“dot tax havens” in their investigation on market orientation and its effects, as that allows for 
looking at investments inarguably designed for tax avoidance. 
It has however been argued that many countries with significant populations and 
economic activity independent of foreign investment for tax avoidance purposes, can be 




The argument is based on the second defining feature of a tax haven; the financial 
secrecy they offer to individuals and corporations (Palan et al., 2010). This secrecy in turn can 
provide mechanisms that defeat the purpose of a relatively high tax rate, as shown by “double 
Irish” method & the Amazon-Luxembourg case. This argument is also supported by recent 
literature that links Switzerland and Luxembourg among others to profit shifting activity from 
within the European Union (Jansky and Kokes, 2016).  
The Tax Justice Network (TJN) is a group of independent researchers focusing on 
international tax, international aspects of financial regulation and tax havens. TJN have 
constructed a Financial Secrecy Index (FSI). The index ranks jurisdictions based on secrecy 
provisions and their share of global financial services. This list is utilized to identify not only the 
significant “dot” tax havens but larger havens based on secrecy provisions. Switzerland, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and the UAE between them control 15.31% of the global financial services 
export market and are ranked 3rd, 4th, 5th and 10th respectively on the secrecy index, and are thus 
also warrant inclusion in list of tax havens used to create the dependent variable for this thesis. 
In an effort to be more thorough with the analysis, this study utilizes a number of 
different tax haven variables. For chapter 3, two different dependent variables are used; one 
consisting of the dot tax havens, named “Tax Island” and one that includes the 4 larger havens 
listed above, named “Tax Haven”. The final list of jurisdictions categorized as tax havens for 
chapter 3 therefore includes the dot tax havens as utilized by Jones & Temouri (2016) plus the 
UAE, Switzerland, Hong Kong & Singapore because of their significant secrecy provisions and 
role as centres for offshore booking. The jurisdictions are; Antigua, Andorra, Anguilla Barbados, 
Bahrain, Bermuda, Bahamas, Belize, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, 




Monaco, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Seychelles, 
Marshall Islands, UAE, Switzerland, Hong Kong & Singapore. 
The dependent variables “Tax Island” and “Tax Haven” are constructed from the above 
list of jurisdictions, are binary dummies. The variable equals 1 for any firm that owns a 
subsidiary in the list of tax havens outlined above, and zero otherwise.  
For chapter four, a total of four variants are utilized. These variables will be explained in 
the corresponding chapter data section. 
  
2.5 Determinants and impact of tax havens 
The literature dealing directly with determinants tax haven utilization is not as rich as their 
importance warrants, but there is considerable work done indirectly which addresses tax 
avoidance or profit shifting. For example, it has been shown that companies with higher levels of 
IP are increasingly able to shift profits through the use of royalty payments (Dischinger and 
Riedel, 2011; Grubert, 2003; Mutti and Grubert, 2007), but the direct role of tax havens is often 
left unsaid. 
Part of the reason is that measuring actual FDI in tax havens, or actual economic activity, 
is still not easy. This difficulty in ascertaining actual activity of MNEs inside tax havens is 
highlighted by Beugelsdijk, Hennart, Slangen and Smeets (2010). They argue that measuring 
MNEs tax haven affiliate activity as a function of their FDI inflows can be misleading. There are 
two broad reasons outlined for this. One is that FDI inflows often do not actually represent any 
productive activity, since the capital is often transferred to tax havens to be held, not used. 




havens with developed financial markets. With FDI only being collected on a bilateral basis for 
years, this leads to biases in the data. Hence, the commonly used approach can lead to both 
overestimation and underestimation.  
Despite these issues around FDI measurement, a general picture can be formed about 
determinants of tax haven. Academic findings have identified firm size, multi-nationality, 
intangible assets and technology intensity among principal determinants of tax haven usage. 
Graham and Tucker (2006) relate firm size and profitability with utilization of tax 
havens. Firms that make use of tax shelters are shown to accumulate a smaller amount of debt 
than firms that do not employ such tactics. The conclusion drawn is that tax sheltering has 
become a pillar of corporate strategy at such firms as it offers distinct advantages. 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2006a) focus on American MNEs and find that use of tax havens 
is part of their strategy to avoid taxes. Tax havens have a positive relationship with size and 
multi-nationality. Similarly, firms with large R&D operations will be more likely to use tax 
haven affiliates while intra-firm trade exhibits a positive relation with tax haven usage as well. 
The paper concludes that MNEs benefit from tax haven usage through avoiding or deferring tax 
liabilities, but the impact on home economies is not clear. 
Grubert and Mutti (2007) also find evidence for this important role for intangible assets 
in the utilization of tax havens. They show that US parent R&D investments are a weak predictor 
for royalty payments from foreign affiliates to the parent firm based in the home country, but 
they significantly increase the earnings of group affiliates in tax havens. They argue that this is a 
function of the incentive parent firms based in high tax jurisdictions have to shift patents, and 




Taylor, Richardson and Taplin (2015) have a focused study on the determinants of tax 
haven utilization based on data from 200 Australian firms. The data provides evidence of a 
positive correlation between a number of determinants and tax haven utilization. These include 
intangible assets, withholding taxes, multi-nationality and transfer pricing, basically confirming 
the conventional wisdom borne out of earlier papers discussed here.  
Jones and Temouri (2016) confirm previous findings and relate tax haven utilization to 
intangible assets and technology intensiveness but find no statistical significance of home 
country tax rates. Additionally, using the Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; and 
later Hancke, 2009) approach, they show that MNEs based in coordinated market economies 
(such as Germany) are less likely to invest in tax havens than MNEs based in liberal market 
economies (such as the US) regardless of statutory tax rates at home. 
The Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) approach divides countries based on a number of 
factors, including employer-labour relations, national institutions and corporate governance. The 
results from Jones and Temouri (2016) can indeed be viewed as scratching the surface of the 
effect of the factors in VOC on tax haven utilization. As laid out by Hall and Soskice (2001) 
Germany is one of the foremost examples of the stakeholder model, since the different firm 
constituencies -labour, managers, customers, community and so on- enjoy a strong formal 'voice' 
in decision-making through representation on company boards.  
In contrast, in the USA or the UK, LMEs, markets play a much more significant role not 
only in influencing inter-firm relationships but also in regulating the interactions between the 
actors mentioned above. The UK is one of the primary examples of the shareholder model of 




decision-making. The findings of Jones and Temouri (2016) thus open the door for research on 
tax haven utilization from the prism of different models or corporate governance, even outside 
institutions and cultural differences.  
 
2.5.1 The impact of tax havens 
 
The centrality of tax havens to the question of tax avoidance and evasion has placed them at the 
forefront of charged debate in the political sphere. The same has spilled over into academic 
literature with scholars inspecting what are the positive and negative aspects associated with tax 
havens, especially for home countries, i.e. countries where firms originate or commercial activity 
actually takes place.  
Desai, Foley and Hines (2006a) present a favourable view of tax havens, arguing that 
MNEs translate the lower costs achieved through the use of tax havens into greater investment 
activity around the world. Some more positive impacts of tax havens are discussed in the paper, 
“Do tax havens divert economic activity?” While the work doesn’t provide any evidence of 
impact on home economies, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006b) are able to capture evidence of 
impact on neighbours of tax haven countries. They argue that tax havens make capital more 
mobile and allow firms to operate without heavy costs. This in turn accelerates economic activity 
in non-haven countries that are in close proximity to tax havens.  
Similar work by Blanco and Rogers (2014) finds evidence of positive spill-overs from tax 




state that geographic distance matters for financial flows. The developing countries, which are 
the closest to a nearby tax haven benefit the most in terms of FDI inflows. 
Rose and Spiegel (2007) investigate what they term OFCs through the prism of the 
financial sector. Although they agree that OFCs often serve as tax havens and might encourage 
activities otherwise prohibited, they profess that OFCs still make good neighbours. Their study 
finds that an OFC with a strong banking sector has positive effects for neighbouring countries, 
providing more economic activity and perhaps contributing to better domestic banking system. 
Hong and Smart (2010) take that argument, or at least part of it, to home countries. They 
posit that tax havens facilitate mobility of capital and hence investment. By reducing, or helping 
MNEs avoid, tax burden on activities in non-tax haven countries, tax havens make operations in 
non-haven countries more profitable. This, it is argued in their model, is a net benefit for citizens 
of non-tax haven countries.  
Among academics who contend that tax havens have a net negative effect are Slemrod 
and Wilson (2009), who call tax havens “parasitic”. Their argument is that tax havens are not 
generating economic activity on their own, but actually siphoning off tax revenues from 
productive “home” economies. They construct a model to show that removing some tax haven 
jurisdictions could be beneficial for other countries.  
Hines and James (1994) are among the first ones to look at the impact of tax havens 
usage on US firms. They estimate that around 20% of all US FDI could be traced to tax haven 
affiliates. A further 1/3rd of all profits of US MNEs were also diverted to subsidiaries located in 




Jansky and Prats (2015) present a study of 1,500 MNEs operating in India. Their results 
show that firms which are linked with tax havens report lower profits than those firms that do not 
have such links. Therefore, the authors argue that corporations with tax haven presence are able 
to shift their profits and pay lower taxes to the authorities. 
Gravelle (2009) also presents a US focused argument in which it is concluded that tax 
havens are definitely a source of revenue losses for the US tax authority. US MNEs shift profits 
abroad to low tax jurisdictions in the Caribbean and Europe to the tune of $60 billion per year. 
Furthermore, it is stated that tax havens act as a tool for tax evasion, which is illegal, by 
individuals, which causes further losses in revenue to the US.  
Still harsher criticism has come from Eden and Kudrle (2005) who believe tax havens 
represent “renegade states”. This title is warranted as they operate outside the OECD developed 
international tax system, the purpose of which was to help states tax MNEs in an international 
environment. However, the non-compliance of tax havens with the OECD efforts has presented 
loopholes to MNEs that they have exploited, to the detriment of the home states. 
Palan (2002) believes that the presence of tax havens has called into question one of the 
basic tenants of the state, its sovereignty. However, Palan does not see tax havens as the cause, 
but the effect. It is argued that in the increasingly interconnected global market, interests are 
commercial and states are looking to maximize those. Tax havens come into being when the state 
is willing to commercialize one its most basic rights. This allows MNEs to dictate lower and 





In terms of the scale of the issue, Alstadstaeter, Johannesen and Zucman (2018) estimate 
that 10% of global wealth is stashed away in tax havens, but the distribution is unequal, affecting 
developing regions disproportionately. Zucman (2014) has also argued that the wealth stashed in 

























Tax haven utilization has largely been attributed to be a determined by a firm’s financial or 
technological characteristics, among others. But is there a relationship between corporate 
governance and tax haven utilization? This paper gives a brief overview of corporate governance 
issues and their relationship with tax as laid out in previous literature, and then identifies two 
aspects that might have an influence on tax haven utilization. Using two datasets obtained from 
ORBIS, the paper shows a negative association between ownership concentration and female 
appointments to the board of directors with the likelihood of owning a subsidiary in a tax haven. 
The study is limited in scope but opens the door for further investigation in this area.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts with a section identifying and outlining a number of themes in the corporate 
governance literature & the link between corporate governance & tax havens in existing 
literature. Section 2 outlines stakeholder theory (board of directors, gender diversity) is utilised 
as a lens to view tax haven activity, whereas 3 reviews agency theory (compensation, incentives, 
alignment of interests, ownership concentration, institutional ownership) as another important 
theoretical perspective in the literature that can play a role in explaining tax haven activity. I 
draw on recent studies to form a hypothesis about the role of female members of the board of 
governors and possible impacts on tax haven utilization, and then extend the ownership 
concentration and tax avoidance argument to tax haven activity and derive a 2nd hypothesis. 
Section 4 describes the data available for an empirical examination of the hypothesises and 




between ownership concentration and tax haven subsidiary ownership, as well as between female 
presence on board of directors and tax haven subsidiary ownership. The chapter is concluded in 
section 6 with taking stock of the existing literature on corporate governance and tax havens and 
outline several avenues of further research. 
 
This thesis looks at tax haven activity with a tax avoidance lens. In that view, tax havens 
represent what Dunning (1993) termed escape investments. These are investments made 
specifically to avoid high corporate tax rates at home. Apple’s investment in Ireland and 
Amazon’s European headquarters in Luxembourg fall neatly into this category. Recent work by 
Van Tulder (2015) has split FDI investment motivations into ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’. Intrinsic 
motivations are inherent to being a MNE, maximizing firm specific advantages or acquiring new 
advantages, these could be resources, markets and so on. Extrinsic motives are more interesting, 
for they talk about motivations borne out of the environment the firm operates in. Extrinsic 
motivations align with the “escape investments” Dunning has talked about, in that MNEs facing 
high tax rates at home would want to invest in tax havens where they can avoid the taxation. 
What is even more relevant about Van Tulder’s work is the reference to culture and home 
country institutions, which he argues will influence the mindset of managers when making such 
“tax avoidance” investments. 
As discussed earlier, the work of Jones and Temouri (2016) provides support for this 
point of view with the implicit suggestion that different approaches to capitalism colour 
managerial decisions with regards to investment in tax havens. These different approaches to 
capitalism consist of different national attitudes, different culture, different institutional systems, 




corporate governance (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Thus Van Tulder’s work helps explain both the 
intrinsic and extrinsic determinants of tax haven utilization identified in literature so far, and also 
provides a bridge to investigate impact of corporate governance on tax haven utilization, since 
corporate governance can also be split into internal(incentive compensation, board composition) 
& external factors(Audit, capital market pressure, enforcement & government regulations), with 
effects for example on executive compensation (Wright & Kroll, 2002; Kini, Kracaw & Mian, 
2004).  
Corporate governance, broadly defined, is the sum of supervision and management rules 
and practices for firms with multiple shareholders. Within corporate governance literature, the 
agency theory of corporate governance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) 
and the Stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984) are of particular interest. 
The literature that deals specifically with corporate governance and tax havens is young 
and scarce, especially considering the importance of tax havens in global business. Furthermore, 
there is sometimes a lack of cohesion between corporate governance theory, tax avoidance and 
tax haven. For example, Taylor et al. (2015) measure tax haven utilization across a number of 
variables, including multi-nationality, performance-based management remuneration and 
corporate governance. They have a narrow data set looking at Australian firms and an opaque 
description of the “strength of corporate governance” variable that they have based their findings 
on. Furthermore, there is no model specified defining the corporate governance variable, nor a 
theory to explain the relationship with tax haven utilization. 
There is however considerable work done on tax avoidance and corporate governance. 




Heitzman (2010), Wilde & Wilson (2018) and Kovermann & Velte (2019). Kovermann & Velte 
(2019) surmise that the previous reviews have been too broad, with corporate governance a part 
of the picture but not the subject. They do concede that that Wilde & Wilson (2018) have 
covered corporate governance as a determinant but have focused only on the relationship 
between management & shareholders, leaving aside other stakeholders. Therefore, they base 
their analysis of the literature on the Stakeholder Agency Theory (Hill & Jones, 1992).  
The purpose of this thesis is to draw a bridge between corporate governance theories, tax 
avoidance and tax havens. Therefore, this chapter will first lay out the corporate governance 
theories that inform most of the work in this field, then identify the work done on tax avoidance 
and finally link it with the literature on tax havens to derive the theoretical basis for 
hypothesises.  
 
3.2 Agency Theory and Tax Havens 
There are two theories of corporate governance that have interested scholars investigating tax 
avoidance and in some instances tax havens; the agency theory and the stakeholder theory. The 
agency theory posits a principal-agent view of the firm. The principal is the shareholder(s) who 
has invested capital in the firm and expects a return. The agent(s) is the manager of the firm who 
is tasked with running the business and providing returns to the principal. An obvious conflict of 
interests arises; what may be best for the manager, will not necessarily best for the shareholders. 
From Eisenhardt (1989);  
“Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency 




principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the 
agent is actually doing. The problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has 
behaved appropriately. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal 
and agent have different attitudes toward risk. The problem here is that the principal and the 
agent may prefer different actions because of the different risk preferences.” 
Outright misappropriation is insured against through the enforcement of contracts, courts 
and legal safeguards, yet interests still diverge. These manifest in the form of inefficiencies or 
different priorities. One example is the cash flow problem, highlighted by Jensen (1986) through 
evidence from the oil industry. Where shareholders interest is in getting a return on their 
investment, managers are interested in growing the firm and increasing their own power. This 
results in profits being invested back into the company, rather than being paid out as dividends to 
investors. 
Much of the literature on corporate governance and agency theory deals with how to 
align the interest of managers, or agents, with those of the principals, or shareholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). The supervisory board, government regulations and courts are the main 
avenues available to the shareholder to exercise control over managers. Making use of these 
resources, shareholders look to ensure that managers do not divert funds for personal enrichment, 
don’t waste the firm’s capital and work to maximise profits. 
There have been many approaches to achieve this goal, two are of interest the current 
context. The first is large ownership blocks in a firm that give major shareholders a controlling 




control the board of directors and can effectively monitor management, while reducing the costs 
of doing so.  
The second is to offer incentive compensation to managers, tying their remuneration with 
firm profits (Murphy, 1985), or offer them firm stock (Demsetz, 1983). These measures, and 
government regulations, have allowed the corporate governance structures in some firms, mostly 
the US and UK (Gilson, 2006), to move away from large ownership stakes.  
With manager remuneration dependant on stock prices, and the managers getting 
company stock as a form of incentive, the interest of managers shifts to increases in stock prices. 
Shareholders profit from this arrangement by treating stocks as a trading commodity rather than 
a long-term investment. The basic agency problem has led to several proposition when it comes 
to corporate tax avoidance which we turn to now. 
 
3.2.1 Compensation, Incentives and Alignment of Interests 
 
The first proposition identified by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) considers the alignment of 
interests between shareholders and managers; the shareholder goal being increase in value and 
the tool for alignment being incentive compensation. In this case tax avoidance, an activity that 
reduces tax cost on the firm, should increase as managers look to increase profitability, and 
hence their remuneration. Indeed, Phillips (2003) uses survey data to show that compensating 
managers on after-tax income leads to lower effective tax rates. This would suggest that weaker 
control, or weaker governance mechanisms would then result in less tax avoidance, as managers 




Sikes and Weaver (2010) also consider the effect of incentives on tax executives and find that 
when the tax department is considered a profit centre GAAP ETRs are lower but Cash ETRs are 
not. 
 
Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2012) find a negative association between tax director 
compensation incentives and GAAP ETRs while Rego and Wilson (2012) suggest that mangers 
are encouraged to operate in a more tax aggressive manner through managerial equity incentives. 
After-tax compensation incentives have also been found to have an association with corporate 
behaviour (Gaertner 2014) while CEO performance bonuses result in firms reporting lower cash 
effective rates compared to when the bonuses are based on earnings metrics. 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) model the effect of incentive compensation and 
governance structures on tax avoidance. They find a negative association between equity based 
compensation and tax avoidance but they find that this holds only in firms with weaker 
shareholder rights and lower levels of institutional ownership. Their argument is that tax 
avoidance, or “sheltering” requires obfuscation to prevent detection. This would require shell 
companies in tax havens, that are often hidden and operations within whom are not required to 
be publicly explained, in fact intentionally left unexplained. This in turn creates an opportunity 
for diversion for the managers.  
Note that the interests of the principal and the agents are not always aligned and due to 
information asymmetry, agent's selfish behaviour (opportunism) is always present (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Thus, in absence of strong monitoring mechanisms, proxied here by weaker 




interests of the owners. This also explains empirical literature regarding private family firms, that 
documents that family firms are less tax aggressive than non-family firms (Chen et al., 2010). 
Essentially, family-owned firms are willing to forgo tax benefits to avoid concerns by minority 
shareholders of family rent seeking masked by tax avoidance activities.  
However, it can also be argued that the result is consistent with the individual’s model for 
tax evasion, which links aggressive tax reporting to an individual’s risk aversion and costs for 
flagging by the tax authorities would appear more prohibitive to individual wholly responsible 
than a large number of shareholders. In fact, Gallemore, Maydew and Thornock (2014) show 
that managers are not affected by allegations of using tax shelters, nor are the firms that engage 
in them. This is further reflected in a recent study of UK companies (Brooks, Godfrey, 
Hillenbrand and Money, 2016) which found that investors are not concerned by tax avoidance 
activities of managers, only with stock prices. Additionally, stock prices were not affected by the 
tax payments of firms. 
 Recently Bennedsen and Zeume (2018) have looked at transparency through Tax 
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) with tax havens. They find that firm value, for 
poorly governed firms, increases 2.5% if TIEAs are signed with tax havens they are operating in. 
Furthermore, some MNEs relocate to more secretive or opaque tax havens after TIEAs are 
agreed between their home countries and current tax haven states. This behaviour hints at 
expropriation risk and suggests divergent interests between managers and shareholders.  
Atwood and Lewellen (2019) have also published current empirical findings in a similar 
vein. They build on the tax avoidance theory of managerial diversion when corporate governance 




(2007) within the agency framework. The sample consists of 6,734 tax haven and 83,541 non–
tax haven firm‐year observations, consisting of multinational firms based in 28 countries, and tax 
haven firms are identified by parent company incorporation into tax havens jurisdictions. They 
provide evidence that manager diversion and tax avoidance are complementary for tax haven 
firms, measured by dividend payouts, based in countries with weak investor protections but not 
for tax haven firms based in countries with strong investor protections. This is an important 
contribution to literature as it sheds some light on the mixed results previous literature has 
displayed when dealing with tax avoidance when using the agency framework. 
Further, it highlights an important overlooked factor, i.e. investor protections. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) mention shareholder rights and weak governance mechanisms in the initial 
theory, which can both be affected by investor protections in a particular region or jurisdiction. 
Investor protections are among a number of governance institutions outside the firm that could 
stand to have a role in tax haven utilization, not just in terms of manager expropriation 
opportunities.  
One study that highlights this in the context of profit shifting was by Sugathan and 
George (2015) conducted with Indian firms that had foreign ownership. Their empirical study 
concludes that on average foreign owned firms’ shift 6% of total pre-tax income outside of the 
country. They credit the weak government institutions in India for this, noting that tax-motivated 
profit shifting is interlinked with the quality of institutions at the country level. Furthermore, they 
find “that governance infrastructure that improves collective action and transparency in both the 





3.2.2 Institutional ownership 
Firms’ managers have significant individual effects on tax avoidance (Dyreng, Hanlon, and 
Maydew 2010), and logically would weigh the costs of tax avoidance (enforcement action by tax 
authorities and reputational costs) against the benefits for the themselves and the firm. It has 
been discussed earlier how owners try to align manager interests with their own through 
incentive compensation and better monitoring. 
Different owners however have different capacities and competencies, and different 
visions for the firm. Of interest in the tax context are quasi-indexer institutional investors 
(Bushee 1998, 2001) who hold diverse, large portfolios and have significant competencies of 
their own and expectations from managers. Chen, Huang, Li and Shevlin (2018) investigate the 
effect of quasi-indexer institutional ownership on firms’ tax avoidance behaviour. They suggest 
that although institutional investors don’t have an explicit mandate to reduce taxes, they put 
pressure on managers to improve post-tax profit. Indeed, quasi-indexers position themselves as 
long-term investors and there is some literature that relates institutional ownership with 
improvements in firms’ long-term performance metrics such as Tobin's Q (Appel et al., 2016a). 
The argument is that this pressure to increase firm performance will also lead towards an 
increase in tax savings(avoidance). Using a regression discontinuity design, Chen et al (2018) 
find evidence for their hypothesis; higher institutional ownership leads to greater tax savings. 
They find that this is achieved through a focus on increasing performance, not tax avoidance, and 
that the tools used by investors to achieve this include, at least partially, executive equity 
incentives and information environment. These results corroborate earlier findings by Khan, 




Bird and Karolyi (2017) pose the same question but extend it to the use of tax havens. 
Using a regression discontinuity design they examine the effect of positive shocks to institutional 
ownership on effective tax rates, finding a negative association. Furthermore, they find that a 1 
percentage point increase in institutional ownership is associated with a 1.3 percent increase in 
the likelihood of having a subsidiary in at least one tax haven country. These effects are smaller 
for firms with initially strong governance and high executive equity compensation, suggesting 
that an increase in tax avoidance and tax haven utilization comes about with significant 
improvement in corporate governance. 
 
3.2.3 Ownership concentration 
Another strand of thought builds around the traditional view of the agency theory but focuses on 
ownership concentration instead of manager remuneration. Manager remuneration is a means to 
align interests, whereas ownership concentration reduces the costs of monitoring, but also could 
shift the interests of owners. As seen earlier in the case of private family firms, the model of tax 
avoidance for firms in certain situations shifts towards the individual’s model, with risk aversion 
and costs becoming a significant factor.  
Badertscher, Katz and Rego (2013) extend this argument to ownership concentration and 
tax avoidance. They argue that tax avoidance has certain costs associated with it, which makes it 
a risky business decision. These costs include “fees paid to tax experts, time devoted to the 
resolution of tax audits, reputational penalties, and penalties paid to tax authorities”. In firms 
where ownership and control is concentrated in the hands of a few, this would result in managers 




Conversely in firms where ownership is diversified and there exist less effective 
measures of control over management, managers are likely to make more risky decisions, i.e. 
more aggressive tax avoidance. This is also complimented with diversified shareholders’ lack of 
concern with tax avoidance activities (Brooks et al 2016). Thus, Badertscher et al (2013) confirm 
their theory with an analysis of private manager-owned firms and private firm owned by Private 
Equity firms and find divergence in their tax behaviour.  
This thesis extends this argument to tax havens. Tax havens are a tool for tax avoidance, 
perhaps the most potent tool, but they can also mask manager diversion activities. Literature to 
this effect has been cited earlier in the paper (Atwood & Lewellen, 2019) and a citable case study 
is that of Siemens. Siemens, as revealed by the Panama Papers, ran a number of secret tax haven 
subsidiaries. Hans-Joachim Kohlsdorf, a high-ranking employee who was involved in running 
slush funds through the subsidiaries is believed to have funnelled around $2 million into his own 
accounts. Atwood & Lewellen (2019) suggest higher costs of diversion would discourage this 
behaviour, which a concentrated ownership would represent. Furthermore, concentrated 
ownership models represent shareholders with different motivations than diluted ownership 
shareholders, i.e. diluted shareholders are less concerned with tax avoidance (Brooks et al. 2016). 
 In MNEs with high ownership concentration, shareholders are less averse to take risks 
and more likely to take a longterm view, thus making less risky decisions. With tax havens 
constantly in the news, they also carry a reputational penalty that would discourage large 
shareholders. A manifestation of this reputational penalty is perhaps the trend of reducing the 
number of subsidiaries disclosed, at least in the US, by MNEs that Donohoe, McGill and Outslay 




firms with private family ownership private family ownership (Chen, Chen, Chenq & Shevlin 
2013), who forego tax avoidance in order to allay fears of diversion and avoid reputational 
penalties and investor suspicion.  
On the other hand, firms with low ownership concentration, shareholders are likely to take the 
short-term view, with post tax profits and stock price a primary concern. This behaviour 
incentivizes high risk decisions by managers, especially tax avoidance and by extension tax 
haven utilization. Small shareholders are also less likely to be perturbed by reputational penalties 
and would have weaker control, reducing the costs on managers for diversion. Therefore, I can 
hypothesize that: 
H1: Higher ownership concentration reduces the likelihood of MNEs owning tax haven 
subsidiaries 
 
3.3 Stakeholder Theory and Tax Havens 
The agency theory presents the equation of corporate governance as one with only two factors, 
the principals (shareholders) and the agents (managers). The corporate governance mechanisms 
are thus derived to mediate the relationship between the two. This leads to a somewhat limited 
view of the firm, a shortcoming addressed by Kovermann & Velte (2019) by using the 
stakeholder agency theory, a theory that takes into consideration both agency and stakeholder 
motivations, instead of the classical agency theory.  
This is because in the context of tax avoidance, the stakeholder view is important as it 
brings the focus to managers & directors as individuals instead of the just agents & principals. 




Velte, 2019), this is why incentives are offered to align manager interests with shareholders 
motivations for tax avoidance, and, as Crocker and Slemrod (2004) point out, why penalties on 
the tax managers represent a more effective tool in reducing tax evasion than penalties on the 
shareholder.  
A purely agency view of the firm would be in danger of overlooking the individual roles 
& motivations. Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2010) identified the gap in the literature 
concerning the impact that key executives play in determining the tax strategy of a firm. Their 
work provides evidence of the impact of both CEOs and CFOs in company tax strategy and find 
an 11 per cent difference between the GAAP ETRs when moving between the top and bottom 
quartile of executives. 
Shareholders are, in practice, not the sole consideration of managers when making 
decisions. Other groups exert pressure on managers as they too are responsible for or effected by 
the decisions that managers take. These groups today include governments, labour unions, 
communities and suppliers and buyers, among others.  
The stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984) simply proposes that the principal-agent contract 
is not all that defines a firm, instead there are stakeholders impacted by the firm’s actions and 
they too are part of the equation. Though it may still be argued that shareholders are the most 
important among the stakeholders of a firm, stakeholder theory posits that they do not have a 
monopoly when it comes to manager decisions. From a stakeholder-centric perspective of 
corporate governance, managers of public corporations are tasked not only with protecting and 
maximizing shareholder wealth but are also responsible for ensuring that strategic decisions 




Corporate governance can thus be framed as rules and practices that ensure that managers 
act with the interests of the firm’s stakeholders in mind, rather than just focus on value creation 
for shareholders. Wood (1991) describes the term corporate social performance (CSP) as the 
outcome of corporate activities undertaken to fulfil the legal, discretionary, economic and ethical 
responsibilities of a firm towards its stakeholders, rather than just the shareholders.  
Shahzad, Rutherford and Sharfman (2016) identify corporate governance mechanisms 
that in theory could impact CSP and use an empirical study to confirm that these do in practice as 
well. Measures used in their study include board size, board gender diversity, auditor 
independence, CEO duality and board committees among others. 
 
3.3.1 Board of Directors 
The board of directors is an oversight system for managers, a tool used to ratify and monitor the 
corporation’s most important decisions and to hire, fire, and compensate top-level managers 
within the corporation (Fama and Jensen, 1983). It  
Tax haven literature however is scant when it comes to measuring the impact of variables 
identified by the stakeholder theory, such as the Board of Directors (BOD). This is because the 
framing of the issue has revolved mostly around the agency theory (Desai and Dharmapala 2006; 
Crocker and Slemrod 2005). There is though work done in tax avoidance literature, and a 
significant empirical effort in this regard is undertaken by Lanis and Richardson (2011) who 
measure the effect of board of director composition on tax aggressiveness. Their study of 
Australian corporations shows that the inclusion of a higher proportion of outside members on 




There are competing narratives about the role of outside directors as other studies 
(Richardson, Lanis, and Taylor, 2015; McClure, Lanis, Wells, and Govendir, 2018) have shown 
the opposite effect, i.e., the presence of outside directors is positively associated with tax 
avoidance. Kovermann and Velte (2019) explain the dichotomy as a function of other conditions 
effecting the firm, like financial distress, culture of company, country or time period of study 
falling before or after the GFC.  
Outside directors are significantly important in the tax avoidance context because they 
have an implicit duty of care not only to shareholders, but also to other key stakeholders and 
critically to society as a whole (Ibrahim, Howard, and Angelidis, 2003; Pearce and Zahra, 1991; 
Rose, 2007), and while corporation’s adoption of tax aggressive is often viewed to have a 
negative impact on society (Slemrod, 2004; Landolf, 2006; Williams, 2007).  
 
3.3.2 Gender diversity 
Dyreng et al. (2010) pointed out that individual managers can have significant effects on firm’s 
tax behaviour, other scholars have investigated individuals if there exist individual 
characteristics, traits or backgrounds that effect the firms’ tax behaviour. Subsequently, studies 
have releaved relationships between a number of individual traits and backgrounds within 
managers to behaviour of the firm with regard to tax. For example, Chyz (2013) show an 
association between personal aggressiveness of managers with tax outcomes, Feller and Schanz 
(2017), point to manager power and Koester, Shevlin and Wangerin (2017) identify managerial 




2007), political orientation (Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie, Graffin, 2015) and narcissism (Olsen 
and Stekelberg, 2016). 
Other work has looked at the management team has found interesting insights for tax 
avoidance. For example, Abernathy, Kubick, and Masli (2016) find an increase in tax avoidance 
associated with the ascension of the general counsel—i.e., a lawyer—into the top management 
team.  As discussed earlier, managers are decision makers when it comes to tax avoidance.  
This is all relevant since the board of directors monitors management, and different traits 
and characteristics of the board should in turn effect management, and in turn tax strategy. For 
this study, we are particularly interested in board gender diversity. 
Previous literature has revealed that women are more likely to bring expertise from 
outside of business and therefore may have different perspectives on the issues facing the board 
(Hillman et al., 2002). Women are thought to take a different approach to board membership 
with research demonstrating that they take a more participative and democratic approach (Eagly 
and Johnson 1990; Eagly, Johannsen-Schmidt and van Engen, 2003).   
Early research on board gender diversity by Betz et al. (1989) found that women 
members of the board of directors are less likely to take risks compared to male directors with 
regards to financial matters and corporate reporting. Peni and Vähämaa (2010) took the same 
question to managers and found that firms with female Chief Female Oficers(CFOs) adopt a 
more conservative, risk-averse financial reporting style compared to firms with male CFOs. 
Carter et al. (2003) argue that women directors generally are likely to display more 
independent thinking than male directors, which is crucial for effective board oversight. Daily et 




boardroom and facilitate more informed decisions that increase the level of transparency at the 
board level. McLeod-Hemingway (2007) find that women are likely to contribute positively to 
the general functioning and deliberations of the board by enhancing the degree of trustworthiness 
of the board to the firm’s various stakeholders. 
Kruger (2009) found that companies with higher female board representation have higher 
incidence of positive social responsibility. More specifically, the study indicates more generous 
attitude towards communities and more attention to the welfare of a firm’s natural stakeholders 
(e.g. communities, employees or the environment) for companies with a higher proportion of 
women on the board of directors.  
Similar arguments were put forward by Bear et al. (2010) who found a positive 
relationship between CSR and the number of women on the board of directors. They identified 
that two major strengths, participative decision making styles (Konrad et al. 2008) and increased 
sensitivity (Williams 2003), brought by the women to the board are found to be the key reasons 
for corporate responsibility strength ratings (Bear et al. 2010). 
Relationship between female members of the board of governors and tax has also been 
investigated. Adams and Ferreira (2009) examine the association between women in the 
boardroom and corporate governance and firm performance. They find gender composition of 
the board being positively associated with board effectiveness. They argue that higher female 
participation on the board acts comparably to outside directors and is threfore likely to reduce tax 
aggressiveness. 
Early work by Baldry (1987) shows that females are likely to be more compliant in tax-




diversity is significant in explaining attitude changes in tax ethics. This has recently been further 
confirmed by Richardson, Taylor and Lanis (2016) who find that in a sample of Australian firms, 
female presence on the board of directors reduces the likelihood of tax aggressiveness. This 
effect is relative to increase in the proportion of women from a baseline of 1, suggesting that 
alone they might not have a drastic impact but an increase in percentage amplifies the effect. 
These studies focusing on the tax aggressiveness and tax ethics aspect of gender diverse 
board, backed by the positive CSR outcome studies, form the basis of the 2nd hypothesis; 
 
H2: The presence of female members on the board of directors will reduce the likelihood of an 
MNE operating a subsidiary in a tax haven jurisdiction 
 
3.4 Data & Methodology 
To test the hypothesis this study draws on ORBIS database by Bureau van Dijk that compiles 
detailed information, including financials, shareholdings, locations, subsidiaries and more, from 
around the globe. For our ownership concentration model the data set selected contains a 
snapshot of published details for over 7,000 MNEs from 12 developed world countries for the 
year 2016. These include USA, UK, Japan, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Austria, Sweden, 
Norway, Finland, Denmark & Canada.  
Home countries firms are defined in ORBIS as Global Ultimate Owners based in said 
country with at least a 50.01% stake in a foreign enterprise. Admittedly, some MNEs that have 




The ORBIS data contains published information by MNEs that also includes disclosures 
about location of their subsidiaries. Using this information, we can map out how many 
subsidiaries each MNE has in a tax haven jurisdiction. This leads to creation of the dependent 
variables “Tax Haven” & “Tax Island” which are binary measures for each MNE signalling 
ownership, or lack thereof, of a tax haven subsidiary.  
If we look at the sample by MNEs’ country of origin, we get the Japan as the most well 
represented with over 1,900 MNEs and New Zealand occupying the other end of the spectrum 
with just 13.  
Among the MNEs in the sample over 3,000 own at least one subsidiary in a tax haven 
location. Japan boasts the highest percentage of MNEs with tax haven subsidiaries at 45% while 






Table 1: Country distribution of MNEs (Ownership Concentration) 
   Country Freq. Percent Cum. 




Australia 167 2.16 3.48 
Canada 70 0.91 4.38 
Germany 995 12.87 17.25 
Denmark 290 3.75 21 
Finland 270 3.49 24.49 
United Kingdom 1,285 16.62 41.11 
Japan 1,929 24.95 66.05 
Norway 100 1.29 67.35 
New Zealand 13 0.17 67.52 
Sweden 798 10.32 77.84 
USA 1,714 22.16 100 








Table 2: Classification of whether MNEs are in tax havens or not 
 






0          1              Total 
  
 
Austria 68         34 102 
Australia 111         56 167 
Canada 39          31 70 
Germany 650        345 995 
Denmark 216         74 290 
Finland 213         57 270 
United Kingdom 724         561 1,285 
Japan 926        1,003 1,929 
Norway 55           45 100 
New Zealand 8              5 13 
Sweden 608         190 798 
USA 653        1,061 1,714 
  
 
Total           4,271      3,462 7,733 
 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics Ownership Concentration sample 
 
 





  Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
    Austria  0.333 0.473 102 
Australia   0.335 0.473 167 
Canada   0.442 0.500 70 
Germany   0.346 0.476 995 
Denmark   0.255 0.436 290 
Finland   0.211 0.408 270 
United Kingdom   0.436 0.496 1,285 
Japan   0.519 0.499 1,929 
Norway   0.45 0.5 100 
New Zealand   0.384 0.506 13 
Sweden   0.238 0.426 798 
USA   0.619 0.485 1,714 
    Total   0.447 0.497 7,733 
 
 
3.4.1 Variable of Interest: Ownership Concentration 
The sample size is very large but across and contains MNEs of a multitude of sizes. This is to 
capture as much variation in the snapshot as possible. This study does acknowledge that scholars 
have argued (Thomsen and Pedersen, 1997) that “more variation in ownership patterns [can be 




view of Faccio and Lang (2002) who indicate that cross-country differences are less significant 
among small firms than they are among large ones. However, to get a richer dataset we abstain 
from restricting the sample to just firms of a large size, as has been done in previous studies on 
ownership concentration (Richter & Weiss, 2013) 
The concept of ‘ownership’ in this study pertains to financial holdings (capital blocks), 
which may diverge from the voting rights that owners may hold (Morck et al., 2005). However, 
it can be argued that the financial stakes that owners hold provide the economic basis for the 
return rights associated with ownership. Furthermore, previous literature (Faccio and Lang, 
2002) shows that discrepancies between financial ownership and control are not widespread. 
Among the 13 countries Faccio and Lang (2002) investigated, the ratio between cash flow rights 
and control rights varied only between 0.74 and 0.94, and the standard deviation of this ratio 
across all countries is less than a third of its mean. Using financial holdings, or percentage of 
shareholdings, as the basis for calculating the ownership concentration ratio in this study was 
assessed to be the correct decision. 
Existing studies on ownership concentration use two main types of concentration 
measures. First, ownership-specific count measures, such as the sum of the ownership 
percentages of the five largest owners(cr5). Increasing the number of owners taken into account 
when creating the measurement variable, i.e. using the largest 20 instead of largest 10 or largest 
5, does not enhance, but rather decreases the precision of the measure of ownership 
concentration (Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca, 2007; Van der Elst, 2004).  
The second measure studies use is the ‘universal’ concentration estimates such as the 




shares. The HHI has an advantage over the cr5 in that it takes into account all owners, thereby 
drawing a comprehensive picture of ownership dispersion. However, the problem this measure 
presents is that of the availability of data. With the ORBIS data set, complete shareholder 
ownership details are not available for a wide range of MNEs. Using HHI in this scenario will 
result in accurate measures of some MNEs, drawing on complete information, but for a majority 
of MNEs the measures would be drawn from incomplete information. Previous work has shown 
that when complete ownership information is available for some firms, but not for others, the 
comparability of the HHI suffers (Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca, 2007; Van der Elst, 2004). 
After taking this into account and going through the data sample available for the study, it 
has been decided to use a cr4 measure of ownership concentration, i.e. a measure of percentage 
ownership by the 4 largest shareholders. There are shortcomings in this measure. One problem 
that applies to both the largest shareholder method as well as the HHI is that they sometimes do 
not take into account the possibility that shareholders may act in concert, whether through 
informal or through formal mechanisms (e.g. written shareholder agreements; for an overview of 
the latter see Chemla, Habib, & Ljungqvist, 2007, pp. 117–119). If two or more shareholders act 
in concert, their power may exceed the sum of their voting rights, and this phenomenon has even 
been formally recognized in some jurisdictions e.g. in the context of takeover legislation (for an 
example see Nierkirk, 2000). According to a study commissioned by the European Commission 
(ISS, Shearman Sterling & ECGI, 2007, pp. 31–32), shareholder agreements constitute a control-
enhancing mechanism that is widely considered to be in line with the principle of contractual 




ORBIS provides an answer to this problem by providing details of controlling 
shareholders by both their direct & indirect (through intermediaries) control over shareholding 
blocks. This goes a long way in negating the indirect shareholding problem faced by previous 
studies but the information is still reliant on public disclosures. In cases where MNEs weren’t 
required to, and chose not to, disclose such details, the accuracy of the measure will suffer. 
 
3.4.2 Variable of Interest: Appointment of female members of the board of directors 
The second variable of interest is the appointment of female members to the board of directors. 
The dataset utilized for this study is focused on UK & US firms, looking at over 650 firms across 
an 8 year period; 2010 to 2018. The variable “Female Appointments” represents the number of 
women appointed to the board of directors by an MNE between the years 2010 to 2012. The data 















Island                   Tax Haven 
  Year 0 1 0 1           Total 
 
       2010 419 144 274 289 563
 2011 461 164 295 330 625 
 2012 487 196 311 372 683 
 2013 440 202 264 378 642 
 2014 399 225 234 390 624 
 2015 336 284 191 429 620 
 2016 248 374 111 511 622 
 2017 162 416 59 519 578 
 2018 131 360 40 451 491 
  
 
In order to capture the effect of female representation on board of directors, this study 
also utilizes two measures of tax havens.  
 
3.4.2 Explanatory Variables: 
Explanatory variables employed for the purpose of this study are identified by drawing on 
previous literature. These include multi-nationality, a factor identified as contributing to an 
MNEs use of tax haven subsidiaries by (Taylor, Richardson & Taplin, 2015) and proxied by the 
number of foreign subsidiaries each MNE owns. Size has been identified as an explanatory 
variable by (Graham & Tucker 2006), and measures to account for this range from revenues to 
assets to number of employees. Technology intensiveness & ownership of patents, intangible 
assets is a key indicator of an MNEs propensity to invest in tax havens, because of the specific 
transfer pricing opportunities afforded to MNEs on account of these. The ownership 




technology intensiveness, as was done by Jones & Temouri (2016). This is important because it 
captures industry level differences that effect tax haven utilization and would remove biases in 
the data.  
For the female appointment model the industries are more finely classified, for a total of 20 
different classifications, again by using the NACE industry code and Eurostat categorizations. 
The larger number of classifications used in the female appointment model is to cater for any 
bias that could arise with gender preferences for certain industries. Which might not be clearly 
accounted for in the broad technology-intensiveness based classifications. 
 
3.4.3 Model 
The dependent variable for the hypothesis is a dummy created to represent the presence of a tax 
haven subsidiary. If an MNE has a tax haven subsidiary the dependent variables “Tax 
Island”/“Tax Haven” will signal this with a value of 1 and signal absence of a tax haven 
subsidiary with a value of 0. With a binary dependent a probit model is used as seen in previous 
work of this nature (Jones & Temouri 2016). The study runs 2 variations of 2 different models, 
one for calculating effect of female board member appointments in the UK & US and second  for 
‘OWNCON’ (Ownership Contentration) across firms from the 12 home countries. For robustness 
count models are also run, these measure the number of tax haven subsidiaries owned by each 
firm at a certain point in time. 
 





FSA contains firm specific independent variables identified in earlier studies. SectorTech 
vector refers to industry sectors that cover High tech manufacturing, Medium/high tech 
manufacturing, Medium/low tech manufacturing, low tech manufacturing, Knowledge intensive 
& less knowledge intensive. TAX is tax rates represent the corporate tax rate faced by each MNE 
in 2016, this is a country level variable.  
For the female appointment hypothesis, the model is modified. 
Tax Haven = β0 + β1 Fem Appoint + β2FSAkit + β3 SectorWide + β4 Taxit + ɛit             
Here the SectorWide variable represents the different finely tuned industry classifications used. 




The model for ownership concentration was run with two specifications, one with each definition 
of tax haven dummy. In both cases, the results supported the initial hypothesis, that ownership 








Table 5 Results on Ownership Concentration 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Tax Island Tax Haven 
   
Own Con -0.00196*** -0.00103*** 
 (0.000233) (0.000216) 
Foreign Subs 0.0152*** 0.0181*** 
 (0.000604) (0.000566) 
High Tech Manufacturing -0.00749 0.0170 
 (0.0414) (0.0378) 
Knowledge Intensive Services 0.0476** 0.0636*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0170) 
Less Knowledge Intensive Services 0.0610** 0.0623*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0215) 
Operating Revenue -0.0198* -0.0202** 
 (0.0109) (0.0102) 
Total Assets 0.0480*** 0.0464*** 
 (0.00757) (0.00710) 
Cashflow -0.156 -0.184* 
 (0.0994) (0.0980) 
Low Tech 0.0269 0.0349 
 (0.0281) (0.0257) 
Medium High Tech -0.103*** -0.0453** 
 (0.0237) (0.0228) 
Medium Low Tech 0.0441** 0.0424** 
 (0.0206) (0.0190) 
Number of employees -4.71e-07 -3.83e-07 
 (4.44e-07) (4.38e-07) 
Top Corp Tax 0.00677*** 0.00544*** 
 (0.00113) (0.00106) 
   
Observations 7,527 7,527 
Note: Each column reports probit regression. The dependent variable is whether a firm owns a 
subsidiary in a tax haven. Two variations of tax haven dummy. Marginal effects are reported. 
Some controls, the constant and the fixed effect coefficients are unreported for brevity. Total 
turnover, free cash flow and assets are entered as their natural logarithms. Standard errors in 
parentheses 






The marginal effects reported indicate a negative, significant association between owning 
a subsidiary in a tax haven and ownership concentration. A 1% increase in ownership 
concentration signals a 0.13 percent increase in the likelihood of owning a subsidiary in a Tax 
Haven and almost a 0.2% increase in likelihood of owning a subsidiary in a Tax Island. These 
results seem to align with previous work on both tax avoidance (Badertscher et al., 2013; Chen et 
al. 2010) and the recent study on tax havens (Atwood & Lewellen, 2019) in so far as the 
theoretical basis, but since those studies are not directly based on measures of ownership 
concentration, there can be no definitive conclusion drawn on the variable.  
The rest of the variables provide results in line with previous studies. MNEs tax haven 
subsidiary ownership is positively related with size, multi-nationality, technology intensiveness 
etc. The recent findings (Jones & Temouri, 2016) that MNEs based in liberal market economies 
are more likely to own tax haven subsidiaries also holds. 
 
Notice that the relationship holds when the regression is run for the count variables. This 
indicates that ownership concentration is negatively related with the number of subsidiaries in a 
Tax Island. This is statistically significant. We get statistically insignificant results for the count 
of Tax Haven variable, which is a measure that includes some larger tax havens. For the models 







Table 6: Results on Ownership Concentration by count 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Tax Island Tax Haven 
   
Own Con -0.00160*** 0.00494* 
 (0.000175) (0.00291) 
Foreign Subs 0.00146*** 0.119*** 
 (0.000101) (0.00168) 
High Tech Manufacturing 0.0410 -0.797 
 (0.0306) (0.508) 
Knowledge Intensive Services 0.0658*** 0.141 
 (0.0143) (0.238) 
Less Knowledge Intensive Services 0.0688*** 0.827*** 
 (0.0187) (0.310) 
Operating Revenue 0.0269*** -0.833*** 
 (0.00804) (0.134) 
Total Assets 0.0542*** 0.583*** 
 (0.00564) (0.0936) 
Cash flow -0.0462* 0.356 
 (0.0248) (0.413) 
Low Tech 0.0567*** -0.0798 
 (0.0210) (0.349) 
Medium High Tech -0.0172 -1.248*** 
 (0.0173) (0.288) 
Medium Low Tech 0.0790*** -0.809*** 
 (0.0156) (0.259) 
Number of employees -7.41e-07*** -1.20e-05*** 
 (2.11e-07) (3.50e-06) 
Top Corp Tax 0.00206** 0.0615*** 
 (0.000838) (0.0139) 
   
   
   
Observations 7,527 7,527 
   
Each column reports a regression. The dependent variable is the number of tax haven 
subsidiaries owned by a firm. Two variations of tax haven used. Some of the controls and 
constant are unreported for brevity. Total long-term debt, turnover, free cash flow and intangible 
assets are entered as their natural logarithms and lagged. Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 7: Results on Female Appointments in Board Of Directors 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Tax Island Tax Haven 
   
Fem Appoint -0.0792*** 0.00988 
 (0.0137) (0.00971) 
Turnover -0.00518 0.00932 
 (0.0119) (0.00817) 
Cashflow 0.0363*** 0.0188*** 
 (0.0104) (0.00704) 
Long term debt 0.0272*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.00588) (0.00372) 
Intangible fixed assets 0.0383*** 0.0114*** 
 (0.00667) (0.00433) 
Corp Tax -0.0119*** -0.00535*** 
 (0.00143) (0.00103) 
Foreign Subsidiaries 0.00340*** 0.00342*** 
 (0.000161) (0.000121) 
Agriculture -0.0252 -0.358 
 (0.250) (0.246) 
Mining 0.106 -0.0881 
 (0.0914) (0.0756) 
Manufacturing 0.0365 0.0123 
 (0.0747) (0.0482) 
InfoCom 0.0560 0.00949 
 (0.0796) (0.0500) 
Financial 0.470*** 0.138*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0279) 
Real Estate 0.385*** 0.0627 
 (0.0663) (0.0573) 
Education 0.487*** 0.141*** 
 (0.0453) (0.0464) 
Arts & Ent 0.242 0.0800 
 (0.148) (0.0977) 
Observations 5,448 5,448 
 
Note: Each column reports probit regression. The dependent variable is whether a firm owns a 
subsidiary in a tax haven. Two variations of tax haven dummy. Marginal effects are reported. 
Some of the industry category controls, constant and the fixed effect coefficients are unreported 
for brevity. Total long-term debt, turnover, free cash flow and intangible assets are entered as 
their natural logarithms and lagged. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in 
parentheses 






Table 8: Results on Female Appointment on Board Of Directors 2 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Tax Island Tax Haven 
   
Fem Appoint -0.179 -1.063** 
 (0.306) (0.519) 
Turnover -0.485** -0.404 
 (0.230) (0.334) 
Cashflow 0.0904 -0.140 
 (0.174) (0.228) 
Long term debt 0.477*** 0.506*** 
 (0.0983) (0.132) 
Intangible fixed assets -0.217* -0.316* 
 (0.126) (0.183) 
Corp Tax -0.105*** -0.114*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0284) 
Foreign Subsidiaries 0.0495*** 0.135*** 
 (0.00140) (0.00184) 
Agriculture -0.0858 -1.183 
 (4.350) (6.987) 
Mining 0.679 -1.675 
 (1.964) (3.225) 
Manufacturing 0.229 -0.593 
 (1.568) (2.585) 
InfoCom 1.600 0.495 
 (1.671) (2.758) 
Financial 7.681*** 4.767 
 (1.832) (3.029) 
Real Estate 6.545*** 6.966* 
 (2.262) (3.761) 
Education 3.988 4.818 
 (4.192) (6.875) 
Arts & Ent -1.447 -5.670 
 (3.390) (5.630) 
   
Observations 5,448 5,448 
Note: Each column reports xt regression. The dependent variable is the number of tax haven 
subsidiaries owned by a firm. Two variations of tax haven used. Some of the industry category 
controls are unreported for brevity. Total long-term debt, turnover, free cash flow and intangible 
assets are entered as their natural logarithms and lagged.  





The first one is calculated using the “Fem Appoint” variable and the results confirm the 
hypothesis that female representation on the board reduces the likelihood of MNEs operating a 
subsidiary in tax haven jurisdictions. The marginal effects indicate a large negative relationship 
between owning a Tax Island subsidiary and Female appointments to the board of directors. 
Specifically, each appointment reduces the likelihood of owning a Tax Island subsidiary by 
7.9%. The finding is statistically significant. The relationship with the Tax Haven variable, the 
variable including larger countries, is insignificant.  
Results for the count variable of tax haven subsidiaries indicate a similar relationship 
with female representation in the board of directors, i.e. a negative effect on the MNEs 
propensity to operate a subsidiary in a tax haven location. However, these are not statististically 
significant. These results are largely in line with previous work by Taylor et al. (2016) that link 
the presence of female members on the BOD to a negative effect on the tax aggressiveness of the 
firm. Similarly, Law & Mills (2017) have found that male members of the BOD tend to be more 
aggressive than female members. As a direct study measuring the effect of female members of 
the BOD on tax haven utilization hasn’t been conducted, the aforementioned studies provide the 
best comparable empirical findings.   
 
3.6. Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research Avenues 
Tax havens play a key role in tax avoidance in today’s interconnected world. In fact, most 
methods of international tax avoidance – transfer pricing, strategic intellectual property location, 
corporate inversions, international debt shifting - would not be possible without tax havens. The 




partially explained by the work that identifies key determinants such as intangible assets, firm 
size, multi-nationality, debt and technology intensiveness.  
However, it is the work by Jones and Temouri (2016) that has identified another 
significant factor; orientation of the particular economy of the MNE using the VOC approach. 
This suggests that differences in culture, national ethos, institutional environment and corporate 
governance may play a significant role in a firm’s decision to invest in tax havens. Among these, 
corporate governance is a factor that is largely rooted in agency theory and scholars have 
identified ownership concentration, private ownership, manager incentives, manager diversion 
and institutional investors as determinants of tax avoidance. Recently studies have built on the 
work of Desai and Dharmapala (2006) to extend the managerial diversion, in the presence of 
weak corporate governance mechanism, theory to tax havens and found supportive evidence. 
Similarly, institutional ownership is also shown to not only be associated with tax avoidance, but 
also with tax havens. However, tax avoidance determinants rooted in the stakeholder theory, 
such as board composition and diversity, remain less explored in tax haven literature.   
The results for the female appointments on propensity to own tax havens are also 
interesting. This is especially true when looked at in light of literature that links presence of 
women on board of directors with positive CSR outcomes or ratings (Braun, 2010; Kruger, 2009; 
Bear et al. 2010). Could it be that firms who appoint female directors tend to close down 
subsidiaries in dot tax havens, which carry a greater reputational penalty, but not in the larger 
Big 7 havens due to CSR concerns? 
This study has only scratched the surface of the relationship between corporate 




forwarded by scholars about the negative association between tax avoidance and costs of 
diversion (Atwood & Lewellen, 2019) or private family ownership (Chen, Chen, Chenq & 
Shevlin 2013) hold weight and may apply to use of tax havens as well. Might other areas of 
corporate governance, other theories also hold some answers? The questions can certainly be 
asked. What are the differences between co-ordinated market economies and liberal market 
economies that drive the divergence in tax haven utilization? Can tax haven activity be partly 
explained by the stakeholder model of corporate governance? Or the representation of labour on 
boards of directors? Or the greater participation by women in managerial positions? Or diversity 
in educational backgrounds? Or employment history? All these questions are worth posing and 
have basis in the tax avoidance literature already.  
Another fruitful area of research would be to combine corporate governance at the MNE 
level and institutional theory (Peng et al., 2009), which can lead to a better understanding of the 
motivations that emerging market MNEs (EMNEs) may have when deciding to shift capital into 
tax havens. For example, there are various dimensions to the institutional environment that are 
common across many emerging markets, affecting a significant number of EMNEs which are 
either state-owned, partially state-owned; or former state-owned enterprises that have been 
privatized. Given their sheer size and the speed of expansion internationally, the rise and spread 
of state capitalism in the emerging world has increasingly caused concern (e.g. Huawei with 
government backing). Yet the impact of state ownership and political connections of state-owned 
enterprises on their internationalization, and the use of tax havens, is an under-explored area. Do 





Last, but not the least, the identification of government institution quality as a factor in 
profit shifting (Sugathon and George, 2015) and the effect of investor protections on the 
relationship between manager diversion and tax avoidance (Altwood and Lewellen, 2019) pose 
other interesting research questions. What is the effect of governance structures not in home 
countries, but in other institutional weak or corrupt countries that MNEs operate in with respect 
to tax haven utilization?  
The answer to such research questions that arise from the intersection of tax avoidance 
and tax havens, could provide important insights not only to the under-sheltering puzzle, but also 
increase our understanding of the role of corporate governance on a firm’s strategic choices and 














Chapter 4: Complementarity between capital flight and tax haven 
utilization 
 
This chapter investigates the determinants of tax havens use by Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs). The study focuses on MNEs’ subsidiary locations and measures the impact of presence 
in different geographical and political regions on the use of a tax haven. The work expands on 
current literature and internalization theory to form a conceptual framework that can investigate 
the impact of subsidiary locations on tax haven utilization by MNEs from the developed world. 
Results show that presence of developed world MNE subsidiaries in the developing world, 
especially countries with large unrecorded capital outflows, has a strong positive impact on tax 
haven utilization. This implies that tax havens serve as a tool for wealth transfer and exploitation 




. Tax havens, second home to some of the richest people – and firms – in the world and at the 
centre of many corruption scandals, have received widespread media attention in recent years. 
The light regulations, nominal tax rates and strict secrecy they provide make tax havens a 
popular destination for capital from around the world, which increasingly includes, as the 
panama papers have shown, the developing world. Oligarchs from Russia and even the former 




just a phenomenon common in rich, seemingly corrupt individuals? Or is there a larger game 
afoot. 
In this paper, we explore the relationship between tax haven use and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) into developing countries often characterised by weak institutions, market imperfections 
and a propensity for significant capital flight. This is of critical importance because tax havens 
are increasingly being characterised as wealth extractors that undermine economic development 
in countries with weak institutions and at the same time contribute to rising inequality in 
developed nations (Torslov, Wier and Zucman, 2018).  
Andersen et al. (2017) show that 15% of the windfall gains to petroleum producing 
countries with autocratic rulers is diverted to accounts in tax havens. A recent World Bank report 
(Andersen, Johannesen and Rijkers, 2020) also shows that aid disbursements to highly aid-
dependent countries is strongly associated with an increase in bank deposits to tax havens (also 
known as offshore financial centers). Coupled with disclosures in the Panama Papers, Paradise 
Papers and the Luanda Leaks (Ndikumana, 2020), there is a clear pattern of abuse by elites in the 
developing world to amass wealth by using tax havens. Capital flight, Ndikumana (2020) argues, 
has had a negative impact on the citizens of developing countries in Africa, depriving 
governments of the resources to invest in public services such as education, clean drinking water, 
healthcare, childcare services and sanitation systems. 
A significant share of all MNEs own tax haven subsidiaries or, in some cases, are owned 
by parent companies that are registered in tax havens or more broadly offshore financial centres, 
that offer low tax rates or beneficial fiscal treatment of cross-border financial transactions, 




financial markets, which make them attractive to companies large and small (UNCTAD, 2016). 
Enormous amounts of capital flow in and out of tax havens each year. Indeed, Oxfam has 
estimated this flow at over $18.47 trillion in 2013, while Zucman (2013) finds that close to 40% 
of the world’s FDI is routed through tax havens. Almost exclusively, this type of investment is 
not used for productive economic activity in the tax haven location. Instead, it is held there to 
avoid corporate tax levied at higher rates across an MNE’s global network. Subsequently, it 
deprives locations that actually create the economic value-added from revenues that could be 
used to finance public investment and it may increase taxes on less mobile forms of income, such 
as wages and salaries paid to workers. 
Using panel data for a sample of MNEs from 19 developed economies, I find that MNEs 
which have subsidiaries in developing countries with a high degree of capital flight also have a 
much stronger propensity to own tax haven subsidiaries relative to other MNEs who only have 
conventional subsidiaries in developed economies. This suggests MNEs which extend their 
networks to regions of the world characterised by weak institutions and a high degree of capital 
flight are perhaps more interested in diverting untaxed profits out of said regions, hence 
depriving them of precious resources needed for their development. 
This is an important finding and contributes to the literature both conceptually and 
empirically. First, the findings extend our conceptual understanding of how institutional voids 
impact on developing countries. Buckley, Sutherland, Voss and El-Gohari (2015) apply 
internalisation theory and the economic geography of FDI to tax havens and offshore financial 
centres with a particular emphasis on Chinese MNEs. They argue that weak capital market 
imperfections and poor institutional environments create significant transactions costs that can be 




specific phenomenon – countries that experience significant capital flight. Empirical contribution 
lies in the large panel dataset which allows for testing the relationship between MNEs from 19 
developed countries and their various FDI locations around the world, including tax havens. This 
allows for a cross-country comparison that is rare in the literature on tax havens, which mostly 
focuses on single country analysis. 
The rest of this chapter is set out as follows. In the second section I discuss some 
previous literature, the gap and motivation, the 3rd section the conceptual framework is laid out, 
which allows for generating two testable hypotheses. The fourth section gives an overview of the 
data and defines methodology for the empirical tests. The fifth section reports results and the 
sixth section concludes with a discussion of findings, policy implications and suggestions for 
future research. 
 
4.2 Literature Gap and Motivation 
 
Literature concerned with determinants of tax havens has focused on different aspects of the 
firm. Graham & Tucker (2006) relate firm size & profitability with utilization of tax havens. 
Desai, Foley, & Hines (2006a) focus on American MNEs and find that firms with large R&D 
operations will be more likely to use tax haven affiliates while intra-firm trade exhibits a positive 
relation with tax haven usage as well. Taylor, Richardson & Taplin (2015) have a focused study 
on the determinants of tax haven utilization based on data from 200 Australian firms. Their focus 




Jones & Temouri (2016) depart from the convention and bring into focus the 
characteristics of an MNE’s home country when trying to explain tax haven utilization. They 
segregate home countries according to the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) approach (Hall & 
Soskice 2001, Hall & Gingerich 2009) creating a dummy variable for home country market 
orientation in their firm level data-set, and use the approach to show that MNE’s originating 
from Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) are more likely to use tax havens when compared with 
MNE’s from Co-ordinated Market Economies (CMEs).  
Figure 1 shows a plot for likelihood of tax haven FDI in two MNE’s as argued by Jones 
& Temouri (2016). The plot 3 dimensional with the interaction of 3 separate axis; the Firm 
Specific Advantages (FSAs), the Home-Country Specific Advantages (CSAs) and the Host-
CSAs. Since the host country here are tax havens, the Host-CSAs present the same value, their 
“non-marketable assets” of low tax rates and secrecy, and it is the interaction of Home-CSAs and 











Figure 1: Plot for tax haven FDI of two firms with different FSAs and Home-CSAs 
(note: Host country here refers to tax havens) 
 
 
This paper builds on previous work by introducing the location of MNE subsidiaries as a 
primary factor to explain tax haven utilization, something that has not been conceptualized 
before. This factor has escaped the attention of international business scholars, who have been 
focused on traditional view of the firm, the host country and the home country. Let us for now 
look at a real-world example of tax avoidance and the use of tax havens and understand where 
the motivation to address subsidiary locations as a factor comes from.  
The Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ), the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) 
& the U.S. Public Interest Research Group Education Fund (U.S. PIRG Education Fund) 












Offshore Shell Games 2016 (2016) tracks the use of tax havens by the biggest US MNEs. The 
report states that at least 367 of the Fortune 500 operate tax haven subsidiaries.  
The most solid contribution of the report is devising a method to calculate the taxes 
avoided by these companies by operating tax haven subsidiaries. US firms are theoretically 
required to declare their tax exposure in the US on profits they have booked abroad. Now US 
firms claim that these are profits made on economic activity outside the United States and can 
choose not to fulfil the obligation of reporting the tax exposure if they deem it “not practical”. 
Only 58 of the 298 Fortune 500 companies with offshore earnings declare the tax they would pay 
if they brought earnings outside the US to the country.  
The US government gives tax credits for earnings made abroad, that is companies won’t 
be taxed twice and tax paid abroad will be deductible for tax purposes on the relevant income in 
the US. The CTJ report uses this provision to calculate the percentage tax paid by MNEs abroad 
by subtracting the percentage tax they declare they are liable to in the US.  
For example, in the case of Apple, the firm has booked $214.9 billion offshore and 
declared that it would owe the US government $65.4 billion if the earnings were shifted to the 
US, as of 2015. This comes to a rate of 30.6%, which when subtracted from the US corporate tax 
rate of 35% gives the tax rate paid by Apple on its earnings abroad: 4.6%.  
Needless to say, 4.6% is a very low tax rate and it is fair to conclude that the firm has 
placed most of its profits abroad into tax havens, thus avoiding applicable tax rates in actual 
areas of economic activity. On average, the report finds that the 58 Fortune 500 companies that 
declared their tax liability in the US paid taxes at only 6.2% on their operations abroad, saving 




However, this thesis will argue that this is revenue denied to foreign governments, and 
points to an exploitation of weaker government institutions around the world for minimizing tax 
liability there. 
Some existing literature backs up this argument and also provides some clues as to how 
the subsidiary locations of MNEs effects their propensity to invest in tax havens. Sundari & 
Susanti (2016) provide an empirical study of Indonesian firms to tease out determinants of 
transfer pricing. The key finding from their study is that foreign ownership is a significant 
positive factor for transfer pricing activity in the firm. With ownership held abroad, or 
concentrated abroad, Indonesian firms were more likely to shift profits outside the country 
through transfer pricing. Thus stripping tax revenue in Indonesia.  
Jansky & Prats (2015) present a study of 1500 MNEs operating in India. Their results 
show that firms which are linked with tax havens report lower profits than those firms that do not 
have such links. Therefore, the authors argue that corporations with tax haven presence are able 
to shift their profits and pay lower taxes to the authorities. 
Sugathan & George (2015) conducted a similar, more in depth study with Indian firms 
that had foreign ownership. Their empirical study concludes that on average foreign owned 
firms’ shift 6% of total pre-tax income outside of the country. They credit the weak government 
institutions in India for this, noting that tax-motivated profit shifting is interlinked with the 
quality of institutions at the country level. Furthermore, they find “that governance infrastructure 





From the CTJ report and some literature it can be concluded that large US firms, from the 
developed world with strong governance institutions & enforcing mechanisms, avoid taxes in 
their foreign subsidiaries by shifting the profits to tax havens. The studies of Indonesian and 
Indian firms, both developing world with comparatively weaker country level governance 
infrastructures, show that foreign ownership increases profit shifting outside the country. The 
work of Sugathan & George is particularly important as it links profit shifting with country level 
institutions.  
This clear gap in literature concerning the incentive (or disincentive) provided to MNEs 
from operating subsidiaries in specific locations when it comes to tax haven utilization has, at the 
time of writing, has not been addressed or identified in International Business literature and 
forms the motivation for this chapter.  
 
 
4.3 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the conceptual framework that shows the complementary relationship 
between tax haven investment and investing in overseas non-tax haven subsidiaries. The 
framework draws on the traditional internalisation theory (see Rugman, 1980; 2010) and 
combines it with insights from Buckley, Sutherland, Voss and El-Gohari (2015) who apply 
internalisation theory to offshore FDI with respect to Chinese capital flows. I lean on Buckley et 
al’s (2015) framework which is based on a case-based empirical approach but extend it in a 




generate empirical hypotheses that can be estimated with firm-level data using panel data 
econometrics. The benefit of this larger scale empirical analysis lies in capturing cross-country 
evidence for a set of heterogeneous DMNEs which have different incentives and subsidiary 
structures in developing and tax haven countries. 
 The profit shifting activities of MNEs is a complex process (Holtzblatt, Jermakowicz, & 
Epstein, 2015; Pun, 2017). MNEs who choose to undertake this type of activity need to employ a 
set of well qualified accountants and tax experts to take advantage of the so-called hybrid miss-
match opportunities that result from differences in the tax code across countries (Kemme, Parikh 
& Steigner, 2017; OECD, 2013). In general, this is not a difficult task for MNEs to set up 
because there is an army of tax specialists, law firms and accountancy firms, such as the Big 4, 
who are ready to meet the demands of firms to undertake this type of activity (see Cobham, 
Jones & Temouri, 2018; Sikka, 2015; Sikka & Willmott, 2010). This can be observed by the 
recent Panama papers and Paradise papers scandals that generated widespread media attention 
across the world from the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. 
 At present, countries across the world are party to over 3,000 bilateral international tax 
treaties. Although this is a significant number and the tax landscape is constantly changing 
(David, 2018), this complexity allows firms to use standard transfer pricing techniques to shift 
profits out of high tax jurisdictions and in to low tax jurisdictions (Eden,1998; Eden & Kurdle, 
2005). It is important to note, that this type of activity is not necessarily illegal. In some 
circumstances, transfer pricing is actually needed in order to evaluate the performance of 
divisions across a MNEs corporate structure. But very often this is abused for tax and secrecy 
purposes and many scholars and NGOs believe it does not play to the spirit and intention of the 




undermines the undoubted ability of capitalism to enhance living standards across the world 
(Shaxson, 2014; Palan et al. 2010).  
 In order to abstract away from the complexity of the structures used to undertake 
international profit shifting, Figure 2 shows a simple tax avoidance structure. This basic 
framework is useful because it can encompass all motivations as to why MNEs may wish to use 
tax haven subsidiaries. In order to simplify the theory I will subsume all of these factors under a 
simple heading: “profit shifting”. Figure 2 includes three boxes from left to right. In box 1 I have 
the parent MNE which I assume originates from a developed economy, for example from the 
OECD. In the second box I have the tax haven subsidiary. This subsidiary is located in an 
offshore jurisdiction that fits the parent company’s needs. Previous literature suggests that MNEs 
do not just choose a tax haven location in a vacuum. Offshore locations specialise in different 
ways, for example geographical proximity or cultural ties to centres of large economic activity, 
quality of governance & institutions, small local populations and so on (Dharmapala & Hines, 
2009). Nevertheless, one common aspect of tax haven locations is that they usually have 
institutions in place that protect the interests of investors. These include a stable political 
environment, a legal system that aligns with the interests of private property, privacy and high 
levels of secrecy for investors, light touch regulation and low, often zero, rates of tax on 
corporate profits. Finally, box 3 includes the parent firm’s set of (non-tax haven) conventional 
subsidiaries. There could be any number of such subsidiaries included in this box, from any 
location (except a tax haven) across the world. Let’s assume that the parent has a significant 






Figure 2: Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 The simple profit shifting structure illustrated in Figure 2 can be described as follows. 
The parent MNE, by its own definition, will set up subsidiaries in foreign markets to mitigate 
transaction costs. This type of FDI is based on the 4 standard FDI motives (Dunning, 1980; 
1988): (1) market-seeking; (2) resources-seeking; (3) efficiency-seeking; and (4) strategic asset-
seeking. Hence real resources will flow back and forth from the set of subsidiaries to the parent. 
This could include knowledge transfers, intangible assets and capital goods and is illustrated by 
capital flow “a” in Figure 2, which is equal to the sum of capital flows from the set of 
subsidiaries. At some stage in the MNEs life cycle, the MNE may choose to take advantage of 
the financial benefits of setting up a tax haven subsidiary. This could be prior to the conventional 
investment overseas or it could be at a later date. Once the tax haven has been set up, what I call 




conventional overseas subsidiaries. These flows can be seen by shadow-resource flows “b” and 
“d” in Figure 1 which are equal to the sum of shadow resource flows from the set of subsidiaries. 
Furthermore (not shown on the diagram), these flows may end up back in the parent firm’s 
location of origin if the tax rules change i.e. there is a repatriation tax holiday (Bloink, 2011, Kyj 
& Romeo, 2015). An example of a shadow resource flow could be the use of an intangible asset 
such as intellectual property like a brand or business process. Ownership of the intangible is 
booked into the tax haven, and the conventional subsidiary has to pay a royalty fee to utilise the 
intellectual property. Hence, profits are shifted from the conventional subsidiary in the high-tax 
location to the tax haven subsidiary in the low tax location. This is shown by capital flow “c” in 
Figure 2 which is equal to the sum of all the profit shifting from each of the conventional 
subsidiaries. A classic example of this type of structure is that of Starbucks. In 2012 it was 
revealed that though Starbucks had sales worth £1.2 billion in the United Kingdom in the 3 years 
preceding 2012, the company paid zero income tax, as they reported zero profits. This was made 
possible by using practices such as transfer pricing, by registering patents with a subsidiary in a 
low tax jurisdiction outside of the UK and then paying royalty payments to it, and by paying 
interest on loans; basically through a robust profit shifting structure (Campbell & Helleloid, 
2016).  
 So how does this simple profit shifting structure relate to the key research question of this 
paper? Our focus is on the complementary relationship between the use of tax haven subsidiaries 
and investment in overseas non-tax haven subsidiaries that are owned in order to conduct 
conventional FDI. In figure 2, the arrow at the top of the figure shows the degree of market 
imperfection and institutional weakness as posited by Buckley, Sutherland, Voss and El-Gohari 




institutional weakness increase, firms are more likely to undertake FDI with a physical presence 
as opposed to running joint ventures, licensing or simply exporting (Puck et al, 2009). Hence, it 
is plausible to argue that box 2 contains a continuum of foreign subsidiaries, controlled by the 
parent and ranked in terms of the level of economic development of the location in which they 
are based. For instance, a UK firm may own a conventional overseas subsidiary in Poland 
represented by position 𝑥 and a conventional overseas subsidiary in the Democrat Republic of 
the Congo represented by position 𝑦 where we assume that the degree of market imperfection 
and institutional weakness is such that 𝑦 > 𝑥. Therefore, MNEs are more likely to own tax 
havens, if they have interests in developing economies. This means that capital flows “c” and “d” 
between the conventional subsidiaries and the tax haven will be much stronger from location 𝑦 
relative to location 𝑥. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: MNEs who control foreign subsidiaries in developing economies have a higher 
likelihood of owning a tax haven subsidiary relative to MNEs who only control foreign 
subsidiaries in developed economies. 
 
The first hypothesis helps to reaffirm internalisation theory set within this context. It builds upon 
Buckley, Sutherland, Voss and El-Gohari (2015) by allowing us to econometrically verify its 
core predication. However, there is already a significant body of literature that provides 
substantial evidence in favour of internalisation theory (de Oliveira Concer & Turolla, 2013). 
Hence, I build upon this first hypothesis by adopting a more nuanced focus that allows us to 
interpret our findings in a different way and moves away from the Buckley framework. The 




Rugman, 2010) and market imperfections as the key driver of FDI is somewhat all encompassing 
and can become quite misleading. It explains very well why FDI occurs but does not offer a 
normative perspective as to whether the FDI flows are welfare enhancing or detrimental. Under 
normal circumstances, IB scholars typically view FDI as being positive in terms of economic 
well-being. There are a number of studies that investigate the causal mechanisms between FDI 
and economic growth (Moudatsou & Kyrkilis, 2011.). However, in this context, where FDI flows 
are being routed in to and out of tax havens is it simply enough to say that the casual mechanism 
of this is a market imperfection? The market imperfection could be related to how a developing 
country has developed its corporate tax regime. As is well known in the public economics 
literature, all taxes have a tendency to result in deadweight loss and hence the market 
imperfection in this context is the result of a tax regime that has been designed to collect revenue 
to finance public goods.  
 
 
The contention in this thesis is that the use of tax havens is not confined as a response to the 
problem of market imperfection, rather it is, especially in the context of the developing world, a 
response to an opportunity.  
 
Figure 3 :Plot for tax haven FDI of two firms with different FSAs, Home-CSAs & 







Consider figure 3 that plots the propensity of two MNEs investing in a tax haven. The host 
country here is the tax haven. The advantages offered by the tax haven to either MNE are the 
same: low tax rate and secrecy. However, the likelihood of investing in the tax haven depends on 
other factors as well; home country advantages, firm specific advantages (Jones & Temouri) and, 
I argue, subsidiary country advantages.  
In layman’s terms, tax havens are only attractive to firms that can move untaxed capital 
into tax havens. Moving capital without taxation could be harder in some countries compared to 
others.  The OECD has been working for over two decades to combat what it perceives as the 
harmful effect of tax havens. The OECD’s efforts in this regard can be traced back to 1998 with 
the OECD Harmful Tax Competition report (Kurdle 2008). Since 2002 the OECD has been 














havens in order to facilitate the exchange of tax information. Bilicka & Fuest (2014) found that 
tax havens were indeed signing the TIEAs with OECD countries they had strong links with, 
noting that tax havens do not systematically undermine tax information exchange by signing 
TIEAs with irrelevant countries. The OECD has also focused on transfer pricing, with the 
transfer guidelines and agreement among member states over the arm’s length principle. Other 
efforts focused on combating tax base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) are only just coming 
into effect but point to the determination of the OECD in this regard. BEPS particularly focuses 
on the tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules across jurisdictions 
that allow firms to artificially shift profits to low or no tax jurisdictions. 
Much of the developing world outside the OECD is far behind when it comes to battling profit 
shifting, transfer pricing etc. In fact, the first set of transfer pricing guidelines for developing 
country tax authorities was published by the UN only in 2013 and a second one issued in 2017 
(United Nations, 2013, 2017). Thus the opportunity to shift profits from a country outside the 
OECD must be much greater than from countries inside the OECD. Hitherto increasing the 
likelihood a MNE operating outside the OECD uses a tax haven. The weakness in institutions 
discussed earlier is not necessarily confined to weak capital controls of individual states, quality 
of governance or corruption, but in the context of tax havens more relevant are larger bilateral 
TIEAs and multinational organisations like the OECD.  
 
 Over recent decades, some of the weakest economies in the world – notably Sub-Saharan 
Africa - have experienced significant outflows of foreign capital into Western financial centres. 
Ndikumana and Boyce (2018 and 2010) calculate capital flight for 30 sub-Saharan African 




over this period, far exceeding the stock of debt owed by these countries as of 2015 ($496.9 
billion). They go on to point out these countries lose more through capital flight than they 
receive in the form of foreign aid. Furthermore, they state that “promoting international 
cooperation to lift the veil of secrecy in offshore banking jurisdictions” would go a long way to 
curtail future capital flight. Hence, there seems to be a strong association between countries that 
experience significant capital flight and tax haven use. This is not necessarily to say that the 
capital flight is completely attributable to MNEs. Many nations suffer from corruption and much 
of the money going out could be in the form of bribes or rent extraction by local elites.  
 
However, what is clear is that capital flight is indicative of the opportunity present to make use 
of tax havens. This is especially true for unrecorded capital flight, which avoids taxation. It is 
this phenomenon that MNEs, who operate across borders and move capital frequently, must view 
as an opportunity but has not been investigated. If an MNE operates in a country associated with 
heavy unrecorded capital flight, it is presented with an opportunity to shift profits out much more 
easily than it would in an OECD country with strong regulations and low unrecorded flight. But 
for MNEs based in the developed world, shifting untaxed profit to their high tax home countries 
would only result in taxation in said country. This would defeat the purpose of profit shifting. In 
order to keep the profits untaxed, they need to move them into a tax haven, 
 
As far as I am aware, estimates of the complementary relationship between MNEs investing in 
countries associated with capital flight and their use of tax havens are non-existent in the 
literature. We simply do not know whether the propensity of MNEs to use tax havens is stronger 




flow out. Hence, our dataset allows us to shed light on this phenomenon and offer an explanation 
of this type of flow. Thus, hypothesis 2 examines the complementary relationship between the 
use of tax havens and, at the same time, undertaking FDI into countries that experience 
significant capital flight.  
 
 Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of owning a tax haven subsidiary increases if an MNE 
 controls subsidiaries in countries associated with a significant degree of capital flight 
 
 
4.4 Data & Methodology 
The primary source of data for this study is the ORBIS database published by Bureau van Dijk. 
ORBIS is a firm level data set that contains published information on accounts, financials, 
ownership and location of companies from all across the world. Furthermore, the database 
includes the number and location of all the owned subsidiaries for each firm. This is valuable as 
it allows us to map the operations of MNEs across the globe and allows us to identify 
investments into locations classified as tax havens. The secrecy provisions in tax havens make it 
hard to trace subsidiaries or any companies incorporated there, not to mention their financial 
details. The geographical identification of subsidiaries provided by the data from ORBIS thus 
presents one of the best and only ways to shed light on this type of activity. 
For the purpose of this study, the dataset includes MNEs from the following 19 
developed countries: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, Austria, Japan, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, France, Greece, Portugal, Italy, 




foreign enterprise. The data consist of an unbalanced panel for the years 2009 to 2017 and the 
dataset consists of over 149,000 observations across 34,000 MNEs. 
Table 9 : MNEs distribution by home country 

























4.4.1 Dependent Variable: Defining tax havens 
Defining which counties are classified as tax havens is not straightforward. In their book Tax 
Havens: How Globalization Really Works, Palan et al (2010:8) define tax havens as ‘‘places or 
countries that have sufficient autonomy to write their own tax, finance, and other laws and 
regulations. They all take advantage of this autonomy to create legislation designed to assist non-




places where those non-resident people or corporations undertake the substance of their 
economic transaction.’’ 
Tax havens are, first and foremost, legal entities; countries, cities, or states, that have the 
authority to make their own laws, specifically tax laws. These entities thus have legal control or 
jurisdiction over certain geographical areas that they use to offer individuals and corporations 
incentives for investment. The incentives come in a number of ways, the most significant of 
which are low tax rates on mobile capital and the provision of secrecy (Palan et al., 2010).  
 The literature so far has focussed more on nominal or low tax offerings by jurisdictions, 
and perhaps overlooked secrecy provisions when defining tax havens. This paper will attempt to 
correct this oversight.  
Researchers that have taken a conservative approach include Hines & Rice (1994) and 
Desai et al. (2006b) who talk of “dot tax havens”; geographically small, isolated, often island 
economies that thrive as financial hubs with little indigenous population or industry. Cayman 
Islands, Andorra, Monaco, Seychelles etc. These are in contrast to the Big 7; Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Switzerland, Liberia, Lebanon, Singapore and Panama, all with populations over 2 
million and significant indigenous economic activity. Jones & Temouri (2016) stick with the 
“dot tax havens” in their investigation on market orientation and its effects, as that allows for 
looking at investments inarguably designed for tax avoidance.  
In order to capture a broader picture, we consider two more categories; the Big 7 tax 
haven - Switzerland, Ireland, Hong Kong, Liberia, Lebanon, Panama and Singapore – and the 
European Union’s list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (European Council, 
2017; 2019). The European Union’s list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes is an 
important resource because it identifies countries that administer harmful preferential tax 
regimes, don’t apply BEPS minimum standards or are lacking in terms of automatic exchange of 
information agreements. 
Thus, for the purposes of this paper we utilise 4 variants of tax havens. First is the list of 
dot tax havens used in previous studies, most recently Jones and Temouri (2016); second is a 
definition that also includes the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions in addition to the dot tax 




combines all 3 definitions. The jurisdictions that fall in each of the groups are laid out in detail in 
table 10. 
 
Table 10 Tax Haven Definitions 
Jones & Temouri 
(2016) Dot Tax Havens 
EU Non-Cooperative 
Jurisdictions 
Hines & Rice 
Big 7 
Andorra Bahrain Hong Kong 
Anguilla Barbados Ireland 
Antigua Belize Lebanon 
Barbados Grenada Liberia 
Bahrain Guam Panama 
Bermuda Macao SAR Singapore 
Bahamas Marshall Islands Switzerland 
Belize Mongolia  
British Virgin Islands Namibia  
Cayman Islands Palau  
Cook Islands Panama  
Cyprus St Lucia  
Isle of Man Samoa  
Jersey Trinidad & Tobago  
Gibraltar Tunisia  
Grenada UAE  
Guernsey   
Liechtenstein   
Luxembourg   
Macao   
Malta   
Monaco   
Netherlands Antilles   
Saint Kitts and Nevis   
Saint Lucia   
Saint Vincent   
Seychelles   
Turks and Caicos Islands   
 
These are binary dummies; the variable equals 1 for any firm that owns a subsidiary in 




2017 and provides the records of subsidiary ownership at each point of time in the data set. The 
dependent variables are thus time variant across the sample. That is to say, if an MNE were to 
close a tax haven subsidiary at one point in time or open a new one, the tax haven dummy would 
switch to represent that change. 
 
 
4.4.2 Explanatory Variables: 
Previous literature identifies a number of variables that have explanatory power in explaining the 
determinants of tax haven use. Taylor, Richardson & Taplin (2015) utilize data based on 200 
Australian firms. They find intangible assets, withholding taxes and multi-nationality to have 
significant explanatory pwer. Graham & Tucker (2006) relate firm size & profitability with the 
utilization of tax havens. Desai, Foley, & Hines (2006a) focus on American MNEs and find that 
firms with large R&D operations will be more likely to use tax haven affiliates while intra-firm 
trade exhibits a positive relationship with tax haven usage.  
With these studies as guidelines, the yearly financial accounts provided by Orbis give us 
a number of our control variables, such as turnover, number of foreign subsidiaries and total 
assets to capture firm size and internationalisation. Also accounted for is firm age, intangible 
fixed assets & longterm debt. It is important to point out that this data is for the parent only and 
not the foreign subsidiaries. I also use country level data by incorporating top statutory and 
effective corporate tax rates from the Oxford Centre for Business Taxation. Effective tax rates 
are lower than statutory rates. Overall tax rates show a downward trend across the spectrum over 




NACE two-digit industry codes are relied upon to create broad sector categorizations to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity. This is to capture the effect of industry type and 
technology intensity. The categories are as follows: high technology manufacturing, medium 
high-technology manufacturing, medium low-technology manufacturing, low technology 
manufacturing, knowledge-intensive services, and less-knowledge intensive services. 
 
4.4.3 The developed & developing world 
In order to classify countries as developed or developing, the study looks at categorizations both 
economic and institutional. For this we will rely on the United Nations and the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation & Development. The World Economic Situation and Prospects(WESP) 
is a joint product of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(UN/DESA), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the 
five United Nations regional commissions (Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and Economic 
and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)) 
The 2014 WESP country classifications reflect the basic economic conditions in the 
country and serve as a reliable marker for development for the time period used in the data set of 
this paper. In order to make a more deliberate classification I rely on the OECD.  
Thus, the OECD and the steps it has taken reflect the kind of institutional strength and 
cross border transparency lacking in the developing world, and which MNEs can take advantage 




developed world countries as those with full membership of the OECD and are also classified as 
developed world by the UN’s 2014 WESP country classifications. 
The countries that qualify as developed for this paper are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 
With this classification as the template, I create a dummy variable called “Developed” to 
represent the presence of subsidiaries of MNEs in the developed world. If an MNE has a 
subsidiary in the developed world the “Developed” variable will be set equal 1 and otherwise 0. 
The developing world is represented by regional dummies created for Africa, Oceania, Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North America, South & Central America, South & 
Central Asia and East Asia. This is done by tracking in which countries each MNE owns a 
subsidiary. The binary dummy with a value of 1 & 0 signals the presence/absence of a subsidiary 
in said region(s).  
Both the developing world geographic variables as well as the developed world 
“Developed” variable exclude tax havens. This means that if an MNE operates in country 
classified as a tax haven inside Africa, and not in any other country in Africa, then the Africa 
dummy for said MNE will have the value of zero. Similarly, the developing world regional 
dummies exclude OECD member developed state from each region pool. For example, if an 




East Asia dummy for said MNE will have a value of zero. Table 20 in the appendix section gives 
a regional breakdown. 
 
4.3.4 Unrecorded capital flight 
Global Financial Integrity (GFI) is a non-profit Washington DC-based research and advisory 
organization, working on the analyses of illicit financial flows and promoting pragmatic 
transparency measures in the international financial system as a means to global development 
and security. GFI put out data as well as periodic reports for what they regard “illicit financial 
flows” from the developing world. This paper makes use of the data from two GFI reports, Illicit 
Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2004-2013 and Illicit Financial Flows to and from 
Developing Countries: 2005-2014. 
The data captures unreported financial outflows from the developing world by obtaining 
IMF data regarding balance of payments of each country and the Directions of Trade Statistics 
(DOTS), enabling analysis of discrepancies. World Bank data on debt is taken into account for 
the analysis of broad capital flight. Their calculations put the total unrecorded capital flight from 
the developed world over the 10-year period (2004-2013) to roughly $7.8 trillion, peaking in 











This paper uses the GFI data to form a ranking of average annual unreported capital flight 
from developing countries. The countries are then divided into 3 groups. The “Capital Flight Top 
10” is the top ten countries by average capital flight. The “Capital Flight 11-30” is the next 20 
countries and the “Capital Flight 31-50” is the group of the next 20 countries rounding up the top 
50. I then create binary dummy variables that record the presence of an MNE subsidiary in each 
group. This will allow us to capture what effect having a subsidiary in a large capital flight group 




























These measures are targeted at capturing total capital flight, but another way to look at 
the data, and institutional weakness, is by calculating capital flight as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product(GDP). Figure 3 captures the 10 largest regions and countries by average 
unrecorded capital flight between 2004 and 2013. Naturally, a number of large economies, such 
as China, India and Brazil, feature in the discussion. However, some unexpected countries, such 
as Malaysia, also make the cut. In 2013, Brazil’s economy was over 5 times the size of 
Malaysia’s, yet unrecorded capital flight from Malaysia is almost twice as much as from Brazil. 
 
Figure 5: Average annual unrecorded capital outflows as percentage of GDP (2004-2013) 
 
 
This means that developing world countries do not suffer a uniform level of unrecorded 

















case in question, Brazil loses only 1.3% of its GDP as unrecorded capital outflows, whereas the 
figure stands at 18.9% for Malaysia. I use GFI data to form a ranking of countries based on 
unrecorded capital outflows as a percentage of their GDP, taking an average figure for each 
country from 2004 to 2013. This allows for a new classification that gives us 4 new variables. 
These measure the presence of MNE subsidiaries in developing countries with unrecorded 
capital flight as a percentage of GDP. Specifically: i) below 2% of GDP; ii) between 2% to 5% 
of GDP; iii) between 5% to 10% of GDP; and  iv) above 10% of GDP. 
 
4.4.5 Empirical Model 
Jones & Temouri (2016) use a probit model for their estimation of tax haven determinants when 
focusing on the Varieties of Capitalism. This study uses the same ORBIS database employed in 
that paper while increasing the number of binary dummies employed. Thus the data lends itself 
to econometric analysis using a probit model, which is consistent with the studies undertaken in 
the past. For this study I use three variants of the same econometric model, the first one of which 
deals with hypothesis 1 as follows: 
 
Tax Haven = β0 + β1 Developed + β2 Region dummy + β3 FSAkit + β4 Sector + ɛit            (1) 
 
where Tax Haven refers to the dependent variable which takes the value of 1 if an MNE 
owns a tax haven subsidiary and 0 otherwise. Developed represents the presence of developed 




dummies to measure presence of subsidiaries of an MNE in North America, South & Central 
America, South & Central Asia, East Asia, Oceania, Middle East, Western Europe and Eastern 
Europe. The vector FSA contains firm specific independent variables identified in earlier studies 
(Jones & Temouri, 2016; Graham & Tucker 2006). These include intangible assets, firm age, 
total assets, turnover, no of subsidiaries & longterm debt. The SECTOR vector refers to industry 
sectors that cover High tech manufacturing, Medium/high tech manufacturing, Medium/low tech 
manufacturing, low tech manufacturing, Knowledge intensive & less knowledge intensive.  
The model above is adjusted twice for the 2nd hypothesis, with the first iteration outlined 
as: 
Tax Haven = β0 + β1 Developed + β2 Capital Flight + β3 Region dummy + β4 FSAkit + β5 Sector + 
ɛit                                                                                                                                                                                                      (2) 
Tax Haven is again the binary variable measuring presence of a subsidiary in tax haven 
and new capital flight dummies are introduced, corresponding to presence of subsidiaries in high 
capital flight risk countries. As outlined in the data section these variables measure presence of 
subsidiaries in 3 categories of high unrecorded capital flight countries. Region dummies are 
adjusted to take this into account, leaving just “rest of world” and “rest of Africa” variables. For 
a second iteration of hypothesis 2 I adjust the equation as follows: 
 
Tax Haven = β0 + β1 Developed + β2 GDP% + β3 FSAkit + β4 Sector + ɛit                                 (3) 
Regional dummies are completely eliminated in the model. Instead developing world 




GDP% variables record the presence of subsidiaries in countries where unrecorded capital 
outflows account for i) above 10% of GDP ii) 5-10% of GDP iii) 2-5% of GDP and iv) below 




The empirical results (marginal effects) are shown in Tables 11, 12 and 13. Each table has four 
columns within it corresponding to different tax haven dependent variables, starting with the 
narrowest definition of a tax haven and finishing with the broadest definition of a tax haven. 
Table 11 specifically tests hypotheses 1, whereas Tables 12 and 13 investigate the impact of 
capital flight and hence test hypothesis 2. 
 
First to be tested is hypotheses 1, which predicts that parent firms who own subsidiaries in the 
developing world will have a greater propensity to use tax havens. This is operationalised by 
including dummy variables for a specific region where a parents owns subsidiaries. As can be 
seen for each tax haven measure in columns 1-4 of table 11, parent firms who own a subsidiary 
in a developed country compared to not owning a subsidiary in a developed country are much 
less likely to own a tax haven subsidiary. The magnitude of this effect gets larger as the tax 
haven measure shifts from the narrow definition to the broad definition. Hence, this represents 
our first part of the evidence that MNEs who only own subsidiaries in the developed world are 
less likely to use tax havens. 
The other regional dummies are of even greater interest and specifically test hypothesis 1. The 




haven it would appear that parent firms who own a subsidiary in Africa have a 5.3 % greater 
probability of utilising a tax haven compared to firms who do not own a tax haven subsidiary. 
Interestingly, the magnitude increases to 11.4 % when the measure for tax havens includes the 
EU blacklisted jurisdictions but falls when utilising the broadest measure of tax havens in 
column 3. This suggests that the ownership of subsidiaries in Africa is strongly correlated with 
the most secretive tax haven locations – the so-called “dot” tax havens and the tax havens 
identified by the EU as being the most non-cooperative in terms of transparency. 
Similar evidence can be seen for the other regional dummy variables for developing countries 
but the magnitude of the effect across the tax haven measures is not quite as large compared to 
Africa. One exception to this however, is the ownership of subsidiaries in Oceania. However, 
this can perhaps be explained as an outlier due to the fact that subsidiary ownership in this region 
comprises a very small part of the sample and the possibility that these locations themselves are 
tiny island economies, arguably working as auxiliaries to neighbouring havens. In summary, 
therefore, our results indicate quite strong support for hypothesis 1 in that it appears that 
subsidiary ownership in the developing world, which is characterised by market imperfections 











Table 11: OECD versus Rest of the world 
Variables Dot Tax 
Havens 
Dot + EU 
Non-
Cooperative 
Dot + Big7 Dot + EU NC 
+ Big7 
Developed -0.0462*** -0.0985*** -0.188*** -0.214*** 
 (0.00272) (0.00356) (0.00459) (0.00399) 
Africa 0.0526*** 0.114*** -0.0243*** 0.0283*** 
 (0.00266) (0.00384) (0.00588) (0.00612) 
East Asia 0.00660*** 0.0153*** 0.171*** 0.160*** 
 (0.00189) (0.00258) (0.00476) (0.00478) 
South & Central Asia 0.0165*** 0.0335*** 0.110*** 0.101*** 
 (0.00248) (0.00341) (0.00576) (0.00573) 
Rest of Europe 0.0297*** 0.0307*** -0.0556*** -0.0667*** 
 (0.00191) (0.00251) (0.00528) (0.00511) 
Middle East 0.0464*** 0.186*** 0.0879*** 0.0673*** 
 (0.00439) (0.0118) (0.0112) (0.0183) 
North America 0.00955*** 0.0520*** -0.0196*** -0.0199*** 
 (0.00251) (0.00380) (0.00674) (0.00666) 
South America -0.00208 0.0240*** -0.0173*** -0.0166*** 
 (0.00198) (0.00281) (0.00499) (0.00499) 
Oceania 0.134*** 0.177*** 0.186*** 0.167*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0230) (0.0345) (0.0361) 
Ln Intangible fixed assets 0.00599*** 0.00715*** 0.0148*** 0.0150*** 
 (0.000366) (0.000469) (0.000747) (0.000738) 
Ln Long term debt 0.00537*** 0.00605*** -0.00355*** -0.00350*** 
 (0.000427) (0.000545) (0.000827) (0.000820) 
Ln Cash flow 0.0134*** 0.0126*** 0.0289*** 0.0253*** 
 (0.000758) (0.000976) (0.00158) (0.00155) 
Ln Turnover -0.00639*** -0.00620*** 0.0160*** 0.0148*** 
 (0.000739) (0.000982) (0.00167) (0.00163) 
Foreign Subsidiaries 0.000900*** 0.00179*** 0.0133*** 0.0145*** 
 (2.99e-05) (7.91e-05) (0.000512) (0.000500) 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 149,244 149,244 149,244 149,244 
Note: Each column reports probit regression. The dependent variable is whether a firm owns a subsidiary in a tax 
haven. Two variations of tax haven dummy. Marginal effects are reported. Period dummies, the constant and the 
fixed effect coefficients are unreported for brevity. Total long-term debt, turnover, free cash flow and intangible 
assets are entered as their natural logarithms. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  





For hypothesis 2 concerning capital outflows, the results also appear to support our hypotheses. 
The propensity of MNEs to utilise tax havens is increased if they own subsidiaries in countries 
with high levels of absolute unrecorded capital outflows. However, the results in Table 12 shows 
a very interesting dynamic in play for the use of particular variants of tax havens. The strongest 
positive relationship for subsidiaries in the top 10 countries by capital flight is with the Big7 
variant of tax havens. This suggests that when investing in these larger economies, such as 
China, MNEs are more likely to go through the larger “offshore financial centres”, for example 
Hong Kong or Singapore. However, for economies outside the top 50 by absolute capital flight, 
the strongest marginal effect are associated with the smaller, more secretive locations ((5.6% for 
dot tax havens and 13.8% for dot + the EU blacklist tax havens).  
This dynamic is again highlighted in results reported in Table 13, which look at clusters of 
countries grouped by capital flight as a percentage of each country’s GDP. The highest 
percentage of GDP outflows are associated most strongly with the smaller and blacklisted tax 
haven locations(5.1% more likely), meanwhile the inclusion of the Big7 produces the strongest 
relationship with countries in the 2-5% of GDP outflow range. This range again includes larger 
economies like India and China, while the above 10% range has smaller, less often poorer 
countries such as Laos and The Gambia (for a full list see appendix Table 21 and 20).  
In terms of our control variables, the results are again consistent with earlier studies in that 
intangible assets and size, measured by total number of subsidiaries and assets, show a positive 
relation with investment in tax havens. Our results also confirm a positive relationship between 




Table 12 : Unrecorded capital outflows (Absolute) 
Variables Dot Tax 
Havens 
Dot + EU 
Non-
Cooperative 
Dot + Big7 Dot+EU NC 
+ Big7 
Developed -0.0437*** -0.0915*** -0.194*** -0.220*** 
 (0.00273) (0.00367) (0.00463) (0.00397) 
Capital Flight Top 10 0.00258 0.0131*** 0.0637*** 0.0501*** 
 (0.00172) (0.00235) (0.00440) (0.00432) 
Capital Flight 11-30 0.0190*** 0.0689*** 0.0373*** 0.0558*** 
 (0.00253) (0.00372) (0.00566) (0.00555) 
Capital Flight 31-50 0.0422*** 0.0458*** -0.0746*** -0.0777*** 
 (0.00221) (0.00274) (0.00507) (0.00498) 
Rest of Africa 0.0568*** 0.138*** -0.0569*** -0.00436 
 (0.00369) (0.00678) (0.00797) (0.00964) 
Rest of World 0.0163*** 0.0517*** 0.0514*** 0.0390*** 
 (0.00239) (0.00345) (0.00599) (0.00590) 
Ln Intangible fixed assets 0.00660*** 0.00840*** 0.0151*** 0.0153*** 
 (0.000370) (0.000473) (0.000744) (0.000734) 
Ln Long term debt 0.00520*** 0.00616*** -0.00453*** -0.00449*** 
 (0.000428) (0.000545) (0.000824) (0.000808) 
Ln Cash flow  0.0137*** 0.0133*** 0.0300*** 0.0266*** 
 (0.000765) (0.000984) (0.00158) (0.00154) 
Ln Turnover  -0.00615*** -0.00674*** 0.0190*** 0.0176*** 
 (0.000749) (0.000987) (0.00168) (0.00163) 
Foreign Subsidiaries 0.000978*** 0.00200*** 0.0141*** 0.0152*** 
 (3.19e-05) (8.50e-05) (0.000476) (0.000432) 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 149,244 149,244 149,244 149,244 
Note: Each column reports probit regression. The dependent variable is whether a firm owns a subsidiary in a tax 
haven. Four variations of tax haven dummy. Marginal effects are reported. Period dummies, the constant and the 
fixed effect coefficients are unreported for brevity. Total long-term debt, turnover, free cash flow and intangible 
assets are entered as their natural logarithms. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 






Table 13: Unrecorded Capital Outflows (GDP %) 
Variables Dot Tax 
Havens 
Dot + EU 
Non-
Cooperative 
Dot + Big7 Dot + EU NC 
+ Big 7 
Developed -0.0456*** -0.0966*** -0.184*** -0.200*** 
 (0.00276) (0.00361) (0.00464) (0.00426) 
Above 10% GDP 0.0280*** 0.0511*** 0.141*** 0.130*** 
 (0.00271) (0.00375) (0.00618) (0.00620) 
5% to 10% GDP 0.0236*** 0.0390*** -0.000286 -0.00154 
 (0.00196) (0.00261) (0.00168) (0.00168) 
2% to 5% GDP 0.0205*** 0.0370*** 0.0501*** 0.104*** 
 (0.00180) (0.00237) (0.00428) (0.00423) 
Below 2% 0.00890*** 0.0452*** -0.0247*** -0.0230*** 
 (0.00193) (0.00272) (0.00492) (0.00487) 
Ln Intangible fixed assets 0.00647*** 0.00796*** 0.0157*** 0.0162*** 
 (0.000369) (0.000468) (0.000742) (0.000737) 
Ln Long term debt 0.00534*** 0.00590*** -0.00471*** -0.00467*** 
 (0.000428) (0.000540) (0.000824) (0.000820) 
Ln Cash flow 0.0129*** 0.0121*** 0.0312*** 0.0276*** 
 (0.000759) (0.000964) (0.00158) (0.00155) 
Ln Turn over -0.00702*** -0.00729*** 0.0195*** 0.0169*** 
 (0.000741) (0.000968) (0.00168) (0.00164) 
Foreign Subsidiaries 0.00107*** 0.00212*** 0.0132*** 0.0137*** 
 (3.17e-05) (8.32e-05) (0.000522) (0.000516) 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 149,244 149,244 149,244 149,244 
Note: Each column reports probit regression. The dependent variable is whether a firm owns a subsidiary in a tax 
haven. Four variations of tax haven dummy. Marginal effects are reported. Period dummies, the constant and the 
fixed effect coefficients are unreported for brevity. Total long-term debt, turnover, free cash flow and intangible 
assets are entered as their natural logarithms. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 










In summary, our results consistently show that firms investing within the OECD developed 
world countries are less likely to invest in tax havens while firms investing in developing world 
countries are more likely to do the same. Developing parts of the Asia and especially Africa are 
the regions where investment by MNEs most strongly increases the likelihood of investment in a 
tax havens. This is explained by looking at unrecorded capital outflows from these regions, with 
Asia characterised by countries with both high total unrecorded capital outflows (China, 
Indonesia, India), as well as countries where unrecorded capital outflows form a large percentage 
of the GDP (Malaysia, Thailand). Meanwhile Africa is the region most vulnerable to unrecorded 
capital outflows, with sub-Saharan Africa as a region posting average unrecorded capital 
outflows that are 6.1% of the region’s GDP (2004–2013), which suggests a relationship with the 
high propensity of MNEs investing in Africa to also utilise tax havens.  
Also significant are estimates for developed world countries which consistently return 
significant, negative marginal effects. These findings could suggest that some of the measures 
the OECD has taken as a whole, and perhaps measures taken by tax authorities of individual 
developed countries, have been somewhat successful in discouraging tax haven utilisation by 
MNEs operating in those jurisdictions. 
Inclusion of the big7 tax havens in the tax haven dummy are associated more strongly with 
subsidiaries in larger economies. An argument could be made that they just serve as facilitation 
locations or gateways to certain regions in the world, but the evidence also favours the 
suggestion that these locations serve as nodes to channel funds out and into the more secretive 
tax havens when firms are dealing with larger economies with arguably better developed 




translate to OECD developed countries, especially for the Big 7 countries based in Europe or 
North America. This though does not hold. Instead of reducing the size of the negative marginal 
effects between dot tax havens and developed world subsidiary presence (around -4.5%), the 
inclusion of the Big 7 further expands the negative effect in all 3 specifications (up to -22.4%). 
Another fascinating finding concerns the Africa region. Owning a subsidiary in the Africa 
increases the likelihood of owning a subsidiary in a “dot” tax haven, the effect increases with the 
inclusion of EU black-listed jurisdictions, but the effect is reduced with the inclusion of the Big7. 
Does this suggested African regimes are so weak MNEs don’t need to operate through one of the 
larger havens to siphon out the profits? There certainly is a location bias for the use of tax havens 
by MNEs. 
The implications here are twofold. First, the larger “tax havens” do indeed act as tax havens 
utilised by MNEs to shift profits. Second, the institutional strength of developed world 
governments, and the efforts made by the OECD for transparency and exchange of information, 
discourage MNEs from using tax havens at least when they are operating within the OECD 
members. Consider the case of Apple. Apple’s $214.9 billion held offshore has been taxed at a 
paltry 4.6%, and if they were to bring the capital to the United States, $65.4 billion would be 
taxed at a rate of 30.4%. However, that is income that Apple derived from financial activity 
outside of the United States. On operations in the United States, Apple reserved $15.8 billion in 
income taxes at an effective tax rate of 25.8% (Helman, 2017). Indeed, Zucman (2015) says that 
55% of foreign profits of US firms are stashed in tax havens.  
This behaviour suggests that capital held in tax havens by DMNEs is actually generated in 




tax havens more when investing in developing countries with a large unrecorded capital flight 
problem, are looked at as part of this larger puzzle, an argument can be made that tax havens 




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The origin & utilization of tax havens has been traced as far back as the period between the first 
& second World Wars (Zucman et al., 2016) and today they are a key cog in the globalised 
business world. World organisations like the OECD, the EU and the UN have all been paying 
attention to tax havens and formulating policy to regulate, and in some instances combat, the 
impact havens have on the modern world. Tax havens now occupy space in many domestic 
political debates as well, especially since the release of the Panama Papers, often in the centre of 
arguments against graft or for fair taxation.  
 
              Given their importance & relevance in the global business & political world, it can be 
argued that not enough attention has been paid to tax havens in academic literature. Tax havens 
by their nature, often geographically inaccessible to large numbers of the human population and 
shrouded in mystery because of legal measures to ensure opacity, are difficult to investigate. 
Regardless of the reasons, academic understanding of how tax havens function & what are the 





                This thesis makes several contributions to that end, providing both theoretical rationale 
and empirical examination to improve our understanding of determinants of tax haven 
utilization. Firstly, the results from this thesis suggest a connection between certain corporate 
governance mechanism and the likelihood of owning a subsidiary in tax havens. The particular 
variables are ownership concentration & female representation on the board of directors. 
Ownership concentration has been studies as a determinant for tax avoidance in previous 
literature (Badertscher, Katz and Rego, 2013; Chen et al. 2010 ) and in one study as determinant 
of tax havens (Bird and Karolyi, 2017). Using a “first four” shareholders concentration measure, 
results in this thesis show a negative relationship between ownership concentration & likelihood 
of owning a tax haven subsidiary. These results could indicate support for two possible theories. 
One is that concentrated ownership indicates long term investment or investors who are looking 
at the longterm health of a firm, and thus less likely to take risky decisions. As tax avoidance, the 
primary purpose for use of tax havens, can be viewed as a risky choice, with consequences such 
as fines and loss of reputation, they are less likely to engage in the behaviour. The second theory 
is Desai and Dharmapala (2006)’s argument of managerial diversion as a cause of tax avoidance, 
where low ownership concentration would represent weaker checks on managers.  
 
                             The ownership concentration study is based on the agency theory of corporate 
governance, whereas the investigation into the role of female members of the board of directors 
is rooted in the stakeholder theory. The stakeholder theory posits the board of governors as a 
mechanism of control where different stakeholders, owing to different backgrounds or interests, 




negative association between the appointment of female members in the board of directors of a 
firm and the likelihood of owning tax haven subsidiaries. These results build on literature that 
shows women have different backgrounds, charecteristics and priorities (Eagly and Johnson 
1990; Eagly, Johannsen-Schmidt and van Engen, 2003; Carter et al., 2003) compared to men in 
the board of directors and their presence on the board reduces the tax aggressiveness of the firm 
(Richardson, Taylor and Lanis, 2016) 
 
                    The results summarily suggest that corporate governance does have a role in 
determining firm behaviour with regards to tax haven utilization, the extent and exact nature of 
the relationship is something that needs further study. These results were limited by the scarcity 
of data available for board of directors backgrounds, as well as some control variables, therefore 
it necessitated the large pool of MNEs from 12 developed world economies, with data from 
developing world economies even more rare. In the future, as developing and developed world 
economies start reporting data in a more transparent and comprehensive manner, the models in 
this thesis can be replicated in longitudinal studies that focus on individual countries or even a 
smaller group of countries. Modelling for individual countries could provide greater insights 
because behaviours tend to vary in different contexts and cultures. The above suggestions also 
constitute the principal limitation of the investigation into corporate governance as a determinant 
for tax haven utilization in this thesis. However, there is still enough empirical evidence to 
suggest the existence of relationships, and certainly enough to warrant further studies.  
 
                    The 4th Chapter of the thesis makes significant empirical contributions. The thesis 




locations. Running probit models to estimate likelihood of owning a tax haven subsidiary, results 
in this thesis show a strong relationship with existing subsidiary locations both positive and 
negative. These results are very interesting as they show positive relationship for MNEs 
operating subsidiaries in the developing world, and particularly in the developing world with 
large incidences of unrecorded capital flight. On the other hand, the results show strong negative 
association with MNEs operating subsidiaries in the developed world.  
 
This suggests MNEs from the developed world are negatively inclined to use tax havens when 
operating within the developed world but do so aggressively when operating in the developing 
world. It can be interpreted that they are taking advantage of weaker institutions or international 
regulators and financial controls to siphon capital and profits out of developing world countries 
and stash them in tax havens.  
 
These findings warrant a reset of the debate around both tax havens in 2 substantial ways. First, 
these findings negate the need or argument for the tax haven driven race to the bottom for tax 
rates across the developed world (Devereaux, Lockwood and Redoano 2008; Altshuler and 
Grubert 2006). As MNEs in the developed world are largely using tax havens when operating in 
the developing world, and thus arguably for extracting profits from the developing world, the 
change in tax rates at home is not going to influence their decision of using tax havens. 
Secondly, the debate about bringing tax money “back” into the developed world countries also 
needs a re-examination. Since findings from this empirical study suggest that MNEs use tax 




havens, and thus the tax due on them, belongs to the developing world and that is where this 
capital should go “back” to cannot be understated. 
 
In conclusion, this thesis provides a basis for further examining the link between corporate 
governance and tax haven utilization, a theoretical extension to examine the international process 
and empirical grounds for retooling the tax haven debate from one focused on stopping base 
erosion in the developed world to one concerned with the exploitation of the developing world.  
 
These findings are relevant to policy makers with the OECD and the developed world, as 
perhaps a basis to rethink the ‘race to the bottom’ tax rates approach. However, their key 
relevance is to the developing world and the development sector, the UN, the World Bank and 
the likes as they endeavour to create better economic and governance conditions in countries 
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Technology and knowledge-intensive sectors 
Data by sector is collected according to the Statistical classification of economic activities in the 
European Community - NACE Rev. 2 and aggregated into the agreed Eurostat high technology 
sectors. These are listed below. 
 
 
Table 15:  Classification of manufacturing industries by level of technology 
intensity 
 
Level of technology 
intensity 
NACE two digits code Divisions 
High-technology sectors 21 
 
26 
Manufacture of basic 
pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations 
Manufacture of computer, 





27 to 30 
Manufacture of chemicals and 
chemical products 
Manufacture of electrical 
equipment; Manufacture of 
machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers; 














Manufacture of coke and refined 
petroleum products; 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic 
products; Manufacture of other 
non-metallic mineral 
products; Manufacture of basic 
metals; Manufacture of fabricated 
metals products, excepts 
machinery and equipment; 
Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment 





31 to 32 
Manufacture of food products, 
beverages, tobacco products, 
textile, wearing apparel, leather 
and related products, wood and of 
products of wood, paper and 
paper products, printing and 
reproduction of recorded media; 
Manufacture of furniture; Other 
manufacturing 











Table 16:  Classification of services industries by level of technology intensity 
 
Level of technology 
intensity 
NACE two digits code Divisions 
Knowledge-intensive services 50 to 51 











64 to 66 









Water transport; Air transport; 
Publishing activities; Motion 
picture, video and television 
programme production, sound 
recording and music publish 
activities; Programming and 
broadcasting activities; 
Telecommunications; computer 
programming, consultancy and 
related activities; Information 
service activities (section J); 
Financial and insurance activities 
(section K); 
Legal and accounting activities; 
Activities of head offices, 
management consultancy 
activities; 
Architectural and engineering 
activities, technical testing and 
analysis; Scientific research and 
development; Advertising and 
market research; Other 
professional, scientific and 
technical 
activities; Veterinary activities 
(section M); 
Employment activities; 





     78 
      80 
84 to 93 
Public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security (section 
O); Education (section 
P), Human health and social work 
activities (section Q); Arts, 








   72 
Motion picture, video and 
television programme production, 
sound recording and music 
publish activities; Programming 
and broadcasting activities; 
Telecommunications; computer 
programming, consultancy and 
related activities; Information 
service activities; 
Scientific research and 
development; 
Knowledge-intensive market 
services (excl. financial 
intermediation and high-tech 
services) 




69 to 71 
 
73 to 74 
      78 
      80 
Water transport; Air transport; 
Legal and accounting activities; 
Activities of head offices, 
management consultancy 
activities; 
Architectural and engineering 
activities, technical testing and 
analysis; 
Advertising and market research; 
Other professional, scientific and 
technical activities; 
Employment activities; 








      58 
      75 
84 to 93 
Publishing activities; 
Veterinary activities; 
Public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security (section 




P), Human health and social work 
activities (section Q); Arts, 




45 t6 47 
      49 
      52 
55 to 56 
      
 
      68 
      77 
       
     79 
      81 
 
      82 
 
      95 
Wholesale and retail trade; Repair 
of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
(section G); 
Land transport and transport via 
pipelines; 
Warehousing and support 
activities for transportation; 
Accommodation and food service 
activities (section I); 
Real estate activities (section L); 
Rental and leasing activities; 
Travel agency, tour operator 
reservation service and related 
activities; 
Services to buildings and 
landscape activities; 
Office administrative, office 
support and other business 
support activities; 
Repair of computers and personal 
and household goods; 
Other less-knowledge-
intensive services 
      53 
      94 
      96 
 
 
97 to 99 
Postal and courier activities; 
Activities of membership 
organisation; 
Other personal service activities; 
Activities of households as 
employers of domestic personnel; 
Undifferentiated goods- and 
services-producing activities of 
private households for own use 
(section T); Activities of 
extraterritorial organisations and 
bodies (section U). 








NACE Rev 2 Statistical Classification of Economic Activities 
 






Parent Description Reference 
to ISIC 
Rev. 4 
A  AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING A 
1 A Crop and animal production, hunting and related service 
activities 
1 
1.1 1 Growing of non-perennial crops 11 
1.11 1.1 Growing of cereals (except rice), leguminous crops and 
oil seeds 
111 
1.12 1.1 Growing of rice 112 
1.13 1.1 Growing of vegetables and melons, roots and tubers 113 
1.14 1.1 Growing of sugar cane 114 
1.15 1.1 Growing of tobacco 115 
1.16 1.1 Growing of fibre crops 116 
1.19 1.1 Growing of other non-perennial crops 119 
1.2 1 Growing of perennial crops 12 
1.21 1.2 Growing of grapes 121 
1.22 1.2 Growing of tropical and subtropical fruits 122 
1.23 1.2 Growing of citrus fruits 123 
1.24 1.2 Growing of pome fruits and stone fruits 124 
1.25 1.2 Growing of other tree and bush fruits and nuts 125 
1.26 1.2 Growing of oleaginous fruits 126 
1.27 1.2 Growing of beverage crops 127 
1.28 1.2 Growing of spices, aromatic, drug and pharmaceutical 
crops 
128 
1.29 1.2 Growing of other perennial crops 129 
1.3 1 Plant propagation 13 
1.3 1.3 Plant propagation 130 




1.41 1.4 Raising of dairy cattle 141 
1.42 1.4 Raising of other cattle and buffaloes 141 
1.43 1.4 Raising of horses and other equines 142 
1.44 1.4 Raising of camels and camelids 143 
1.45 1.4 Raising of sheep and goats 144 
1.46 1.4 Raising of swine/pigs 145 
1.47 1.4 Raising of poultry 146 
1.49 1.4 Raising of other animals 149 
1.5 1 Mixed farming 15 
1.5 1.5 Mixed farming 150 
1.6 1 Support activities to agriculture and post-harvest crop 
activities 
16 
1.61 1.6 Support activities for crop production 161 
1.62 1.6 Support activities for animal production 162 
1.63 1.6 Post-harvest crop activities 163 
1.64 1.6 Seed processing for propagation 164 
1.7 1 Hunting, trapping and related service activities 17 
1.7 1.7 Hunting, trapping and related service activities 170 
2 A Forestry and logging 2 
2.1 2 Silviculture and other forestry activities 21 
2.1 2.1 Silviculture and other forestry activities 210 
2.2 2 Logging 22 
2.2 2.2 Logging 220 
2.3 2 Gathering of wild growing non-wood products 23 
2.3 2.3 Gathering of wild growing non-wood products 230 
2.4 2 Support services to forestry 24 
2.4 2.4 Support services to forestry 240 
3 A Fishing and aquaculture 3 
3.1 3 Fishing 31 
3.11 3.1 Marine fishing 311 
3.12 3.1 Freshwater fishing 312 
3.2 3 Aquaculture 32 
3.21 3.2 Marine aquaculture 321 
3.22 3.2 Freshwater aquaculture 322 
B  MINING AND QUARRYING B 
5 B Mining of coal and lignite 5 
5.1 5 Mining of hard coal 51 
5.1 5.1 Mining of hard coal 510 
5.2 5 Mining of lignite 52 
5.2 5.2 Mining of lignite 520 




6.1 6 Extraction of crude petroleum 61 
6.1 6.1 Extraction of crude petroleum 610 
6.2 6 Extraction of natural gas 62 
6.2 6.2 Extraction of natural gas 620 
7 B Mining of metal ores 7 
7.1 7 Mining of iron ores 71 
7.1 7.1 Mining of iron ores 710 
7.2 7 Mining of non-ferrous metal ores 72 
7.21 7.2 Mining of uranium and thorium ores 721 
7.29 7.2 Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores 729 
8 B Other mining and quarrying 8 
8.1 8 Quarrying of stone, sand and clay 81 
8.11 8.1 Quarrying of ornamental and building stone, limestone, 
gypsum, chalk and slate 
810 
8.12 8.1 Operation of gravel and sand pits; mining of clays and 
kaolin 
810 
8.9 8 Mining and quarrying n.e.c. 89 
8.91 8.9 Mining of chemical and fertiliser minerals 891 
8.92 8.9 Extraction of peat 892 
8.93 8.9 Extraction of salt 893 
8.99 8.9 Other mining and quarrying n.e.c. 899 
9 B Mining support service activities 9 
9.1 9 Support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction 91 
9.1 9.1 Support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction 910 
9.9 9 Support activities for other mining and quarrying 99 
9.9 9.9 Support activities for other mining and quarrying 990 
C  MANUFACTURING C 
10 C Manufacture of food products 10 
10.1 10 Processing and preserving of meat and production of 
meat products 
101 
10.11 10.1 Processing and preserving of meat 1010 
10.12 10.1 Processing and preserving of poultry meat 1010 
10.13 10.1 Production of meat and poultry meat products 1010 
10.2 10 Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and 
molluscs 
102 
10.2 10.2 Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and 
molluscs 
1020 
10.3 10 Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables 103 
10.31 10.3 Processing and preserving of potatoes 1030 
10.32 10.3 Manufacture of fruit and vegetable juice 1030 
10.39 10.3 Other processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables 1030 




10.41 10.4 Manufacture of oils and fats 1040 
10.42 10.4 Manufacture of margarine and similar edible fats 1040 
10.5 10 Manufacture of dairy products 105 
10.51 10.5 Operation of dairies and cheese making 1050 
10.52 10.5 Manufacture of ice cream 1050 
10.6 10 Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch 
products 
106 
10.61 10.6 Manufacture of grain mill products 1061 
10.62 10.6 Manufacture of starches and starch products 1062 
10.7 10 Manufacture of bakery and farinaceous products 107 
10.71 10.7 Manufacture of bread; manufacture of fresh pastry goods 
and cakes 
1071 
10.72 10.7 Manufacture of rusks and biscuits; manufacture of 
preserved pastry goods and cakes 
1071 
10.73 10.7 Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar 
farinaceous products 
1074 
10.8 10 Manufacture of other food products 107 
10.81 10.8 Manufacture of sugar 1072 
10.82 10.8 Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 1073 
10.83 10.8 Processing of tea and coffee 1079 
10.84 10.8 Manufacture of condiments and seasonings 1079 
10.85 10.8 Manufacture of prepared meals and dishes 1075 
10.86 10.8 Manufacture of homogenised food preparations and 
dietetic food 
1079 
10.89 10.8 Manufacture of other food products n.e.c. 1079 
10.9 10 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 108 
10.91 10.9 Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals 1080 
10.92 10.9 Manufacture of prepared pet foods 1080 
11 C Manufacture of beverages 11 
11 11 Manufacture of beverages 110 
11.01 11 Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits 1101 
11.02 11 Manufacture of wine from grape 1102 
11.03 11 Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines 1102 
11.04 11 Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages 1102 
11.05 11 Manufacture of beer 1103 
11.06 11 Manufacture of malt 1103 
11.07 11 Manufacture of soft drinks; production of mineral waters 
and other bottled waters 
1104 
12 C Manufacture of tobacco products 12 
12 12 Manufacture of tobacco products 120 
12 12 Manufacture of tobacco products 1200 




13.1 13 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres 131 
13.1 13.1 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres 1311 
13.2 13 Weaving of textiles 131 
13.2 13.2 Weaving of textiles 1312 
13.3 13 Finishing of textiles 131 
13.3 13.3 Finishing of textiles 1313 
13.9 13 Manufacture of other textiles 139 
13.91 13.9 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics 1391 
13.92 13.9 Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel 1392 
13.93 13.9 Manufacture of carpets and rugs 1393 
13.94 13.9 Manufacture of cordage, rope, twine and netting 1394 
13.95 13.9 Manufacture of non-wovens and articles made from non-
wovens, except apparel 
1399 
13.96 13.9 Manufacture of other technical and industrial textiles 1399 
13.99 13.9 Manufacture of other textiles n.e.c. 1399 
14 C Manufacture of wearing apparel 14 
14.1 14 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel 141 
14.11 14.1 Manufacture of leather clothes 1410 
14.12 14.1 Manufacture of workwear 1410 
14.13 14.1 Manufacture of other outerwear 1410 
14.14 14.1 Manufacture of underwear 1410 
14.19 14.1 Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories 1410 
14.2 14 Manufacture of articles of fur 142 
14.2 14.2 Manufacture of articles of fur 1420 
14.3 14 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted apparel 143 
14.31 14.3 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted hosiery 1430 
14.39 14.3 Manufacture of other knitted and crocheted apparel 1430 
15 C Manufacture of leather and related products 15 
15.1 15 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags, saddlery and harness; dressing and dyeing of 
fur 
151 
15.11 15.1 Tanning and dressing of leather; dressing and dyeing of 
fur 
1511 
15.12 15.1 Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery 
and harness 
1512 
15.2 15 Manufacture of footwear 152 
15.2 15.2 Manufacture of footwear 1520 
16 C Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 
16 
16.1 16 Sawmilling and planing of wood 161 




16.2 16 Manufacture of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting 
materials 
162 
16.21 16.2 Manufacture of veneer sheets and wood-based panels 1621 
16.22 16.2 Manufacture of assembled parquet floors 1622 
16.23 16.2 Manufacture of other builders' carpentry and joinery 1622 
16.24 16.2 Manufacture of wooden containers 1623 
16.29 16.2 Manufacture of other products of wood; manufacture of 
articles of cork, straw and plaiting materials 
1629 
17 C Manufacture of paper and paper products 17 
17.1 17 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 170 
17.11 17.1 Manufacture of pulp 1701 
17.12 17.1 Manufacture of paper and paperboard 1701 
17.2 17 Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard  170 
17.21 17.2 Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and of 
containers of paper and paperboard 
1702 
17.22 17.2 Manufacture of household and sanitary goods and of 
toilet requisites 
1709 
17.23 17.2 Manufacture of paper stationery 1709 
17.24 17.2 Manufacture of wallpaper 1709 
17.29 17.2 Manufacture of other articles of paper and paperboard 1709 
18 C Printing and reproduction of recorded media 18 
18.1 18 Printing and service activities related to printing 181 
18.11 18.1 Printing of newspapers 1811 
18.12 18.1 Other printing 1811 
18.13 18.1 Pre-press and pre-media services 1812 
18.14 18.1 Binding and related services 1812 
18.2 18 Reproduction of recorded media 182 
18.2 18.2 Reproduction of recorded media 1820 
19 C Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 19 
19.1 19 Manufacture of coke oven products 191 
19.1 19.1 Manufacture of coke oven products 1910 
19.2 19 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 192 
19.2 19.2 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 1920 
20 C Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 20 
20.1 20 Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen 
compounds, plastics and synthetic rubber in primary 
forms 
201 
20.11 20.1 Manufacture of industrial gases 2011 
20.12 20.1 Manufacture of dyes and pigments 2011 
20.13 20.1 Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals 2011 
20.14 20.1 Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals 2011 




20.16 20.1 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms 2013 
20.17 20.1 Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms 2013 
20.2 20 Manufacture of pesticides and other agrochemical 
products 
202 
20.2 20.2 Manufacture of pesticides and other agrochemical 
products 
2021 
20.3 20 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, 
printing ink and mastics 
202 
20.3 20.3 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, 
printing ink and mastics 
2022 
20.4 20 Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and 
polishing preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations 
202 
20.41 20.4 Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and 
polishing preparations 
2023 
20.42 20.4 Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparations 2023 
20.5 20 Manufacture of other chemical products 202 
20.51 20.5 Manufacture of explosives 2029 
20.52 20.5 Manufacture of glues 2029 
20.53 20.5 Manufacture of essential oils 2029 
20.59 20.5 Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c. 2029 
20.6 20 Manufacture of man-made fibres 203 
20.6 20.6 Manufacture of man-made fibres 2030 
21 C Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations 
21 
21.1 21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 210 
21.1 21.1 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 2100 
21.2 21 Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations 210 
21.2 21.2 Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations 2100 
22 C Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 22 
22.1 22 Manufacture of rubber products 221 
22.11 22.1 Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes; retreading and 
rebuilding of rubber tyres 
2211 
22.19 22.1 Manufacture of other rubber products 2219 
22.2 22 Manufacture of plastic products 222 
22.21 22.2 Manufacture of plastic plates, sheets, tubes and profiles 2220 
22.22 22.2 Manufacture of plastic packing goods 2220 
22.23 22.2 Manufacture of buildersâ€™ ware of plastic 2220 
22.29 22.2 Manufacture of other plastic products 2220 
23 C Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 23 
23.1 23 Manufacture of glass and glass products 231 
23.11 23.1 Manufacture of flat glass 2310 
23.12 23.1 Shaping and processing of flat glass 2310 




23.14 23.1 Manufacture of glass fibres 2310 
23.19 23.1 Manufacture and processing of other glass, including 
technical glassware 
2310 
23.2 23 Manufacture of refractory products 239 
23.2 23.2 Manufacture of refractory products 2391 
23.3 23 Manufacture of clay building materials 239 
23.31 23.3 Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags 2392 
23.32 23.3 Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products, in 
baked clay 
2392 
23.4 23 Manufacture of other porcelain and ceramic products 239 
23.41 23.4 Manufacture of ceramic household and ornamental 
articles 
2393 
23.42 23.4 Manufacture of ceramic sanitary fixtures 2393 
23.43 23.4 Manufacture of ceramic insulators and insulating fittings 2393 
23.44 23.4 Manufacture of other technical ceramic products 2393 
23.49 23.4 Manufacture of other ceramic products 2393 
23.5 23 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 239 
23.51 23.5 Manufacture of cement 2394 
23.52 23.5 Manufacture of lime and plaster 2394 
23.6 23 Manufacture of articles of concrete, cement and plaster 239 
23.61 23.6 Manufacture of concrete products for construction 
purposes 
2395 
23.62 23.6 Manufacture of plaster products for construction purposes 2395 
23.63 23.6 Manufacture of ready-mixed concrete 2395 
23.64 23.6 Manufacture of mortars 2395 
23.65 23.6 Manufacture of fibre cement 2395 
23.69 23.6 Manufacture of other articles of concrete, plaster and 
cement 
2395 
23.7 23 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone 239 
23.7 23.7 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone 2396 
23.9 23 Manufacture of abrasive products and non-metallic 
mineral products n.e.c. 
239 
23.91 23.9 Production of abrasive products 2399 
23.99 23.9 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 2399 
24 C Manufacture of basic metals 24 
24.1 24 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys 241 
24.1 24.1 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys  2410 
24.2 24 Manufacture of tubes, pipes, hollow profiles and related 
fittings, of steel 
241 
24.2 24.2 Manufacture of tubes, pipes, hollow profiles and related 
fittings, of steel 
2410 
24.3 24 Manufacture of other products of first processing of steel 241 




24.32 24.3 Cold rolling of narrow strip 2410 
24.33 24.3 Cold forming or folding 2410 
24.34 24.3 Cold drawing of wire 2410 
24.4 24 Manufacture of basic precious and other non-ferrous 
metals 
242 
24.41 24.4 Precious metals production 2420 
24.42 24.4 Aluminium production 2420 
24.43 24.4 Lead, zinc and tin production 2420 
24.44 24.4 Copper production 2420 
24.45 24.4 Other non-ferrous metal production 2420 
24.46 24.4 Processing of nuclear fuel  2420 
24.5 24 Casting of metals 243 
24.51 24.5 Casting of iron 2431 
24.52 24.5 Casting of steel 2431 
24.53 24.5 Casting of light metals 2432 
24.54 24.5 Casting of other non-ferrous metals 2432 
25 C Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
25 
25.1 25 Manufacture of structural metal products 251 
25.11 25.1 Manufacture of metal structures and parts of structures 2511 
25.12 25.1 Manufacture of doors and windows of metal 2511 
25.2 25 Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal 251 
25.21 25.2 Manufacture of central heating radiators and boilers 2512 
25.29 25.2 Manufacture of other tanks, reservoirs and containers of 
metal 
2512 
25.3 25 Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating 
hot water boilers 
251 
25.3 25.3 Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating 
hot water boilers 
2513 
25.4 25 Manufacture of weapons and ammunition 252 
25.4 25.4 Manufacture of weapons and ammunition 2520 
25.5 25 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; 
powder metallurgy 
259 
25.5 25.5 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; 
powder metallurgy 
2591 
25.6 25 Treatment and coating of metals; machining 259 
25.61 25.6 Treatment and coating of metals 2592 
25.62 25.6 Machining 2592 
25.7 25 Manufacture of cutlery, tools and general hardware 259 
25.71 25.7 Manufacture of cutlery 2593 
25.72 25.7 Manufacture of locks and hinges 2593 
25.73 25.7 Manufacture of tools 2593 




25.91 25.9 Manufacture of steel drums and similar containers 2599 
25.92 25.9 Manufacture of light metal packaging  2599 
25.93 25.9 Manufacture of wire products, chain and springs 2599 
25.94 25.9 Manufacture of fasteners and screw machine products 2599 
25.99 25.9 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products n.e.c. 2599 
26 C Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 26 
26.1 26 Manufacture of electronic components and boards 261 
26.11 26.1 Manufacture of electronic components 2610 
26.12 26.1 Manufacture of loaded electronic boards 2610 
26.2 26 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 262 
26.2 26.2 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 2620 
26.3 26 Manufacture of communication equipment 263 
26.3 26.3 Manufacture of communication equipment 2630 
26.4 26 Manufacture of consumer electronics 264 
26.4 26.4 Manufacture of consumer electronics 2640 
26.5 26 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for 
measuring, testing and navigation; watches and clocks 
265 
26.51 26.5 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for 
measuring, testing and navigation 
2651 
26.52 26.5 Manufacture of watches and clocks 2652 
26.6 26 Manufacture of irradiation, electromedical and 
electrotherapeutic equipment 
266 
26.6 26.6 Manufacture of irradiation, electromedical and 
electrotherapeutic equipment 
2660 
26.7 26 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic 
equipment 
267 
26.7 26.7 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic 
equipment 
2670 
26.8 26 Manufacture of magnetic and optical media 268 
26.8 26.8 Manufacture of magnetic and optical media 2680 
27 C Manufacture of electrical equipment 27 
27.1 27 Manufacture of electric motors, generators, transformers 
and electricity distribution and control apparatus 
271 
27.11 27.1 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and 
transformers 
2710 
27.12 27.1 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control 
apparatus 
2710 
27.2 27 Manufacture of batteries and accumulators 272 
27.2 27.2 Manufacture of batteries and accumulators 2720 
27.3 27 Manufacture of wiring and wiring devices 273 
27.31 27.3 Manufacture of fibre optic cables 2731 
27.32 27.3 Manufacture of other electronic and electric wires and 
cables 
2732 




27.4 27 Manufacture of electric lighting equipment 274 
27.4 27.4 Manufacture of electric lighting equipment 2740 
27.5 27 Manufacture of domestic appliances 275 
27.51 27.5 Manufacture of electric domestic appliances 2750 
27.52 27.5 Manufacture of non-electric domestic appliances 2750 
27.9 27 Manufacture of other electrical equipment 279 
27.9 27.9 Manufacture of other electrical equipment 2790 
28 C Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 28 
28.1 28 Manufacture of general-purpose machinery 281 
28.11 28.1 Manufacture of engines and turbines, except aircraft, 
vehicle and cycle engines 
2811 
28.12 28.1 Manufacture of fluid power equipment 2812 
28.13 28.1 Manufacture of other pumps and compressors 2813 
28.14 28.1 Manufacture of other taps and valves 2813 
28.15 28.1 Manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving 
elements 
2814 
28.2 28 Manufacture of other general-purpose machinery 281 
28.21 28.2 Manufacture of ovens, furnaces and furnace burners 2815 
28.22 28.2 Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment 2816 
28.23 28.2 Manufacture of office machinery and equipment (except 
computers and peripheral equipment) 
2817 
28.24 28.2 Manufacture of power-driven hand tools 2818 
28.25 28.2 Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and ventilation 
equipment 
2819 
28.29 28.2 Manufacture of other general-purpose machinery n.e.c. 2819 
28.3 28 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 282 
28.3 28.3 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 2821 
28.4 28 Manufacture of metal forming machinery and machine 
tools 
282 
28.41 28.4 Manufacture of metal forming machinery 2822 
28.49 28.4 Manufacture of other machine tools 2822 
28.9 28 Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery 282 
28.91 28.9 Manufacture of machinery for metallurgy 2823 
28.92 28.9 Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and 
construction 
2824 
28.93 28.9 Manufacture of machinery for food, beverage and 
tobacco processing 
2825 
28.94 28.9 Manufacture of machinery for textile, apparel and leather 
production 
2826 
28.95 28.9 Manufacture of machinery for paper and paperboard 
production 
2829 
28.96 28.9 Manufacture of plastics and rubber machinery 2829 




29 C Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 29 
29.1 29 Manufacture of motor vehicles 291 
29.1 29.1 Manufacture of motor vehicles 2910 
29.2 29 Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; 
manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers 
292 
29.2 29.2 Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; 
manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers 
2920 
29.3 29 Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles 293 
29.31 29.3 Manufacture of electrical and electronic equipment for 
motor vehicles 
2930 
29.32 29.3 Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor 
vehicles 
2930 
30 C Manufacture of other transport equipment 30 
30.1 30 Building of ships and boats 301 
30.11 30.1 Building of ships and floating structures 3011 
30.12 30.1 Building of pleasure and sporting boats 3012 
30.2 30 Manufacture of railway locomotives and rolling stock 302 
30.2 30.2 Manufacture of railway locomotives and rolling stock 3020 
30.3 30 Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery 303 
30.3 30.3 Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery 3030 
30.4 30 Manufacture of military fighting vehicles 304 
30.4 30.4 Manufacture of military fighting vehicles 3040 
30.9 30 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c. 309 
30.91 30.9 Manufacture of motorcycles 3091 
30.92 30.9 Manufacture of bicycles and invalid carriages 3092 
30.99 30.9 Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c. 3099 
31 C Manufacture of furniture 31 
31 31 Manufacture of furniture 310 
31.01 31 Manufacture of office and shop furniture 3100 
31.02 31 Manufacture of kitchen furniture 3100 
31.03 31 Manufacture of mattresses 3100 
31.09 31 Manufacture of other furniture 3100 
32 C Other manufacturing 32 
32.1 32 Manufacture of jewellery, bijouterie and related articles 321 
32.11 32.1 Striking of coins 3211 
32.12 32.1 Manufacture of jewellery and related articles 3211 
32.13 32.1 Manufacture of imitation jewellery and related articles 3212 
32.2 32 Manufacture of musical instruments 322 
32.2 32.2 Manufacture of musical instruments 3220 
32.3 32 Manufacture of sports goods 323 
32.3 32.3 Manufacture of sports goods 3230 




32.4 32.4 Manufacture of games and toys 3240 
32.5 32 Manufacture of medical and dental instruments and 
supplies 
325 
32.5 32.5 Manufacture of medical and dental instruments and 
supplies 
3250 
32.9 32 Manufacturing n.e.c. 329 
32.91 32.9 Manufacture of brooms and brushes 3290 
32.99 32.9 Other manufacturing n.e.c.  3290 
33 C Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 33 
33.1 33 Repair of fabricated metal products, machinery and 
equipment 
331 
33.11 33.1 Repair of fabricated metal products 3311 
33.12 33.1 Repair of machinery 3312 
33.13 33.1 Repair of electronic and optical equipment 3313 
33.14 33.1 Repair of electrical equipment 3314 
33.15 33.1 Repair and maintenance of ships and boats 3315 
33.16 33.1 Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft 3315 
33.17 33.1 Repair and maintenance of other transport equipment 3315 
33.19 33.1 Repair of other equipment 3319 
33.2 33 Installation of industrial machinery and equipment 332 
33.2 33.2 Installation of industrial machinery and equipment 3320 
D  ELECTRICITY, GAS, STEAM AND AIR CONDITIONING 
SUPPLY 
D 
35 D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 35 
35.1 35 Electric power generation, transmission and distribution 351 
35.11 35.1 Production of electricity 3510 
35.12 35.1 Transmission of electricity 3510 
35.13 35.1 Distribution of electricity 3510 
35.14 35.1 Trade of electricity 3510 
35.2 35 Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through 
mains 
352 
35.21 35.2 Manufacture of gas 3520 
35.22 35.2 Distribution of gaseous fuels through mains 3520 
35.23 35.2 Trade of gas through mains 3520 
35.3 35 Steam and air conditioning supply 353 
35.3 35.3 Steam and air conditioning supply 3530 
E  WATER SUPPLY; SEWERAGE, WASTE 
MANAGEMENT AND REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES 
E 
36 E Water collection, treatment and supply 36 
36 36 Water collection, treatment and supply 360 
36 36 Water collection, treatment and supply 3600 




37 37 Sewerage 370 
37 37 Sewerage 3700 
38 E Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; 
materials recovery 
38 
38.1 38 Waste collection 381 
38.11 38.1 Collection of non-hazardous waste 3811 
38.12 38.1 Collection of hazardous waste 3812 
38.2 38 Waste treatment and disposal 382 
38.21 38.2 Treatment and disposal of non-hazardous waste 3821 
38.22 38.2 Treatment and disposal of hazardous waste 3822 
38.3 38 Materials recovery 383 
38.31 38.3 Dismantling of wrecks 3830 
38.32 38.3 Recovery of sorted materials 3830 
39 E Remediation activities and other waste management 
services 
39 
39 39 Remediation activities and other waste management 
services 
390 
39 39 Remediation activities and other waste management 
services 
3900 
F  CONSTRUCTION F 
41 F Construction of buildings 41 
41.1 41 Development of building projects 410 
41.1 41.1 Development of building projects 4100 
41.2 41 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings 410 
41.2 41.2 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings 4100 
42 F Civil engineering 42 
42.1 42 Construction of roads and railways 421 
42.11 42.1 Construction of roads and motorways 4210 
42.12 42.1 Construction of railways and underground railways 4210 
42.13 42.1 Construction of bridges and tunnels 4210 
42.2 42 Construction of utility projects 422 
42.21 42.2 Construction of utility projects for fluids 4220 
42.22 42.2 Construction of utility projects for electricity and 
telecommunications 
4220 
42.9 42 Construction of other civil engineering projects 429 
42.91 42.9 Construction of water projects 4290 
42.99 42.9 Construction of other civil engineering projects n.e.c. 4290 
43 F Specialised construction activities 43 
43.1 43 Demolition and site preparation 431 
43.11 43.1 Demolition 4311 
43.12 43.1 Site preparation 4312 




43.2 43 Electrical, plumbing and other construction installation 
activities 
432 
43.21 43.2 Electrical installation 4321 
43.22 43.2 Plumbing, heat and air-conditioning installation 4322 
43.29 43.2 Other construction installation 4329 
43.3 43 Building completion and finishing 433 
43.31 43.3 Plastering 4330 
43.32 43.3 Joinery installation 4330 
43.33 43.3 Floor and wall covering 4330 
43.34 43.3 Painting and glazing 4330 
43.39 43.3 Other building completion and finishing 4330 
43.9 43 Other specialised construction activities 439 
43.91 43.9 Roofing activities 4390 
43.99 43.9 Other specialised construction activities n.e.c. 4390 
G  WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE; REPAIR OF 
MOTOR VEHICLES AND MOTORCYCLES 
G 
45 G Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 
45 
45.1 45 Sale of motor vehicles 451 
45.11 45.1 Sale of cars and light motor vehicles 4510 
45.19 45.1 Sale of other motor vehicles 4510 
45.2 45 Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 452 
45.2 45.2 Maintenance and repair of motor vehicles 4520 
45.3 45 Sale of motor vehicle parts and accessories 453 
45.31 45.3 Wholesale trade of motor vehicle parts and accessories 4530 
45.32 45.3 Retail trade of motor vehicle parts and accessories 4530 
45.4 45 Sale, maintenance and repair of motorcycles and related 
parts and accessories 
454 
45.4 45.4 Sale, maintenance and repair of motorcycles and related 
parts and accessories 
4540 
46 G Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
46 
46.1 46 Wholesale on a fee or contract basis 461 
46.11 46.1 Agents involved in the sale of agricultural raw materials, 
live animals, textile raw materials and semi-finished 
goods 
4610 
46.12 46.1 Agents involved in the sale of fuels, ores, metals and 
industrial chemicals 
4610 
46.13 46.1 Agents involved in the sale of timber and building 
materials 
4610 
46.14 46.1 Agents involved in the sale of machinery, industrial 
equipment, ships and aircraft 
4610 
46.15 46.1 Agents involved in the sale of furniture, household goods, 





46.16 46.1 Agents involved in the sale of textiles, clothing, fur, 
footwear and leather goods 
4610 
46.17 46.1 Agents involved in the sale of food, beverages and 
tobacco 
4610 
46.18 46.1 Agents specialised in the sale of other particular products 4610 
46.19 46.1 Agents involved in the sale of a variety of goods 4610 
46.2 46 Wholesale of agricultural raw materials and live animals 462 
46.21 46.2 Wholesale of grain, unmanufactured tobacco, seeds and 
animal feeds 
4620 
46.22 46.2 Wholesale of flowers and plants 4620 
46.23 46.2 Wholesale of live animals 4620 
46.24 46.2 Wholesale of hides, skins and leather 4620 
46.3 46 Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco 463 
46.31 46.3 Wholesale of fruit and vegetables 4630 
46.32 46.3 Wholesale of meat and meat products 4630 
46.33 46.3 Wholesale of dairy products, eggs and edible oils and fats 4630 
46.34 46.3 Wholesale of beverages 4630 
46.35 46.3 Wholesale of tobacco products 4630 
46.36 46.3 Wholesale of sugar and chocolate and sugar 
confectionery 
4630 
46.37 46.3 Wholesale of coffee, tea, cocoa and spices 4630 
46.38 46.3 Wholesale of other food, including fish, crustaceans and 
molluscs 
4630 
46.39 46.3 Non-specialised wholesale of food, beverages and 
tobacco 
4630 
46.4 46 Wholesale of household goods 464 
46.41 46.4 Wholesale of textiles 4641 
46.42 46.4 Wholesale of clothing and footwear 4641 
46.43 46.4 Wholesale of electrical household appliances 4649 
46.44 46.4 Wholesale of china and glassware and cleaning materials 4649 
46.45 46.4 Wholesale of perfume and cosmetics 4649 
46.46 46.4 Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods 4649 
46.47 46.4 Wholesale of furniture, carpets and lighting equipment 4649 
46.48 46.4 Wholesale of watches and jewellery 4649 
46.49 46.4 Wholesale of other household goods 4649 
46.5 46 Wholesale of information and communication equipment 465 
46.51 46.5 Wholesale of computers, computer peripheral equipment 
and software 
4651 
46.52 46.5 Wholesale of electronic and telecommunications 
equipment and parts 
4652 
46.6 46 Wholesale of other machinery, equipment and supplies 466 






46.62 46.6 Wholesale of machine tools 4659 
46.63 46.6 Wholesale of mining, construction and civil engineering 
machinery 
4659 
46.64 46.6 Wholesale of machinery for the textile industry and of 
sewing and knitting machines 
4659 
46.65 46.6 Wholesale of office furniture 4659 
46.66 46.6 Wholesale of other office machinery and equipment 4659 
46.69 46.6 Wholesale of other machinery and equipment 4659 
46.7 46 Other specialised wholesale 466 
46.71 46.7 Wholesale of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels and related 
products 
4661 
46.72 46.7 Wholesale of metals and metal ores 4662 
46.73 46.7 Wholesale of wood, construction materials and sanitary 
equipment 
4663 
46.74 46.7 Wholesale of hardware, plumbing and heating equipment 
and supplies 
4663 
46.75 46.7 Wholesale of chemical products 4669 
46.76 46.7 Wholesale of other intermediate products 4669 
46.77 46.7 Wholesale of waste and scrap 4669 
46.9 46 Non-specialised wholesale trade 469 
46.9 46.9 Non-specialised wholesale trade 4690 
47 G Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 47 
47.1 47 Retail sale in non-specialised stores 471 
47.11 47.1 Retail sale in non-specialised stores with food, beverages 
or tobacco predominating 
4711 
47.19 47.1 Other retail sale in non-specialised stores 4719 
47.2 47 Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialised 
stores 
472 
47.21 47.2 Retail sale of fruit and vegetables in specialised stores 4721 
47.22 47.2 Retail sale of meat and meat products in specialised 
stores 
4721 
47.23 47.2 Retail sale of fish, crustaceans and molluscs in 
specialised stores 
4721 
47.24 47.2 Retail sale of bread, cakes, flour confectionery and sugar 
confectionery in specialised stores 
4721 
47.25 47.2 Retail sale of beverages in specialised stores 4722 
47.26 47.2 Retail sale of tobacco products in specialised stores 4723 
47.29 47.2 Other retail sale of food in specialised stores 4721 
47.3 47 Retail sale of automotive fuel in specialised stores 473 
47.3 47.3 Retail sale of automotive fuel in specialised stores 4730 
47.4 47 Retail sale of information and communication equipment 
in specialised stores 
474 






47.42 47.4 Retail sale of telecommunications equipment in 
specialised stores 
4741 
47.43 47.4 Retail sale of audio and video equipment in specialised 
stores 
4742 
47.5 47 Retail sale of other household equipment in specialised 
stores 
475 
47.51 47.5 Retail sale of textiles in specialised stores 4751 
47.52 47.5 Retail sale of hardware, paints and glass in specialised 
stores 
4752 
47.53 47.5 Retail sale of carpets, rugs, wall and floor coverings in 
specialised stores 
4753 
47.54 47.5 Retail sale of electrical household appliances in 
specialised stores 
4759 
47.59 47.5 Retail sale of furniture, lighting equipment and other 
household articles in specialised stores 
4759 
47.6 47 Retail sale of cultural and recreation goods in specialised 
stores 
476 
47.61 47.6 Retail sale of books in specialised stores 4761 
47.62 47.6 Retail sale of newspapers and stationery in specialised 
stores 
4761 
47.63 47.6 Retail sale of music and video recordings in specialised 
stores 
4762 
47.64 47.6 Retail sale of sporting equipment in specialised stores 4763 
47.65 47.6 Retail sale of games and toys in specialised stores 4764 
47.7 47 Retail sale of other goods in specialised stores 477 
47.71 47.7 Retail sale of clothing in specialised stores 4771 
47.72 47.7 Retail sale of footwear and leather goods in specialised 
stores 
4771 
47.73 47.7 Dispensing chemist in specialised stores 4772 
47.74 47.7 Retail sale of medical and orthopaedic goods in 
specialised stores 
4772 
47.75 47.7 Retail sale of cosmetic and toilet articles in specialised 
stores 
4772 
47.76 47.7 Retail sale of flowers, plants, seeds, fertilisers, pet 
animals and pet food in specialised stores 
4773 
47.77 47.7 Retail sale of watches and jewellery in specialised stores 4773 
47.78 47.7 Other retail sale of new goods in specialised stores 4773 
47.79 47.7 Retail sale of second-hand goods in stores 4774 
47.8 47 Retail sale via stalls and markets 478 
47.81 47.8 Retail sale via stalls and markets of food, beverages and 
tobacco products 
4781 
47.82 47.8 Retail sale via stalls and markets of textiles, clothing and 
footwear 
4782 
47.89 47.8 Retail sale via stalls and markets of other goods 4789 
47.9 47 Retail trade not in stores, stalls or markets 479 




47.99 47.9 Other retail sale not in stores, stalls or markets 4799 
H  TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE H 
49 H Land transport and transport via pipelines 49 
49.1 49 Passenger rail transport, interurban 491 
49.1 49.1 Passenger rail transport, interurban 4911 
49.2 49 Freight rail transport 491 
49.2 49.2 Freight rail transport 4912 
49.3 49 Other passenger land transport  492 
49.31 49.3 Urban and suburban passenger land transport 4921 
49.32 49.3 Taxi operation 4922 
49.39 49.3 Other passenger land transport n.e.c. 4922 
49.4 49 Freight transport by road and removal services 492 
49.41 49.4 Freight transport by road 4923 
49.42 49.4 Removal services 4923 
49.5 49 Transport via pipeline 493 
49.5 49.5 Transport via pipeline 4930 
50 H Water transport 50 
50.1 50 Sea and coastal passenger water transport 501 
50.1 50.1 Sea and coastal passenger water transport 5011 
50.2 50 Sea and coastal freight water transport 501 
50.2 50.2 Sea and coastal freight water transport 5012 
50.3 50 Inland passenger water transport 502 
50.3 50.3 Inland passenger water transport 5021 
50.4 50 Inland freight water transport 502 
50.4 50.4 Inland freight water transport 5022 
51 H Air transport 51 
51.1 51 Passenger air transport 511 
51.1 51.1 Passenger air transport 5110 
51.2 51 Freight air transport and space transport 512 
51.21 51.2 Freight air transport 5120 
51.22 51.2 Space transport 5120 
52 H Warehousing and support activities for transportation 52 
52.1 52 Warehousing and storage 521 
52.1 52.1 Warehousing and storage 5210 
52.2 52 Support activities for transportation 522 
52.21 52.2 Service activities incidental to land transportation 5221 
52.22 52.2 Service activities incidental to water transportation 5222 
52.23 52.2 Service activities incidental to air transportation 5223 
52.24 52.2 Cargo handling 5224 




53 H Postal and courier activities 53 
53.1 53 Postal activities under universal service obligation 531 
53.1 53.1 Postal activities under universal service obligation 5310 
53.2 53 Other postal and courier activities 532 
53.2 53.2 Other postal and courier activities 5320 
I  ACCOMMODATION AND FOOD SERVICE ACTIVITIES I 
55 I Accommodation 55 
55.1 55 Hotels and similar accommodation 551 
55.1 55.1 Hotels and similar accommodation 5510 
55.2 55 Holiday and other short-stay accommodation 551 
55.2 55.2 Holiday and other short-stay accommodation 5510 
55.3 55 Camping grounds, recreational vehicle parks and trailer 
parks 
552 
55.3 55.3 Camping grounds, recreational vehicle parks and trailer 
parks 
5520 
55.9 55 Other accommodation 559 
55.9 55.9 Other accommodation 5590 
56 I Food and beverage service activities 56 
56.1 56 Restaurants and mobile food service activities 561 
56.1 56.1 Restaurants and mobile food service activities 5610 
56.2 56 Event catering and other food service activities 562 
56.21 56.2 Event catering activities 5621 
56.29 56.2 Other food service activities 5629 
56.3 56 Beverage serving activities 563 
56.3 56.3 Beverage serving activities 5630 
J  INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION J 
58 J Publishing activities 58 
58.1 58 Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing 
activities 
581 
58.11 58.1 Book publishing 5811 
58.12 58.1 Publishing of directories and mailing lists 5812 
58.13 58.1 Publishing of newspapers 5813 
58.14 58.1 Publishing of journals and periodicals 5813 
58.19 58.1 Other publishing activities 5819 
58.2 58 Software publishing 582 
58.21 58.2 Publishing of computer games 5820 
58.29 58.2 Other software publishing 5820 
59 J Motion picture, video and television programme 
production, sound recording and music publishing 
activities 
59 
59.1 59 Motion picture, video and television programme activities 591 





59.12 59.1 Motion picture, video and television programme post-
production activities 
5912 
59.13 59.1 Motion picture, video and television programme 
distribution activities 
5913 
59.14 59.1 Motion picture projection activities 5914 
59.2 59 Sound recording and music publishing activities 592 
59.2 59.2 Sound recording and music publishing activities 5920 
60 J Programming and broadcasting activities 60 
60.1 60 Radio broadcasting 601 
60.1 60.1 Radio broadcasting 6010 
60.2 60 Television programming and broadcasting activities 602 
60.2 60.2 Television programming and broadcasting activities 6020 
61 J Telecommunications 61 
61.1 61 Wired telecommunications activities 611 
61.1 61.1 Wired telecommunications activities 6110 
61.2 61 Wireless telecommunications activities 612 
61.2 61.2 Wireless telecommunications activities 6120 
61.3 61 Satellite telecommunications activities 613 
61.3 61.3 Satellite telecommunications activities 6130 
61.9 61 Other telecommunications activities 619 
61.9 61.9 Other telecommunications activities 6190 
62 J Computer programming, consultancy and related 
activities 
62 
62 62 Computer programming, consultancy and related 
activities 
620 
62.01 62 Computer programming activities 6201 
62.02 62 Computer consultancy activities 6202 
62.03 62 Computer facilities management activities 6202 
62.09 62 Other information technology and computer service 
activities 
6209 
63 J Information service activities 63 
63.1 63 Data processing, hosting and related activities; web 
portals 
631 
63.11 63.1 Data processing, hosting and related activities 6311 
63.12 63.1 Web portals 6312 
63.9 63 Other information service activities 639 
63.91 63.9 News agency activities 6391 
63.99 63.9 Other information service activities n.e.c. 6399 
K  FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE ACTIVITIES K 
64 K Financial service activities, except insurance and pension 
funding 
64 




64.11 64.1 Central banking 6411 
64.19 64.1 Other monetary intermediation 6419 
64.2 64 Activities of holding companies 642 
64.2 64.2 Activities of holding companies 6420 
64.3 64 Trusts, funds and similar financial entities 643 
64.3 64.3 Trusts, funds and similar financial entities 6430 
64.9 64 Other financial service activities, except insurance and 
pension funding 
649 
64.91 64.9 Financial leasing 6491 
64.92 64.9 Other credit granting 6492 
64.99 64.9 Other financial service activities, except insurance and 
pension funding n.e.c. 
6499 
65 K Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except 
compulsory social security 
65 
65.1 65 Insurance 651 
65.11 65.1 Life insurance 6511 
65.12 65.1 Non-life insurance 6512 
65.2 65 Reinsurance 652 
65.2 65.2 Reinsurance 6520 
65.3 65 Pension funding 653 
65.3 65.3 Pension funding 6530 
66 K Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance 
activities 
66 
66.1 66 Activities auxiliary to financial services, except insurance 
and pension funding 
661 
66.11 66.1 Administration of financial markets 6611 
66.12 66.1 Security and commodity contracts brokerage 6612 
66.19 66.1 Other activities auxiliary to financial services, except 
insurance and pension funding 
6619 
66.2 66 Activities auxiliary to insurance and pension funding 662 
66.21 66.2 Risk and damage evaluation 6621 
66.22 66.2 Activities of insurance agents and brokers 6622 
66.29 66.2 Other activities auxiliary to insurance and pension funding 6629 
66.3 66 Fund management activities 663 
66.3 66.3 Fund management activities 6630 
L  REAL ESTATE ACTIVITIES L 
68 L Real estate activities 68 
68.1 68 Buying and selling of own real estate 681 
68.1 68.1 Buying and selling of own real estate 6810 
68.2 68 Rental and operating of own or leased real estate 681 
68.2 68.2 Rental and operating of own or leased real estate 6810 




68.31 68.3 Real estate agencies 6820 
68.32 68.3 Management of real estate on a fee or contract basis 6820 
M  PROFESSIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL 
ACTIVITIES 
M 
69 M Legal and accounting activities 69 
69.1 69 Legal activities 691 
69.1 69.1 Legal activities 6910 
69.2 69 Accounting, bookkeeping and auditing activities; tax 
consultancy 
692 
69.2 69.2 Accounting, bookkeeping and auditing activities; tax 
consultancy 
6920 
70 M Activities of head offices; management consultancy 
activities 
70 
70.1 70 Activities of head offices 701 
70.1 70.1 Activities of head offices 7010 
70.2 70 Management consultancy activities 702 
70.21 70.2 Public relations and communication activities 7020 
70.22 70.2 Business and other management consultancy activities 7020 
71 M Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing 
and analysis 
71 
71.1 71 Architectural and engineering activities and related 
technical consultancy 
711 
71.11 71.1 Architectural activities  7110 
71.12 71.1 Engineering activities and related technical consultancy 7110 
71.2 71 Technical testing and analysis 712 
71.2 71.2 Technical testing and analysis 7120 
72 M Scientific research and development  72 
72.1 72 Research and experimental development on natural 
sciences and engineering 
721 
72.11 72.1 Research and experimental development on 
biotechnology 
7210 
72.19 72.1 Other research and experimental development on natural 
sciences and engineering 
7210 
72.2 72 Research and experimental development on social 
sciences and humanities 
722 
72.2 72.2 Research and experimental development on social 
sciences and humanities 
7220 
73 M Advertising and market research 73 
73.1 73 Advertising 731 
73.11 73.1 Advertising agencies 7310 
73.12 73.1 Media representation 7310 
73.2 73 Market research and public opinion polling 732 
73.2 73.2 Market research and public opinion polling 7320 




74.1 74 Specialised design activities 741 
74.1 74.1 Specialised design activities 7410 
74.2 74 Photographic activities 742 
74.2 74.2 Photographic activities 7420 
74.3 74 Translation and interpretation activities 749 
74.3 74.3 Translation and interpretation activities 7490 
74.9 74 Other professional, scientific and technical activities n.e.c. 749 
74.9 74.9 Other professional, scientific and technical activities n.e.c. 7490 
75 M Veterinary activities 75 
75 75 Veterinary activities 750 
75 75 Veterinary activities 7500 
N  ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT SERVICE 
ACTIVITIES 
N 
77 N Rental and leasing activities 77 
77.1 77 Rental and leasing of motor vehicles 771 
77.11 77.1 Rental and leasing of cars and light motor vehicles 7710 
77.12 77.1 Rental and leasing of trucks 7710 
77.2 77 Rental and leasing of personal and household goods 772 
77.21 77.2 Rental and leasing of recreational and sports goods 7721 
77.22 77.2 Rental of video tapes and disks 7722 
77.29 77.2 Rental and leasing of other personal and household 
goods 
7729 
77.3 77 Rental and leasing of other machinery, equipment and 
tangible goods 
773 
77.31 77.3 Rental and leasing of agricultural machinery and 
equipment 
7730 
77.32 77.3 Rental and leasing of construction and civil engineering 
machinery and equipment 
7730 
77.33 77.3 Rental and leasing of office machinery and equipment 
(including computers) 
7730 
77.34 77.3 Rental and leasing of water transport equipment 7730 
77.35 77.3 Rental and leasing of air transport equipment 7730 
77.39 77.3 Rental and leasing of other machinery, equipment and 
tangible goods n.e.c. 
7730 
77.4 77 Leasing of intellectual property and similar products, 
except copyrighted works 
774 
77.4 77.4 Leasing of intellectual property and similar products, 
except copyrighted works 
7740 
78 N Employment activities 78 
78.1 78 Activities of employment placement agencies 781 
78.1 78.1 Activities of employment placement agencies 7810 
78.2 78 Temporary employment agency activities 782 




78.3 78 Other human resources provision 783 
78.3 78.3 Other human resources provision 7830 
79 N Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation 
service and related activities 
79 
79.1 79 Travel agency and tour operator activities 791 
79.11 79.1 Travel agency activities 7911 
79.12 79.1 Tour operator activities 7912 
79.9 79 Other reservation service and related activities 799 
79.9 79.9 Other reservation service and related activities 7990 
80 N Security and investigation activities 80 
80.1 80 Private security activities 801 
80.1 80.1 Private security activities 8010 
80.2 80 Security systems service activities 802 
80.2 80.2 Security systems service activities 8020 
80.3 80 Investigation activities 803 
80.3 80.3 Investigation activities 8030 
81 N Services to buildings and landscape activities 81 
81.1 81 Combined facilities support activities 811 
81.1 81.1 Combined facilities support activities 8110 
81.2 81 Cleaning activities 812 
81.21 81.2 General cleaning of buildings 8121 
81.22 81.2 Other building and industrial cleaning activities 8129 
81.29 81.2 Other cleaning activities 8129 
81.3 81 Landscape service activities 813 
81.3 81.3 Landscape service activities 8130 
82 N Office administrative, office support and other business 
support activities 
82 
82.1 82 Office administrative and support activities 821 
82.11 82.1 Combined office administrative service activities 8211 
82.19 82.1 Photocopying, document preparation and other 
specialised office support activities 
8219 
82.2 82 Activities of call centres 822 
82.2 82.2 Activities of call centres 8220 
82.3 82 Organisation of conventions and trade shows 823 
82.3 82.3 Organisation of conventions and trade shows 8230 
82.9 82 Business support service activities n.e.c. 829 
82.91 82.9 Activities of collection agencies and credit bureaus 8291 
82.92 82.9 Packaging activities 8292 
82.99 82.9 Other business support service activities n.e.c. 8299 
O  PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEFENCE; 
COMPULSORY SOCIAL SECURITY 
O 





84.1 84 Administration of the State and the economic and social 
policy of the community 
841 
84.11 84.1 General public administration activities 8411 
84.12 84.1 Regulation of the activities of providing health care, 
education, cultural services and other social services, 
excluding social security 
8412 
84.13 84.1 Regulation of and contribution to more efficient operation 
of businesses 
8413 
84.2 84 Provision of services to the community as a whole 842 
84.21 84.2 Foreign affairs 8421 
84.22 84.2 Defence activities 8422 
84.23 84.2 Justice and judicial activities 8423 
84.24 84.2 Public order and safety activities 8423 
84.25 84.2 Fire service activities 8423 
84.3 84 Compulsory social security activities 843 
84.3 84.3 Compulsory social security activities 8430 
P  EDUCATION P 
85 P Education 85 
85.1 85 Pre-primary education 851 
85.1 85.1 Pre-primary education  8510 
85.2 85 Primary education 851 
85.2 85.2 Primary education  8510 
85.3 85 Secondary education 852 
85.31 85.3 General secondary education  8521 
85.32 85.3 Technical and vocational secondary education  8522 
85.4 85 Higher education 853 
85.41 85.4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education 8530 
85.42 85.4 Tertiary education 8530 
85.5 85 Other education 854 
85.51 85.5 Sports and recreation education 8541 
85.52 85.5 Cultural education 8542 
85.53 85.5 Driving school activities 8549 
85.59 85.5 Other education n.e.c. 8549 
85.6 85 Educational support activities 855 
85.6 85.6 Educational support activities 8550 
Q  HUMAN HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK ACTIVITIES Q 
86 Q Human health activities 86 
86.1 86 Hospital activities 861 
86.1 86.1 Hospital activities 8610 
86.2 86 Medical and dental practice activities 862 




86.22 86.2 Specialist medical practice activities 8620 
86.23 86.2 Dental practice activities 8620 
86.9 86 Other human health activities 869 
86.9 86.9 Other human health activities 8690 
87 Q Residential care activities 87 
87.1 87 Residential nursing care activities 871 
87.1 87.1 Residential nursing care activities 8710 
87.2 87 Residential care activities for mental retardation, mental 
health and substance abuse 
872 
87.2 87.2 Residential care activities for mental retardation, mental 
health and substance abuse 
8720 
87.3 87 Residential care activities for the elderly and disabled 873 
87.3 87.3 Residential care activities for the elderly and disabled 8730 
87.9 87 Other residential care activities 879 
87.9 87.9 Other residential care activities 8790 
88 Q Social work activities without accommodation 88 
88.1 88 Social work activities without accommodation for the 
elderly and disabled 
881 
88.1 88.1 Social work activities without accommodation for the 
elderly and disabled 
8810 
88.9 88 Other social work activities without accommodation 889 
88.91 88.9 Child day-care activities 8890 
88.99 88.9 Other social work activities without accommodation n.e.c. 8890 
R  ARTS, ENTERTAINMENT AND RECREATION R 
90 R Creative, arts and entertainment activities 90 
90 90 Creative, arts and entertainment activities 900 
90.01 90 Performing arts 9000 
90.02 90 Support activities to performing arts 9000 
90.03 90 Artistic creation 9000 
90.04 90 Operation of arts facilities 9000 
91 R Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities 91 
91 91 Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities 910 
91.01 91 Library and archives activities 9101 
91.02 91 Museums activities 9102 
91.03 91 Operation of historical sites and buildings and similar 
visitor attractions 
9102 
91.04 91 Botanical and zoological gardens and nature reserves 
activities 
9103 
92 R Gambling and betting activities 92 
92 92 Gambling and betting activities 920 
92 92 Gambling and betting activities 9200 




93.1 93 Sports activities 931 
93.11 93.1 Operation of sports facilities 9311 
93.12 93.1 Activities of sports clubs 9312 
93.13 93.1 Fitness facilities 9311 
93.19 93.1 Other sports activities 9319 
93.2 93 Amusement and recreation activities 932 
93.21 93.2 Activities of amusement parks and theme parks 9321 
93.29 93.2 Other amusement and recreation activities 9329 
S  OTHER SERVICE ACTIVITIES S 
94 S Activities of membership organisations 94 
94.1 94 Activities of business, employers and professional 
membership organisations 
941 
94.11 94.1 Activities of business and employers membership 
organisations 
9411 
94.12 94.1 Activities of professional membership organisations 9412 
94.2 94 Activities of trade unions 942 
94.2 94.2 Activities of trade unions 9420 
94.9 94 Activities of other membership organisations 949 
94.91 94.9 Activities of religious organisations 9491 
94.92 94.9 Activities of political organisations 9492 
94.99 94.9 Activities of other membership organisations n.e.c. 9499 
95 S Repair of computers and personal and household goods 95 
95.1 95 Repair of computers and communication equipment 951 
95.11 95.1 Repair of computers and peripheral equipment 9511 
95.12 95.1 Repair of communication equipment 9512 
95.2 95 Repair of personal and household goods 952 
95.21 95.2 Repair of consumer electronics 9521 
95.22 95.2 Repair of household appliances and home and garden 
equipment 
9522 
95.23 95.2 Repair of footwear and leather goods 9523 
95.24 95.2 Repair of furniture and home furnishings 9524 
95.25 95.2 Repair of watches, clocks and jewellery 9529 
95.29 95.2 Repair of other personal and household goods 9529 
96 S Other personal service activities 96 
96 96 Other personal service activities 960 
96.01 96 Washing and (dry-)cleaning of textile and fur products 9601 
96.02 96 Hairdressing and other beauty treatment 9602 
96.03 96 Funeral and related activities 9603 
96.04 96 Physical well-being activities 9609 
96.09 96 Other personal service activities n.e.c. 9609 
T  ACTIVITIES OF HOUSEHOLDS AS EMPLOYERS; 





PRODUCING ACTIVITIES OF HOUSEHOLDS FOR 
OWN USE 
97 T Activities of households as employers of domestic 
personnel 
97 
97 97 Activities of households as employers of domestic 
personnel 
970 
97 97 Activities of households as employers of domestic 
personnel 
9700 
98 T Undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities 
of private households for own use 
98 
98.1 98 Undifferentiated goods-producing activities of private 
households for own use 
981 
98.1 98.1 Undifferentiated goods-producing activities of private 
households for own use 
9810 
98.2 98 Undifferentiated service-producing activities of private 
households for own use 
982 
98.2 98.2 Undifferentiated service-producing activities of private 
households for own use 
9820 
U  ACTIVITIES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL 
ORGANISATIONS AND BODIES 
U 
99 U Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 99 
99 99 Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 990 





















2004 to 2013 average and cumulative unrecorded outflows from developing world. 
 
Table 18: Unrecorded Capital outflows per country (US$ Millions) 
 
Country 2007 2010 2013 Cumulative Average 
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of 0 0 0 1,331 133 
Albania 220 190 18 1,234 123 
Algeria 1,301 1,406 1,043 15,246 1,525 
Angola 1,641 0 55 3,850 385 
Antigua and Barbuda 4 0 0 49 5 
Argentina 5,391 5,265 17,171 76,540 7,654 
Armenia, Republic of 806 1,201 1,848 9,833 983 
Aruba 13,517 319 647 80,577 8,058 
Azerbaijan, Republic of 26,816 7,860 14,736 94,999 9,500 
Bahamas, The 1,622 2,197 2,368 17,727 1,773 
Bahrain, Kingdom of 1,677 0 123 7,907 791 
Bangladesh 4,098 5,409 9,666 55,877 5,588 
Barbados 66 86 67 1,138 114 
Belarus 8,325 7,911 11,284 88,197 8,820 
Belize 185 95 135 1,291 129 
Benin 0 343 81 1,493 149 
Bhutan 101 0 0 318 40 
Bolivia 103 809 2,273 6,267 627 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 67 0 0 198 20 
Botswana 1,687 1,230 1,242 13,680 1,368 
Brazil 16,430 30,770 28,185 226,667 22,667 




Bulgaria 4,641 681 1,998 24,768 2,477 
Burkina Faso 247 490 856 4,262 426 
Burundi 53 14 227 866 87 
Cabo Verde 43 27 48 431 43 
Cambodia 1,046 1,273 4,007 15,086 1,509 
Cameroon 1,121 622 291 7,523 752 
Central African Republic 1 34 0 162 16 
Chad 989 1,146 1,532 10,756 1,076 
Chile 4,394 5,895 9,725 54,995 5,500 
China, P.R.: Mainland 107,435 172,367 258,640 1,392,276 139,228 
Colombia 608 625 1,185 14,745 1,475 
Comoros 20 29 96 539 54 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 170 175 18 2,254 225 
Congo, Republic of 1,723 1,784 894 15,230 1,523 
Costa Rica 5,816 15,788 21,383 113,459 11,346 
Cote d'Ivoire 3,429 1,767 1,917 23,344 2,334 
Croatia 4,111 2,338 2,354 34,556 3,456 
Djibouti 385 486 413 3,745 375 
Dominica 0 4 0 17 2 
Dominican Republic 865 2,344 2,243 14,578 1,458 
Ecuador 1,523 3,818 1,948 25,966 2,597 
Egypt 4,817 2,145 3,619 39,827 3,983 
El Salvador 1,725 1,600 1,846 17,437 1,744 
Equatorial Guinea 947 2,851 4,455 21,750 2,175 
Eritrea 21 . . 115 38 
Ethiopia 1,491 5,618 3,371 25,835 2,583 
Fiji 239 270 166 2,748 275 
Gabon 0 382 0 3,140 314 




Georgia 1,566 1,227 1,190 14,945 1,495 
Ghana 37 721 659 4,013 401 
Grenada 54 59 89 544 54 
Guatemala 1,526 1,990 2,672 21,793 2,179 
Guinea 633 413 446 3,258 326 
Guinea-Bissau 193 68 19 620 62 
Guyana 226 579 318 2,847 285 
Haiti 95 61 512 1,299 130 
Honduras 4,787 4,761 5,579 46,935 4,694 
Hungary 2,593 5,510 7,193 57,062 5,706 
India 34,513 70,337 83,014 510,286 51,029 
Indonesia 18,354 14,646 14,633 180,710 18,071 
Iran, Islamic Republic of 15,173 3,247 0 64,223 6,422 
Iraq 3,660 21,115 15,994 105,005 10,501 
Jamaica 273 348 308 6,358 636 
Jordan 918 1,632 3,359 15,223 1,522 
Kazakhstan 20,794 11,236 24,529 167,401 16,740 
Kenya 258 0 255 829 83 
Kiribati 3 5 19 50 5 
Kosovo, Republic of 0 0 0 0 0 
Kuwait 5,116 0 4,508 28,471 2,847 
Kyrgyz Republic 476 150 0 1,010 101 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 930 478 1,584 6,638 664 
Lebanon 6,605 149 0 19,915 1,991 
Lesotho 420 294 255 3,409 341 
Liberia 1,905 560 547 9,659 966 
Libya 0 2,137 3,008 11,833 1,183 
Macedonia, FYR 597 459 235 5,162 516 




Malawi 442 766 824 6,496 650 
Malaysia 36,525 62,154 48,251 418,542 41,854 
Maldives 49 62 345 1,089 109 
Mali 187 945 800 4,688 469 
Mauritania 0 0 292 400 67 
Mauritius 462 719 891 6,093 609 
Mexico 46,443 67,450 77,583 528,439 52,844 
Moldova 855 784 1,007 9,079 908 
Mongolia 212 0 125 1,478 148 
Montenegro 380 0 0 2,566 257 
Morocco 4,126 3,493 3,934 41,015 4,102 
Mozambique 103 640 260 2,426 243 
Myanmar 336 2,132 0 6,840 684 
Namibia 1,610 1,673 1,264 13,924 1,392 
Nepal 544 1,521 0 5,674 567 
Nicaragua 2,552 2,870 4,846 30,273 3,027 
Niger 102 561 143 1,572 157 
Nigeria 19,335 19,376 26,735 178,040 17,804 
Oman 4,236 2,759 8,209 43,850 4,385 
Pakistan 0 729 529 1,917 192 
Panama 1,918 2,622 2,604 21,038 2,104 
Papua New Guinea 34 471 474 4,724 472 
Paraguay 2,461 2,653 4,116 37,501 3,750 
Peru 2,474 4,722 7,013 42,838 4,284 
Philippines 7,910 8,874 7,938 90,250 9,025 
Poland 3,876 13,503 16,793 90,017 9,002 
Qatar 2,814 5,719 5,005 47,129 4,713 
Romania 5,284 1,958 3,613 34,866 3,487 




Rwanda 177 430 1,039 3,589 359 
Samoa 144 129 149 1,454 145 
Sao Tome and Principe 10 10 31 178 18 
Saudi Arabia 1,032 2,830 6,938 28,766 2,877 
Senegal 693 588 1,029 8,034 803 
Serbia, Republic of 3,156 3,005 2,910 40,830 4,083 
Seychelles 0 107 0 458 46 
Sierra Leone 861 1,915 413 5,580 558 
Solomon Islands 136 157 167 1,369 137 
Somalia . . 0 0 0 
South Africa 27,292 24,613 17,421 209,219 20,922 
Sri Lanka 1,890 2,634 1,753 19,967 1,997 
St. Kitts and Nevis 7 26 0 53 5 
St. Lucia 0 0 23 121 12 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0 0 0 53 5 
Sudan 2,177 1,410 531 13,115 1,311 
Suriname 764 947 882 7,598 760 
Swaziland 1,364 394 295 5,817 582 
Syrian Arab Republic 1,255 2,008 10,642 47,667 4,767 
Tajikistan 337 0 0 934 93 
Tanzania 58 1,355 323 4,820 482 
Thailand 10,348 24,100 32,971 191,768 19,177 
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of 9 0 43 188 23 
Togo 2,883 1,173 1,479 22,293 2,229 
Tonga 9 48 0 169 17 
Trinidad and Tobago 2,728 3,382 6,449 36,663 3,666 
Tunisia 1,676 1,726 1,993 16,842 1,684 
Turkey 17,237 13,365 26,487 154,500 15,450 




Uganda 701 1,143 363 7,149 715 
Ukraine 7,175 13,843 13,911 116,762 11,676 
United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 0 0 
Uruguay 768 2,081 1,515 9,558 956 
Uzbekistan . . . . . 
Vanuatu 286 171 203 2,247 225 
Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana 
de 18,349 7,863 9,162 123,936 12,394 
Vietnam 5,473 8,358 17,837 92,935 9,293 
Yemen, Republic of 458 0 125 3,068 307 
Zambia 3,355 2,683 3,709 28,853 2,885 
Zimbabwe 97 0 0 2,763 276 
Sub-Saharan Africa 77,012 78,038 74,593 674,977 67,498 
Asia 236,485 381,729 481,988 3,048,278 304,828 
Developing Europe 190,551 221,845 250,437 1,998,870 199,887 
MENA+AP 57,426 52,992 70,266 556,496 55,650 
Western Hemisphere 137,672 172,027 212,846 1,569,299 156,930 
All Developing Countries 699,145 906,631 1,090,130 7,847,921 784,792 
Note: A "." indicates missing data. 

















Average of annual unrecorded outflows as percentage of GDP 2004-2013 
 









Costa Rica 35.60041 




The Bahamas 22.26158 
Paraguay 21.68803 
Suriname 21.30273 
Sierra Leone 21.21983 
Solomon Islands 20.65842 























The Gambia 10.97195 
Serbia 10.58853 
Comoros 10.57522 
CÃ´te dâ€™Ivoire 10.19038 
Ethiopia 9.62232 
Belize 9.57997 

































Papua New Guinea 5.22502 
Philippines 5.14496 


























































St. Lucia 1.04357 
Algeria 0.99926 
Central African Republic 0.91812 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.82242 
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.78042 
Eritrea 0.59582 
Colombia 0.59384 
Saudi Arabia 0.57504 
Angola 0.52314 
Timor-Leste 0.50898 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.42035 
Dominica 0.37524 
Kenya 0.23196 

















Table 20 Regional Distribution Table 








Austria Turkey Algeria  Libya  China Sri Lanka Syria Albania  Aruba  Argentina  
Belgium UK Angola  Madagascar  Mongolia Bangladesh Lebanon Belarus  Costa Rica  Bolivia  
Canada US Benin  Malawi  North 
Korea 
India Palestine Bosnia   Cuba  Brazil  
Denmark Australia Botswana  Mali  Hong Kong Afghanistan Jordan Bulgaria  Curaçao  Colombia  
France Finland Burkina 
Faso  
Mauritania  Taiwan Pakistan Iraq Croatia  Dominica  Ecuador  
Germany Japan Burundi  Mauritius  Brunei Bhutan Iran Cyprus  Dom. Rep. Guyana  
Greece New 
Zealand 
Cameroon  Morocco  Cambodia Nepal Kuwait Kosovo El Salvador  Paraguay  
Iceland Chile Cape Verde  Mozambique  Indonesia Maldives Qatar Latvia  Guatemala  Peru  
Italy Czech Rep. CAR  Namibia  Laos Tajikistan Saudi Ara. Lithuania  Haiti  Suriname  
Netherlands Estonia Chad  Niger  Malaysia Uzbekistan UAE Macedonia  Honduras  Uruguay  
Norway Hungary Comoros  Nigeria  Myanmar Kazakhstan Oman Moldova  Jamaica  Venezuela  
Portugal Poland Rep. Congo  Rwanda  Philippines Turkmenistan Yemen Montenegro  Martinique   
Spain Slovakia DRC  São Tomé  Singapore Kyrgyzstan  Romania  Mexico   
Sweden South Korea Côte d'Ivoire  Senegal  Thailand Georgia  Russia Montserrat   




 Slovenia Egypt  Sierra Leone  Vietnam Azerbaijan  Serbia  Panama  
  Eq. Guinea  Somalia     Ukraine  Trinidad  
  Eritrea  South Africa        
  Ethiopia  South Sudan        
  Gabon  Sudan        
  The Gambia  Swaziland        
  Ghana  Tanzania        
  Guinea  Togo        
  Guinea Bis. Tunisia        
  Kenya  Uganda        
  Lesotho  Zambia        









Table 21. List of countries by unrecorded capital outflows (Top 50) 
Extreme Capital 




Flight (31 – 50) 
China Kazakhstan Oman 
Russian  Turkey Peru 
Mexico Venezuela Morocco 
India Ukraine Serbia 
Malaysia Costa Rica Egypt 
Brazil Iraq Paraguay 
South Africa Azerbaijan Trinidad and Tobago 
Thailand Vietnam Romania 
Indonesia Philippines Nicaragua 
Nigeria Poland Zambia 
 Belarus Saudi Arabia 
 Aruba Kuwait 
 Argentina Ecuador 
 Iran Ethiopia 
 Hungary Bulgaria 




 Syria Guatemala 
 Qatar Equatorial Guinea 







Table 22 List of countries by unrecorded capital outflows (GDP %) 
GDP Above 10% GDP 5%-10% GDP 2%-5% GDP Below 2% 
Aruba Ethiopia Morocco Libya 
Liberia Sao Tome and Principe Jamaica Myanmar 
Togo Vietnam Burundi Argentina 
Vanuatu Oman Tonga Tajikistan 
Djibouti Panama Sri Lanka Iran 
Nicaragua El Salvador Hungary Tanzania 
Costa Rica Ukraine Nepal Ghana 
Brunei Darussalam Iraq Qatar Brazil 
Honduras Fiji Tunisia Yemen 
Samoa Guinea-Bissau Ecuador Congo - Kinshasa 
Azerbaijan Russian Federation Uganda Albania 
Paraguay Rwanda India Afghanistan 
Suriname Guinea Kiribati Mauritania 
Sierra Leone Montenegro Bolivia Algeria 
Solomon Islands Thailand Cameroon Central African Republic 
Equatorial Guinea Jordan Peru Eritrea 
Malaysia Mauritius Dominican Republic Colombia 
Lesotho Senegal Niger Saudi Arabia 
Belarus South Africa Zimbabwe Angola 
Swaziland Madagascar Indonesia Timor-Leste 
Trinidad and Tobago Lebanon Uruguay Dominica 
Moldova Croatia Cabo Verde Kenya 
Zambia Macedonia China Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Syria Nigeria Sudan Pakistan 
Malawi Guatemala Bhutan Turkmenistan 
Congo - Brazzaville Mali Benin  




Namibia Maldives Kuwait  
Guyana Venezuela Egypt  
Georgia Bangladesh Gabon  
Kazakhstan Papua New Guinea Mozambique  
Armenia Philippines Romania  
Botswana Burkina Faso Kyrgyzstan  
Laos Mexico Mongolia  
Chad  Haiti  
The Gambia    
Serbia    
Comoros    
Côte d'Ivoire    
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